

A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

ROBERT GOLDSMITH

WITH A SPECIAL INTRODUCTION
BY DR. A. LAWRENCE LOWELL

"THE time is past when the United States can live in seclusion from the rest of the world. For better or for worse, we are a member of the society of nations. We must now make choice between military preparedness on the scale followed by Europe and membership in a League of Nations which provides guaranties against sudden attack by any power. I believe that our people have the courage to face facts as they now are and to determine their policies unfettered by the traditions of a day to which, however we may long for it, we can never go back.

"The author of A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE has written a timely book. But he has done something better than that. On a serious subject he has written a book in popular vein that ought to be read by every man and woman who wants to see his country, in this crisis of civilization, choose the course that will make the world a better and a safer place for us and for our children's children."

—*The Hon. William Howard Taft, formerly President of the United States.*



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A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE



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WITH A SPECIAL INTRODUCTION BY
PRESIDENT A. LAWRENCE LOWELL

"And therefore thoughte they do daylie practise and exercise themselves in the discipline of warre, and not onelie the men, but also the women upon certen appointed daies, lest they should be to seke in the feate of armes, if nede should require, yet they never go to battell, but either in the defence of their owne countrey, or to drive out of their frendes lande the enemies that have invaded it, or by their power to deliver from the yocke and bondage of tirannye some people, that be therewith oppressed. Which thing they do of meere pitie and compassion."

— SIR THOMAS MORE.

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TO MY WIFE

EDITH DARROW GOLDSMITH

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SPECIAL INTRODUCTION

By

DR. A. LAWRENCE LOWELL

PRESIDENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION BY PRESIDENT LOWELL

IF a quiet country town is visited by a desperado, or if a sudden fit of lawlessness breaks out, so that life and property are no longer safe, and there is no police force to cope with the situation, the normal American procedure is the formation of a vigilance committee. The indifferent are stirred to action, and even men who abhor violence and bloodshed are moved to arm themselves, until all good citizens join in force to support the committee, maintain order, and prevent breaches of the public peace.

The present war; with its millions of young men killed; millions more maimed for life; with the suffering of a still larger number of civilians, men, women and children; with the long stretches of land devastated as no land ever was before; with the ferocity and the cold cruelty which the contest has at times called forth; has set many men thinking earnestly and with a purpose. Advocates of peace, who had relied on the slow process of per-

suasion and reason, have felt the need of more vigorous and speedy methods of procedure; while people who had not taken the fear of war seriously have been aroused to the danger and the results. They have seen that, with the control over the forces of nature in these later days, the destructiveness of war is greater even than had been imagined; and that, with the organization of all the resources of nations for the conflict, the suffering tends to be more widespread, the efforts of whole peoples more intense, and the ruthlessness of the struggle more pronounced.

Men are feeling that it is not enough to rely upon the gradual effects of a higher morality, and enlarged sympathy and better mutual understanding among the nations; but that when this war comes to an end something must be done at once to prevent such another holocaust of civilisation. The sight of peoples who have reached the highest point of development yet known destroying one another, of mankind destroying itself, would be absurd if it were not tragic. Human society has a right to protect itself, by compelling, if need be, a nation to refrain from resorting to arms, and setting the earth afire, before its grievance has been brought before the bar of the world; and perhaps after-

wards if its claim is manifestly extortionate and unjust.

With this conviction the League to Enforce Peace was organised in our country, and the plan has met with the approval of the highest officers of state in the leading countries of the world. The programme was drawn with a view to the minimum that would obtain the object of restraining war, and no attempt was made to lay down details or provide methods of procedure which must be determined by the representatives of the nations concerned when they meet for conference. The important thing for an unofficial body is to advocate the principle, not to draft a treaty.

This book has been written with that object. The author, as the reader will perceive, is an idealist who knows well the value of approaching an ideal by actual steps forward, rather than by dreams of a distant future based upon a radical change in human nature. He discusses how the existing forces have failed to prevent war, and why the principle of compulsory international power is necessary and appropriate for the purpose. He looks at the subject from a somewhat novel standpoint, and makes many interesting observations in the course of his argument. All people who feel a real desire

to free mankind from war, who believe that civilisation is incomplete so long as wars like the present ravage the earth, will find themselves well repaid in reading this book.

PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR

THERE is little doubt that war as an institution will be hard put to it to find any defenders after this most stupendous and most sanguinary of all wars has run its dreadful course to the bitter end. We are no longer uncertain as to the attitude of the majority of men and women the world over concerning

Yon hideous, grinning thing that stalks
Hidden in music, like a queen
That in a garden of glory walks.

“War,” writes Mr. Britling in a really remarkable letter to the father of his son’s German tutor, “is a curtain of dense black fabric across all the hopes and kindliness of mankind. . . . Massacres of boys! That indeed is the essence of modern war. The killing off of the young. It is the destruction of the human inheritance; it is the spending of all the live material of the future upon present-day hate and greed.”¹ The German Crown Prince asks of his interviewer, “Have you had a chance to see enough of this dreadful business?”

¹ H. G. Wells: *Mr. Britling Sees it Through*.

Does your heart already ache? What a pity, what a pity it is! All this terrible extinction of human life, blasting of the hope and expectancy of youth, the mortgaging of our energies and resources far into the future!"¹

Now the only thing at all exceptional about these striking passages is the frankness of their expression. They do but voice the sentiment of all sorts and conditions of people. This reaction of disgust and horror and chagrin and mortification is to-day well-nigh universal and is the all-sufficient answer to the laboured arguments in defence of war. Whenever and wherever intelligent people get together to talk things over, a sense of shame as well as sorrow is voiced.

This was not always so. Far from it. The time was when people looked upon war as the routine business of a considerable part of the population. The life-work of many men was killing and they tried to do their work as well as they knew how. If hearts were broken and little children starved to death, why that was all in the day's work. Valiant men had no time to bother about sentimental matters. The heavy heel of war trampled all that was

¹ Interview with Wm. Bayard Hale in *New York American*, quoted in *Current History* for November, 1916.

beautiful into the bloody mire. Of course, even in those early times, a few there were who uttered their feeble protests against the practice of fighting, but nobody paid any attention to them. We should not permit ourselves to forget that war was once the normal condition of society. Peace was the exception. It has been carefully computed that there have been but 227 years of peace, when no states or nations were at war, in the 3,412 years of recorded history since 1496 B.C. "We have done much," said Mr. Joseph H. Choate, at the Second Hague Conference on August 1, 1907, "to regulate war, but very little to prevent it. Let us unite on this great pacific measure [a permanent court of arbitral justice] and satisfy the world that this second conference really intends that hereafter *peace, and not war, shall be the normal condition of civilised nations.*"¹ To-day a world war is an incident—however terrible an incident. It is an interruption of the normal industrial life of the nation.

Whether the moral or the economic or the intellectual argument against war is the most convincing is an academic question which need not now detain us. Of this, however, we may be quite sure,

¹ The italics are ours.

— the growing sense of the relative futility of all wars and the utter folly of most wars is doing more than anything else to set the majority of men against it. What is the use of it all, is the question most frequently asked by thinking people the world over. Why lay waste the world, why fill the fields and seas with unmarked graves, why break the hearts of mothers and wives and little children, if at the end we are to resume the *status quo ante*? There is little doubt that if a *plébiscite* were possible, if a referendum could be taken, we should find that an overwhelming vote would be cast against war. There would be a “landslide” in favour not of peace at any price, to be sure, but of peace if possible. No arguments are needed at this late day to convince people of either the wrong of war, or the waste of war, or the folly of war. Its obscenity, burden, and stupidity are just about axiomatic. It has ceased to be a problem of evangelism, and has become a problem of statesmanship. We all know about the awfulness and the insanity of war; what we want to know now is, what must we do to be saved? Not, what must we think? nor, what must we feel? nor, what must we dream? but, what must we do? We may not be ready, however willing, to believe that this is the

war that will end all wars, and yet there are on every hand indications that a portentous change is impending. At the imperious command of the Lord of History, it may be that now, at last, in the fulness of time, a palsied world will stretch forth its hand and perform the miracle of endeavour.

But there is nothing to be gained by deluding ourselves with vain hopes. Wars will follow wars, as night follows day, if, when this war is over, a treaty is signed, the terms of which are not radically different from the terms of every other treaty of peace that has ever been made. Obviously, what is wanted is something new under the sun — a new kind of peace, that shall be in the first place generous, in the second place genuine, and in the third place guaranteed. There must be either international guarantees of national security — or chaos.

Perhaps it may as well be acknowledged at once that no serious attempt has as yet been made to perpetuate peace. There has been no lack of grandiose “schemes” and magnificent “plans,” and a few that were reasonable and practical though born into the world too soon. But the sword of Damocles still dangles from its thread. We have had the peace that was predaceous and rancorous; the peace that left wounded pride and

ravished sovereignty to brood and fester and corrupt the world. We have had the peace that was a mere makeshift, a truce, an armistice, a respite,—to give battling nations an opportunity to get their second wind, to recoup their lost fortunes, to recuperate their exhausted vitality and to forge new and more devilish weapons. But we have not yet genuinely laboured, as practical statesmen, to make peace permanent, or even, for that matter, to reduce the probability of war, by establishing the peace of justice and liberty and humanity.

Now, it may be that there is no such thing as a discoverable principle of international government that will certainly preserve the peace of the world. Perhaps the best machinery will break down under the strain. But it is too soon to despond. The simple truth is, as has been said but will bear repeating, that up to the present — aside from the fervent preaching of the gospel of peace and brotherhood — no genuine, concerted, determined action has as yet been taken by the nations of the world to fulfil the age-old promise of peace. The trouble has been that the opposition to war has been neither co-ordinated nor organised, nor has it had a clear intellectual policy or a definite

programme of action. The sentiment against war has too often been dissipated in rhapsodic visions of Utopia.

Perhaps now at last, at "the end of the ages," we are really ready for the great undertaking, not as a matter of political and moral idealism, but of social efficiency and practical statesmanship. Perhaps, now, at length, after centuries of high hopes and vague dreams, we are slept-out and willing to wake-up and wrestle with the problem. What is wanted is a mutual agreement, a general treaty creating a league of the civilised nations of the world and pledging them, not to disarm *sine die*, but to employ their united strength to compel any recalcitrant nation-member to submit its dispute to an international court of arbitration or council of conciliation for a hearing before precipitating overt hostilities.

To accomplish this purpose, numerous plans and programmes have been devised. Among them all the most practical appears to be that put forth by the League to Enforce Peace. And what is the League to Enforce Peace and what does it propose? On June 17, 1915, on the call of one hundred and twenty of the most influential and repre-

sentative men from all sections of the country about four hundred met in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, and organised a League whose reason-for-existence should be to adopt a programme of action to follow the present war which would look towards the possible prevention of future wars. The announcement which introduces the Proposals advocated says, "We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following." Four proposals were adopted at the organisation meeting, as follows:

First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

Second: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the

signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.¹

Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article One.

Briefly, it is proposed that a league of nations, including the United States, should be created at the end of the present war. Such a league would not constitute an "entangling alliance," wherein one group of nations combine to protect one another against an opposing group similarly united. An invitation to join the league would be extended to all civilised and progressive nations. A general treaty would be signed by the terms of which the member-nations would mutually agree to submit

¹ The following interpretation of Article 3 has been authorised by the Executive Committee:

"The signatory powers shall jointly employ diplomatic and economic pressure against any one of their number that threatens war against a fellow signatory without having first submitted its dispute for international inquiry, conciliation, arbitration or judicial hearing, and awaited a conclusion, or without having in good faith offered so to submit it. They shall follow this forthwith by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be dealt with as provided in the foregoing."

for public hearing any and all disputes whatever which might arise among them.

To carry out the programme it would become necessary to set up two international tribunals: A Judicial Court for the purpose of hearing and deciding those questions that can be determined by the established and accepted rules of international law; and a Council of Conciliation for the purpose of composing, by compromise, all other questions which come up that, unless settled, would be likely to lead to war. The Court, after preliminary inquiry, would determine before which tribunal a given case would go.

In the event of any member-nation threatening war against any other member-nation, before first submitting its quarrel for public review and report, all the other nations who are members of the League would immediately join in bringing to bear both diplomatic and economic pressure to estop the would-be aggressor. If, after this joint protest, it persisted with overt acts of hostility and actually commenced war, then the other member-nations, with their combined military and naval forces, would come to the defence of the one attacked, or perhaps, more strictly speaking, would discipline the aggressor. This might require that each nation

would have to pledge itself to provide and maintain its fair quota of the necessary military forces; but, on the other hand, it is confidently expected that the acceptance and operation of the programme would result in the gradual reduction of armaments,—if indeed a specific agreement to reduce armaments were not made one of the essential terms treaty creating the league of nations.

The forces of the League would be used for one purpose only: to compel submission of matters in dispute to a Court of Inquiry before any war was begun or persisted in by any member; they would not be employed to execute the judgments of the court or to enforce the unwilling acceptance of awards. The appeal to arms would still remain available to the several nations as a last resort. It is believed that the prolonged postponement, plus the public discussion, plus the justice of the award, would all tend to ensure its acceptance in the majority of cases.

The programme begins with a proposal which is substantially the same as the essential provision in the Bryan arbitration treaties contracted between the United States and some thirty nations, viz., to submit all questions for a public hearing and to delay hostilities for a year or more. The pro-

gramme also makes provision for holding international conferences, from time to time, similar to those held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, for the purpose of broadening and clarifying the rules of international law, which shall by mutual agreement, govern in the decisions of the International Court. To these provisions the programme adds what the lawyers call a "sanction,"—to compel and enforce the main provision. And it is this sanction which really constitutes the distinctive mark of the programme.

Needless to say, it matters nothing, or less than nothing, whether such an understanding be called a league to enforce peace, a league to insure peace, or, a combination in restraint of war; or, indeed, for that matter, a federation of the world, so long as its plain purpose is to preserve peace with justice.

This book is not primarily addressed to the expert in international affairs—to the scholar in diplomacy—but to the general reader. For this reason the author has thought it desirable to devote a considerable amount of space to a preliminary study, in the earlier chapters, of certain factors and forces in modern life, and has not thought it expedient, in this place, to elaborately

discuss the details of such practical problems of international politics as the treatment of backward nations, the freedom of the seas, and so forth.

The author has had also to keep in mind the fact that the volume is to be made available for use as a study book in churches and clubs through the use of a special manual of instructions for teachers and group leaders now in course of preparation. This is the real reason why Part I treats so extensively of the several forces that failed to prevent the war — pacifism, the churches, the workers, the women, business, and diplomacy. But let us make no mistake. If these failed to prevent the war it was not wholly because they were indifferent or incompetent. The Israelites were expected to make bricks without straw and we have demanded more than we had any right to expect when we asked that sentiment perform the labours of organisation. The only alternative to international anarchy is international government,— however tentative or imperfect.

The will to peace has not been lacking, but the machinery for making that will effective has been lacking. It is precisely because certain influences and institutions have not been sufficient that we are

ready to turn eagerly to such practical programmes to prevent war as present themselves. This is the subject of Part II of this book.

Nor will it do for us to overlook the very serious objection to a blind dependence upon mere mechanical organisation, however perfect. Wheels within wheels are absolutely essential for the smooth-running of international relations; but "the spirit of the living creature in the wheels" is infinitely more important. In other words it is rightly contended that so long as militarism sits in the seats of the mighty, with a sword for a sceptre, we shall continue to have wars till time shall be no more. This is the crux of the situation. There is no more important problem before the world to-day than the complete discrediting of the military caste, the utter destruction of militarism. Whether temporary peace be attained with or without victory, nothing is more certain than that permanent peace can never come until modernity has been victorious over mediævalism, until militarism has been crushed beyond recovery. This is the subject of Part III of this book.

FOREWORD

I WISH to express my sincere gratitude to several friends who have generously given of their time to read this book in manuscript. Some have made valuable suggestions which I have not infrequently adopted. I wish especially to thank Mr. William H. Short, Prof. John Bates Clark, Dr. Talcott Williams, Mr. Walter Lippmann, Prof. Walter Yale Durand, Mr. Glenn Frank, Mr. Frederick Harris, Mr. R. R. Lutz, Dr. Hugh Black and Dr. Thomas Blaisdell. The excellent bibliographies at the end of the book were prepared and contributed by my wife. In the preparation of the manuscript for the printer I have been ably assisted by Florence Sexauer. Also I want to acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. Thomas E. Green for suggesting the title for Part I.

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PART I

THE FORCES THAT FAILED

IN THE PALACE OF NIGHT

In his allegorical play, THE BLUE BIRD, Maurice Maeterlinck, the Belgian poet, describes the journey of Tyltyl and Mytyl in their quest for happiness. After visiting the Land of Memory they go to the Palace of Night — the night of the dark ages of superstition and ignorance. In their fruitless search they open the doors to the rooms where ghosts, diseases, and other things are kept. At length they stand before the door behind which the Wars are kept. The Queen warns the children that "they are more terrible than ever. . . . Heaven knows what would happen if one of them escaped." The boy, however, opens the door on a little gap and as he does so one huge and awful War pokes its paw through and another its ugly head. "Quick! Quick!" shouts Tyltyl. "Push with all your might. . . . They are coming! They are breaking down the door!" The boy and girl (Man and Woman) and all the other actors push until they slam the door in the faces of the brutal Wars. Then the children pass on in their search for the blue-bird that means happiness.

But this is only drama and poetry and fiction. What really happened, of course, was very different. On June 30, 1914, Princeps (not Tyltyl) opened the door to the room where the Wars were kept. When he shot the Austrian Archduke at Serajevo the door was opened on a crack. Then Austria sent her demands to Serbia and the door was opened wider. A month later Russian forces were mobilised and Germany sent her ultimatum which flung the door wide open. The beasts rushed towards the door which everybody, when it was too late, tried to slam shut. The workers of the world and the women of the world put their shoulders to the door. Diplomacy, statesmanship, religion and everything that we denominate under the word civilisation hurried to put their shoulders to the door to prevent the Wars from coming out. But it was soon evident that the organised forces of barbarism were more powerful than the disorganised forces of civilisation. The Wars broke their chains and rushed across the threshold, tearing from its hinges the massive door, which fell upon the broken bodies of humanity.

A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

CHAPTER I

THE TROUBLE WITH PACIFISM

No sooner had the war broken out than a cry of derision went up from every quarter charging that the whole movement towards peace had come to naught — that pacifism was a delusion and a snare. Wreaths of hypocritical praise were placed on the brows of prophets who dreamed of a distant day of peace. Insincere encomiums were pronounced upon Isaiah and Micah, upon Kant and Penn, but, as soon as one's back was turned, these prophets were ridiculed as having been the victims of vagrant visions. Pacifists were told to wake up and look about them upon whole nations "wading in slaughter." They were reminded of the deserted Peace Palace at The Hague, and of treaties held as lightly as a libertine holds his marriage vows. The fact was noted that the country which had pro-

duced the author of *Eternal Peace* was one of the prime movers in the war, while the country whose Czar had assembled the First Hague Convention was another major belligerent. It was pointed out that a century of propaganda, urging universal peace, had been like casting pearls before swine. Without consulting any of the "professional pacifists" or any of the institutions, such as the church, that would be most likely to counsel restraint, recourse was had to arms. Of course, not everybody argued in this fashion, but certainly all the disciples of militarism and all the apostles of force did. They cynically inferred that pacifism was a pretty but innocuous sentiment and that so long as there were no vital issues to be determined there could surely be no great harm in subscribing to the sentiment. And so, with a sneer, "practical people" wished the pacifist God speed on his silly errand.

Two things may be said in reply. The first is that there were some pacifists who were not surprised by the outbreak of the war. Dr. Alfred Fried,¹ for one, had said again and again that such a war as this was certain to come unless the

¹ See his *The Restoration of Europe*, Ch. VII, particularly pp. 149 and 150.

programme of prevention he advocated was adopted. That is why he and others laboured, in season and out of season, not merely to spread the sentiments of peace but to construct the machinery that might make the preservation of peace possible. They went ahead and built their Peace Palaces and held their Hague Conventions and their International Congresses. They spared no efforts to organise the opinion of the world and to persuade the most influential people in the leading nations to build on more substantial foundations than shifting sand. The rain descended, the floods came, and the winds blew and beat upon that house till it fell. Now, they maintain, and not without some justification, that the collapse came precisely because the structure of society was not based on the solid rock of mutual goodwill plus the machinery they wanted to set up. It is not reasonable to charge that international law failed, inasmuch as the aggressor nation gave international law no chance either to succeed or fail. It is confusing to say that arbitration failed, inasmuch as the Central Powers refused to try arbitration, even when it was suggested by Serbia in reply to Austria's demands.¹ It is not accurate to say

¹ " If the Imperial and Royal Government [Austria-Hungary]

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that conciliation failed, inasmuch as the offers of a conference for the purpose of coming to an understanding, made by Sir Edward Grey in his telegram to the British Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 26, 1914,¹ and by the Czar of Russia in the *communiqué* issued on August 2, 1914, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs,² were rejected by Germany.³ The plain truth is that the machinery for

are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, . . . by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague.”—Note of July 25, 1914.

¹ “Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestions to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg could be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.”—The British White Paper, No. 36.

² “The Imperial Government declared that Russia was ready to continue the *pourparlers* towards a pacific solution of the conflict, either by means of direct negotiations with the Cabinet of Vienna, or, following the proposal of Great Britain, by means of a conference of the four great Powers not directly interested, namely, England, France, Germany, and Italy.”—The Russian Orange Book, No. 77.

³ On July 27 Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that the British proposal had been rejected by the Foreign Minister, who “maintained that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable.”—The British White Paper, No. 43.

On July 28 Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey:

“Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Serbian note; that

mobilising peace sentiment and for adjusting just such differences as those which arose in July, 1914, was rather clumsy and inadequate and could not be made to operate as rapidly as the machinery of war, particularly as one party to the controversy was bent on having war.

The other thing that may be said in answer to the charge that pacifism has failed is that a certain type of pacifism, and what is usually meant by "pacifism" has failed. Its failure, however, clears the ground and makes room for saner and more practical efforts. There is no denying the fact that a good deal of pacifist sentiment was hardly distinguishable from mild-mannered sentimentality. The disciples of this school were unquestionably sincere enough and perhaps were rigorously logical, but they refused to look the facts of life in the face and to deal with men and nations as they actually are. They were naïve. Their plans were visionary and their schemes chimerical. "The peace movement," writes Ellen Key in her most

war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe."—The British White Paper, No. 62.

recent book,¹ "that has only appealed to the emotions has never put the axe to the root of the problem. . . . So long as it was only a proclamation of Christian humanitarianism, it never built on a foundation of reality." These pacifists too often thought of countries and statesmen in the abstract, gave free rein to their imaginations, and dreamed of a day when blessed peace would cover the earth as the waters cover the sea. Their ignorance of *Realpolitik* was both profound and comprehensive. They evidenced but little genius for practicality, and dogmatically refused to compromise. Like Brand in Ibsen's drama, they could have "all or nothing," and because they could not have all, they were perforce obliged to take nothing, or, what is infinitely worse — war. Maybe the time will come, in the far future, when human nature will not merely acknowledge the wrong and waste and folly of war, but will go ahead and actually forge its swords into ploughshares, remodel its ships into schools and transform its arsenals into factories that produce the goods the people need. But that time has not yet come and we shall gain nothing but disappointment by deluding ourselves with fan-

¹ *War, Peace, and the Future*, pp. 122, 123.

tastic visions. It can hardly help to speculate on when, if ever, this desired day will dawn.

Because pacifism has failed in its endeavour to prevent war, it must now, willingly or involuntarily, make way for statesmanship, for a new kind of statesmanship. The pressing task now is to make statesmen out of pacifists and pacifists out of statesmen. We shall have to quit gazing into the heavens and turn our attention to the actual problems that confront men and nations in a real world. We shall have to lay aside every weight of vain visioning and run with patience the long race. We shall have to substitute willing for wishing and cultivate a talent for details. We shall have to organise the world for peace and not for war. We must be ready to reckon with the facts as they are, and with human nature as it is. It will probably be conceded without discussion that this particular kind of "pacifism," this new statesmanship, has not yet had a try-out. Whether or not it can succeed in preventing war is still unsettled and uncertain. We shall know more about that a decade or a century hence.

CHAPTER II

DO CHRISTIANS WANT WAR?

A GREAT many people contend that this war has demonstrated the futility of Christianity, the impotence of all organised religion. Whichever way we turn some one is ready to remind us that if Christianity stands for anything at all it stands for peace on earth, good will to men. We are not permitted to forget for an hour that the Gospel of Christ, whatever else it may be, is an evangel of peace; that the message of Jesus was a challenge to a warring world. The force of love and righteousness, it is explained, came into the world to displace the force of Roman arms. Furthermore, it is pointed out that this Gospel has now been preached to the uttermost parts of the world, that every European nation is nominally Christian, and that the Church numbers its adherents by the millions—more than twenty-four million Protestants and more than thirteen million Roman Catholics. And yet when war threatened, the whole structure went to pieces like a frame house in San Francisco.

That Christianity has failed has been whispered among churchmen in their cloistered retreats, and proclaimed from the housetops by the enemies of the Church. It is one of those half-truths that are more dangerous than falsehoods. The ready reply to the accusation is that Christianity has not failed because Christianity has never been tried. As well say, as some do, that democracy has never been tried. Of course both have been tried — after a fashion. Those who say that Christianity failed to prevent this world war speak the unvarnished and undeniable truth. The Christianity that has been tried has certainly failed. And the fact of the war is the reproach of Christianity. But the particular kind of Christianity that has been weighed in the balance and found wanting is nominal and formal and mystic Christianity: theological, ecclesiastical and sacerdotal Christianity. Some other kind of Christianity will have to be tried.

The old kind of Christianity could not withstand the shock of the earthquake. It did not succeed in fireproofing the world against the flames of war. When certain rulers and statesmen were determined to have war they brushed aside all the compunctions of Christian conscience. Apparently they were not only not bothered by their own pri-

vate consciences, but were equally indifferent to the moral judgments of mankind. It is true that they have since spared no efforts to win the goodwill of the neutral world. When the tornado of war struck a tranquil world it swept away the moral and social teachings of Jesus. At any rate it did so far as their political application was concerned. Was this because there is bound up in Christianity no compelling power to prevent war? Was it not rather the perfect demonstration that, as nations, we have been pretending to worship a God whom we despise, to believe a Prophet whom we ignore, and to be stirred by motives which really do not impel us? Of course, if what we mean by the failure of Christianity is that the appeal of Jesus to his own contemporaries that they substitute a vital religion for a formal religion, a religion of deed for a religion of creed, a practical religion for a doctrinal religion, has failed of acceptance by modern society, why then, yes, in that sense, Christianity has failed. The war itself is convincing proof of that fact. The formal Christianity of ritual and dogma has failed as it was bound to fail.

We are swiftly coming to realise that for all too many years and centuries we have been taught, and have not repudiated the teaching, that this world is

a ship that has sprung a leak and is rapidly sinking, and that our wisest course is to get onto a raft of personal salvation and make sure of our individual escape. But the conviction is growing that we have emphasised the importance of personal salvation to the neglect of the redemption of society — a contravention of the simple teachings of Jesus. No attempt is made to deny that religion is, in a very profound sense, a personal matter — the establishment and maintenance of right relations between the individual and his Maker; but it is firmly believed by many that to stress this syllable of personal salvation in the word Christianity and to slur over the syllable which has to do with its social implications is to make religion esoteric and morbid. It may be that this explanation of why Christianity, when the crisis of the centuries came, was not effective may be the true explanation. Perhaps it is, as claimed, because the majority of preachers have for generations concentrated upon the spiritual value of religion and have slighted its social significance that the churches have been so comparatively impotent in business, industry, politics and diplomacy. Has the time not come, at last, to shift the accent?

A further explanation sometimes offered for the

failure of the churches to prevent the coming of the war is that religious teachers have taken our minds off this present world and have put them on another — distant in time and place. They have exhorted us patiently to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune here, and have confidently assured us that compensation would come hereafter. It must be perfectly obvious that we cannot make the present world better by riveting our attention on a future world. As long as religion turns men's minds away from the pressing problems of the present and spends its force on vagrant dreams of future bliss it will fail to redeem this world from crime and misery and greed and war. While there are still many thousands of preachers and teachers who specialise in other-worldliness, it is a fortunate fact that most modern ministers at least divide their time between eschatology and sociology. Christianity must come to grips with all the practical problems of this life; it must take a real interest in searching for an answer to the Immigrant Question, to the Liquor Question, to the Labour Question.

Still another explanation given for the comparative inefficiency of the Church in relation to the practical problems of social and political life is the

wastage of its energy through meaningless competition. There are in America no less than one hundred and sixty-four different denominations and sects, most of them differing in little more than name. One of the most hopeful signs of the times is the movement towards Christian co-operation through the old Evangelical Alliance and the present Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.¹ If the churches could and would speak with one voice and in no uncertain tones proclaim their determined protest against war, they would be heard above the shouting and the tumult of conflict.

These truths have been burned into us by the fires of war. Probably now the simplest way out would be for us all to acknowledge, without the piling up of apologetic words, that the kind of Christianity that has been most commonly practised is impotent to save society. Why not make up our minds once for all as to whether or not we really want to make this world a fitter habitat for humanity? And if that is what we want we shall have to transfer our thoughts and affections from a future world to a present world, from a distant world to a world in which we live and move and have our being. It

¹ For an excellent review of the work of the Federal Council see an Article by Dr. Frederick Lynch in the *Independent* for December 4, 1916.

may require no little display of moral courage, but perhaps now is as good a time as any for us to quit our rigmarole of dogmatism and ritualism and get down to the actual job of "saving the world." When the religion of Jesus shall come to mean the religion of justice in all human relations — between man and woman, between capital and labour, between citizen and alien, between nation and nation, and between race and race — we shall be very near to the beginning of the end of war. Such a revival of religion would be worth more to the world than a hundred calculated campaigns of clap-trap. There ought to blow over the Church to-day some Pentecostal wind that would stir its dormant energies. What else, unless this, does the word enthusiasm mean,— the breath of God blown on the smouldering embers of the heart until it be kindled into a living flame? It may be well to recall that, paradoxical as it may seem, this war has deepened doubt at the same time that it has inspired faith.¹ Pessimism and unbelief have come up like the black-damp of a coal mine and have choked what faith we had. It has been hard to answer the questions of the sceptics. War makes for a return to ma-

¹ See Article on "War and Religion," by the Rev. Sidney M. Berry, Minister of Carr's Lane Church, Birmingham, England, in *Current History* for November, 1916.

terialism and a seeming dependence upon brute physical forces; and yet, just because so many millions of men are daily on the verge of death, religious devotion and a profound sense of dependence upon some Power not ourselves, mightier than the powers that be, is quickened and strengthened.

Nor is this all. Friends of progress have always put much confidence in the restraining influences of culture and enlightenment. Education has long been esteemed one of the most potent factors in human life, and the school has been valued as one of the greatest institutions making for advance. Many of us had almost come to believe that ignorance and barbarism were practically synonymous. We thought that the hope of the world lay in dispelling ignorance, with its accompanying train of superstition, intolerance, savagery and cruelty. When a great European war was predicted many doubted, saying that modern education would tend to inhibit war, and that men who had submitted themselves to the refining processes of culture could not let themselves go with the old abandon of the savage. If education has failed at the crucial test it should be made sun-clear that what has failed is not education, but mis-education and partial education. We have gone on mumbling the

phrases of a scholastic learning that has had little or no vital relation to the real world. We have trained men's heads without training their hearts and wills, and then have wondered why our education has not been successful in preventing war.

Revolutionary changes are certain to follow in the wake of this war — many of them changes of an unprecedented character. Hardly anything will continue to be as it has been in the past. There will be reformations in every department of human life. And not the least of these will take place in the field of education. The school will cease to be thought of as a place where scholars may retire from the real world to contemplate the problems of life, and will become a vital factor in the transformation of society. We shall have to surrender the notion that education is the process of filling an empty skull with the accumulated knowledge of past ages and conceive of it rather as a process of training human faculties — the memory, the judgment, the will, and the conscience. Education must be moral as well as mental, volitional as well as intellectual.

To the Church and the School, as forces that create and mould public opinion and sentiment, must be added the Press. Modern newspapers

wield a power second only to the autocratic power of Old World States. They are able immeasurably to advance the cause of civilisation; they are capable of doing an immense amount of mischief. It is hard to overestimate the potential influence of a free press, for good and for evil.

It is platitudinous to speak of the tremendous force of public opinion. "There can be no doubt whatever," wrote Havelock Ellis more than a year before the present war broke out,¹ "that during recent years, and especially in the more democratic countries, an international consensus of public opinion has gradually grown up, making itself the voice, like a Greek chorus, of an abstract justice. . . . A popular international voice generously pronouncing itself in favour of justice, and resonantly condemning any government which clashes against justice, is now a factor of the international situation. It is, moreover, tending to become a factor having a certain influence on affairs." That there is a latent power in the will of the world which, when aroused and organised, can accomplish miracles is not to be denied. And that is why so much confidence had been placed in the power of public opinion, in common conscience, to thwart the de-

¹ *The Task of Social Hygiene.*

signs of selfish politicians and financiers. "We had hoped"—like the disciples on the road to Emmaus—that popular sentiment, as inspired and cultivated by the churches, the schools and the newspapers, would make a wholesale war in this enlightened age impossible.

The three familiar arguments against war—the horror of war, the waste of war, and the folly of war—were unanswerable. Especially was it true that no reply could be made to the moral argument. The shame and crime of war we knew to be axiomatic. Surely, we said, nobody needs to be convinced to-day that war is essentially and fundamentally wrong. Men who held no extreme doctrines of non-resistance maintained not that all wars are wrong, but that all war, as such, is wrong. And there is a difference, a vital difference, that is not unlike that between man-slaughter and justifiable homicide. It was held that a war fought to rid the world of a condition worse than war itself is right, but that all other wars are wrong. The justification of war is its justice. The law that is written on the human heart is the Moral Law, and that cannot be abrogated by a declaration of war.

This mental and moral aversion—not to speak of a natural revulsion, detestation, abhorrence—

it had been hoped would prevent war. Still, in spite of everything, the war came. But what of the future? In times past it was possible wholly to ignore the world's sad voice of discontent. It will not much longer be possible to continue indifferent. The latent power of public opinion is not going to remain latent. Its pressure can already be felt. If any proof of this were needed, it could readily be found in the way that all the belligerents have sought the good will of the neutral world.

It has already been suggested that the minds of men are made up on this subject of war and peace. There is no mistake about this as a fact. Nor is it any snap judgment. They have taken nearly four thousand years to come to a decision, and that decision is, with scarcely a dissenting voice, that war, particularly as waged under modern conditions, is not only incredibly horrible but also incalculably expensive. This war has demonstrated beyond doubt that, whatever the results, direct or indirect, they are certain to be entirely incommensurate with the cost in treasure and suffering.

CHAPTER III

WHERE WERE THE WORKERS?

NOR are these the only forces that have failed. Many had counted on the workers to preserve the peace of the world. We were assured that in these latter days the labourers of one country had much more in common with the labourers of another country than they had with other groups in their own land. Among the socialists a group had grown up who called themselves Internationalists, and it was argued that nothing could possibly induce them to take up arms against their brother workers in other lands. Class-consciousness was esteemed more powerful than nation-consciousness, and it was freely claimed that a new sentiment of solidarity and humanity had arrived to take the place of the old sentiment of nationality and patriotism. Perhaps the logic of history was on the side of those who thus reasoned, but here, as so often happens, abstract logic broke down in the presence of concrete life. Inspired and urged by sentiments that have a very deep rootage in the human spirit, these

men, with or without compulsion, hastened to answer their country's call to arms,—to rally round the flag.¹

But it is not enough to say that the workers failed to prevent the war. In all probability we had no right to think for a moment that they would succeed. Doubtless we took their enthusiastic promises too seriously. We ought to inquire why they failed. There are three answers. The first we have already suggested. It is that there was a miscalculation as to the potency of the appeal to patriotic and nationalistic sentiment. The second reply is that the workers were not organised internationally, except on paper, and therefore could act as a unit only with great difficulty. The third reason is that within their own country they had only a modicum of political power,—at any rate in reference to foreign affairs. The power to proclaim or to prevent war, to precipitate or to postpone war, was altogether beyond their control. All they could do was raise their individual voices of protest; they could not back up their voices with their votes in any effectual way. It is therefore hardly just to say that the workers failed to prevent this war. It is true enough that they did not prevent

¹ See Chapter XVI, "The Frontiers of Friendship."

the war, but that is only an indication of their political weakness. If the peace of the world is ever to be preserved the political power of the workers, who do the fighting, must be greatly enhanced.

Fortunately there are signs and portents that the day is not distant when Labour's right to be heard in the determination of such momentous issues as war and peace, will be recognised and granted. For a mighty change is impending.¹ The modern movement towards democracy, now temporarily halted, will, in the end, be greatly accelerated by the war. For a while, during the early months, the notion gained credence that the rapid growth and spread of democracy had so frightened Old World rulers that the war was precipitated by them to stem the rising tide. Unlikely as this now seems, and be it as it may, the ultimate effect of the war will undoubtedly be to increase the momentum of the democratic movement. Students of affairs in the several belligerent nations² tell us that we may expect radical reforms, economic and political, after the war. Attention is called to

¹ See Article by H. G. Wells entitled "As the World Lives On," in the *Independent* for January 8, 1917.

² See Herbert Bayard Swope's *Inside the German Empire*, especially Chapter IV. Also see Article on "The Social Revolution in England" by Arthur Gleason in the *Century* for February, 1917.

the fact that because of the exigencies of the war's demands, the workers in all the fighting nations have been compelled to co-operate industrially to a degree that their most enthusiastic leaders had never dared to suggest before the war. Enforced co-operation has been undertaken on a grand scale, — so much so that prices and wages have been rigidly fixed by governmental authority.

It is interesting and important to observe and record what has been going on in Europe since the war began. In practically every belligerent nation, the Government has forced upon industry and manufacture, willy-nilly, a sort of paternalistic democracy, a kind of coerced co-operation. Much of the labour of production and distribution is being performed under direct government management. There is government control, and sometimes operation of mines, shipping and railways. Beginning December 1, 1916, all the South Wales mine fields came under the control of a committee representing the British Board of Trade, the Home Office, and the Admiralty. This committee manages the mines, determines the price, decides on the profits, and settles the question of wages. For the nonce, practically all competition and duplication has been eliminated. This mobilisation of labour and

control of industry became absolutely necessary. For no nation, fighting for its existence, could afford to indulge in wasteful methods. The economies brought about by the all but universal substitution of co-operation for competition meant just so much more money for the war-chests.

Many insist that after the war, having discovered the advantages and economy of such industrial co-operation, the citizen-workers will refuse to return to the old manner of unrestricted competition. They will argue that the enormous savings effected by co-operation have been spent in a costly war to meet the urgent needs of a national crisis. When the crisis is past they will insist that there should be a re-distribution in terms of reward. They will say to their several governments, "Oh, very well, we will tear a leaf from your experience. We, too, believe in co-operation, in democratising industry, but with a difference. Hereafter we will voluntarily co-operate and save for ourselves the usufruct of the labour of our own heads and hands." It is an anomaly of modern times that while we have already achieved democracy, in no small measure, in religion, in education, and in domestic politics, industry should still largely be ruled by monarchs of the market. When a degree of democracy,

or something like representative government, has been achieved in industry, there will be three parties that will share in its control: those who own the working capital or tools; those who labour with head (officers and managers) or hand (manual toilers); and the general consuming public.

At length it seems to have dawned upon the workers that war does not inure to their profit. They pay a disproportionate amount of the total cost in life and treasure and they get least for their expenditure. The value of war for them is a fictitious value.¹ So it is highly probable that they will not hesitate to go to almost any lengths to bring about the changes that seem to them but just and fair. In the measure that the workers succeed in securing what they demand they will be the stronger by just that much. But even if they are not successful in bringing about radical and far-reaching economic reforms, there is still the probability, amounting almost to a certainty, that they will acquire new and greater political power. The use of this power by the workers through their representatives in the national councils would certainly act as a brake upon future wars.

¹ See Article by Alvin S. Johnson in *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1914, on "War and the Interests of Labour."

The spreading revolt of the labouring classes against war is an ominous fact. They are determined that if any means are humanly available for preventing the recurrence of such a holocaust as has marked this age, then its like must never occur again. These are the times that try men's souls — and the long-suffering patience of the people. That patient endurance is now utterly exhausted. And because they are so firmly convinced that there is no commensurate profit for them in most wars, the great majorities that go to make up the populations of the nations are determined that their rulers and statesmen must discover ways for preventing future wars, or else throw-up their jobs. It is a dangerous thing to tantalise an awakened giant. Samson may be blinded and oppressed, and shorn of his strength for a time, but he may yet pull the temple down upon our heads. The people will not always remain blind, harnessed to the grist-mill. Old-fashioned rulers hold their sceptres with a slender grip. The power of potentates is dwindling. Common will and public right are to be the Imperial Rulers of To-morrow.

The worker is coming into his own. Perhaps, after this war, we shall need a brand new appraisal of greatness and heroism. Our appreciation has

usually been reserved for the soldier type of hero. No one will deny that at his best the soldier-hero possesses many, if not all, the attributes and virtues of valour and devotion. Too much cannot be said in recognition of loyalty and courage whenever and wherever found. But it is with heroism as it is with suffering—it is too costly and valuable to be wantonly wasted. The Master of all Moderns taught us more than nineteen centuries ago that neither greatness nor courage was confined to fields of carnage. Can it be that we are two thousand years behind the times? Jesus saw far into the future when he prophesied that the time would come when we should have to revise our estimate of greatness. He explained to his disciples (Matthew 20: 25–28) that sooner or later the world would acclaim the Servant in the House of Life as the greatest of us all.

It is no dispraise, and certainly no disparagement, of the soldier to say that he has played his part, and has usually played it well, in the drama of history. But he should not linger any longer on the stage of life. His generous enthusiasm and passionate devotion have been misdirected and prodigally spent. Some day, and perhaps sooner than we dare hope, the valour of the soldier will become

the ardour of the engineer. The new sceptre of authority will be a lever and not a sword. Placed under this world of disease and poverty and crime, it will lift it to a higher level. For after all, as some one has said, the greatest engineering feat in history is to raise the standard of living. The mantle of social authority, and in course of time of political authority as well, will be thrown across the shoulders of the engineer — whose business it is to construct and not destroy.

There is a reason for all this. It is one of the revolutionary changes accelerated by the war. The political sovereigns are not the only potentates whose tenure of absolute authority is precarious. Financial oligarchs are also tottering to their fall. The theory of the divine right of a few men to hold the purse-strings of the people's credit has been torpedoed and sunk, along with that other theory of the divine right of a mediæval monarch to sign the death-warrant of six million men. This is how it has come about. The dramatic and critical need of the nations at war has made them pass by all figure-heads and merely prominent people, men who happened to own things and who therefore had a financial and social rating, and has led them to draft into the service of the State, for all important

and responsible work, the man that knows and the man that can get things done,—the creative thinker, the practical scientist and the political engineer. Lord Northcliffe has pointed out that what is happening is that with the pressure of war has come the hard necessity for national efficiency. This, he says, is why prime ministers have called to their councils working men, business men, and scientists, without regard to class or party.

The war is certain to enhance the value and prestige of men of this stamp. Their stock is bound to go up. The stream of credit, like the river Nile, will overflow its banks. Bills of all sorts will be enacted to democratise finance and facilitate credit opportunities, thereby opening the sluiceways of ambition, enterprise and achievement. Increased credit opportunities for the common man will increase his social usefulness, improve his individual status, and strengthen his political control. Gradually the soldier will make way for the engineer and the warrior for the worker.

CHAPTER IV

WHAT ABOUT THE WOMEN?

NOT so very different from the charge that we were misled when told that the workers would prevent so calamitous a thing as a world war, is the statement that we were likewise deceived when induced to believe that the women would stand united against war. It was clear that the workers had everything to lose and little to gain by fighting the battles of their rulers, but it was no less clear that the women had as much, if not more, to lose than the workers. And surely, it was argued, the women know the awful cost of war in suffering and sacrifice.

The answer to the sneer that when we depended upon the women to prevent war we were leaning on a broken reed, is of much the same character as that in reference to the workers. If the women failed to preserve peace it was, in the first place, because they were not organised, and, in the second place, because they had practically no political

power and certainly no direct vote in determining international matters.

But this condition, too, it seems altogether likely will be changed after the war. As with the workers, so with the women, they have been called upon to do unprecedented tasks in the several fighting nations. It will not do to ignore, nor treat lightly the rôle that the women have played in this grim drama. The *dénouement* has proved, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that in respects other than purely idealistic they are the peers of their brothers. With equal patriotism they have responded to the appeal for sacrifice and service, and this has been as true of the princess as of the peasant.

The awakening of the women has not waited for the bugle reveille. The Feminist Movement is a part of the great democratic movement of modern times. The advance of women, during the past few decades, has meant that an ever-increasing number have protested against arbitrary sex discrimination, against presumptuous masculine despotism, against domestic drudgery, industrial parasitism, economic dependence and political disability.

We need not here discuss in detail these several phases of the Woman Movement. It is as true of "feminism" as it is of so many other reforms of

one kind and another,— the war has put a stop to all direct propaganda and meliorative legislation. And yet, as a matter of fact, what do we find has actually happened? We find that in mobilising the nations (not merely the armies) no arbitrary lets and hindrances have been thrown in the way of woman's employment anywhere and everywhere,— in home, or shop, or hospital, or on the farm, or in connection with transportation lines. There is no time for the idle discussion of fine-spun theories as to the intellectual inferiority or industrial incompetency of women, as such. Nations engaged in a life-and-death struggle cannot afford to discriminate on account of sex. What "despotism" there is to-day is military, or governmental for military reasons, and it limits and controls the freedom of action of all alike. Military necessity is no respecter of persons.

As for that aspect of the Woman Movement which has concerned itself primarily with the problem of excessive drudgery in the business of home-making and house-keeping, it may be noted that the war has inspired the invention of many labour-saving devices that should reduce the heart-breaking strain and tax of what Arnold Bennett has felicitously called "domestic dailiness." Also, under the compulsion

of necessity, many schemes have been introduced and many projects put into practical operation, in the way of community washing and cooking and serving.

As for a special class of industrial parasites, who live on the labour of others and feel keenly the shame of selfish indulgence and social futility, this class of women has, at any rate temporarily, ceased to exist. A nation in arms, availing itself of every last resource, material and human, can neither afford to feed the lazy nor tolerate the idle. Few stories of the war are more thrilling than those that tell of women of wealth and fashion who, unlike the rich young ruler, have not made the Great Refusal.¹ They have left all and taken up their cross of denial and sacrifice.

Take also the matter of economic independence. To be sure, the fight to obtain equal pay for equal work has not yet been won, but between two and three million additional women have entered the ranks of gainful occupations. In England, three-quarters of a million are working in munition factories alone. Can old prejudices prevail long in the face of these facts? Surely several steps, not to

¹ See the Report of Dr. William Graham, Medical Superintendent of the Belfast District Asylum, reprinted in *Current History* for November, 1916.

say strides, have been taken in the direction of economic independence. It does not seem probable that these steps will be retraced and that this advance will be followed by retrogression.

No matter what may be thought of the Feminist Movement as a whole, there is little reason to believe that governments will refuse, after this war, to give the women more power in legislation. The extension of the franchise so as to include women, while not a foregone conclusion, seems altogether likely. Indeed Denmark and Iceland and four provinces of Canada have already enfranchised their women since the war began and the probability that the women of England will win the suffrage amounts almost to a certainty. The war has given the women an extraordinary opportunity to demonstrate their equality with men in numberless agricultural, industrial, commercial and social activities, and so, by inference, their equal intelligence and fitness to exercise the franchise. It is not unreasonably urged that if they can work and make guns for their country they can also vote and make laws for their country. On sentimental grounds alone it is hard to see how the Governments can longer deny to women a share in the conduct of the affairs of the nation which they so heroically and

devotedly have laboured to defend. And they will be the more eager to acquire and exercise this political power after they have had time to sit down and reckon up the fearful costs of the war to them. After the itemised bills have all been rendered and they have pondered over the dreadful details, they will, more than ever before, want to have a voice in those councils of state which decide the momentous question of war or no-war. Can the demand any longer be refused and the right withheld?

The revolt of women against the custom of war, as such, was to have been expected. And this, of course, is not to deny that there were countless ardent women, in all the belligerent countries, whose patriotic support has been whole-hearted and loyal. But by every instinct of nature, and by every reason of self-interest, women ought to be opposed to war root and branch. If many of them seem unthinking and unpractical in their opposition, that is the most natural thing in the world. The fact that women are called upon to pay such heavy taxes in irreparable loss and inconsolable sorrow, in privation and cruelty, goes far to explain why women, in the main, are such uncompromising foes of universal military training and conscription.

One reason for this reaction of war on normal

women has been pointed out by Olive Schreiner, in a striking passage. "On that day," she writes in her deservedly popular book,¹ "when the woman takes her place beside the man in the governance and arrangement of external affairs of her race will also be that day that heralds the death of war as a means of arranging human differences. . . . It is not because of woman's cowardice, incapacity, nor, above all, because of her general superior virtue, that she will end war when her voice is fully and clearly heard in the governance of states—it is because, on this one point, and on this point almost alone, the knowledge of woman, simply as woman, is superior to that of man; she knows the history of human flesh; she knows its cost; he does not. In a besieged city, it might well happen that men in the streets might seize upon statues and marble carvings from public buildings and galleries and hurl them in to stop the breaches made in their ramparts by the enemy, unconsideringly and merely because they came first to hand, not valuing them more than had they been paving-stones. One man, however, could not do this—the sculptor. He, who, though there might be no work of his own chisel among them, yet knew what each of these

¹ *Woman and Labor*, pp. 176, 180.

works of art had cost, knew by experience the long years of struggle and study and the infinitude of toil which had gone to the shaping of even one limb, to the carving of even one perfected outline, he could never so use them without thought or care. Instinctively he would seek to throw in household goods, even gold and silver, all the city held, before he sacrificed its works of art!"

CHAPTER V

DID BUSINESS HELP OR HINDER?

AMONG the forces counted on to prevent the recurrence of war, business was considered the most dependable. The almost inconceivable cost of conducting modern wars was set forth as a sufficient reason for believing that we had seen the last war between great nations. And many were convinced, for the claim was not unreasonable. Credulity was not overtaxed in believing that the weight of war would prove too heavy for the shoulders of society. It was said that international commerce and finance had become so intricate and complex that it would be the last limit of folly to permit a modern war which would damage and destroy the delicate fabric of trade. It was urged, and it sounded plausible, that the financiers, because they had so much at stake and because they could hardly hope to profit by war (except for a few money lenders and armament manufacturers), would not permit it to come. But they did. The war came. Whether or not they possessed the power to prevent

it need not be discussed here. At best that is a speculative problem. But the end is not yet, and there is considerable likelihood that, as a direct consequence of this war, the opposition of business will be better organised and far more determined.

The financial burden of a modern war is as heavy as the serpent Midgard that girds the world. The money cost of the American Civil War in round numbers was \$5,000,000,000, or more than \$3,500,000 for each day it lasted. The Franco-Prussian and Russo-Japanese wars each cost in the neighbourhood of \$2,500,000,000. Between the years of 1789 and 1909 the total income of the United States Government was \$21,401,539,121, of which amount \$10,854,850,565 was expended in wars and pensions. European nations had, even before the war, been spending right along nearer two-thirds than one-half of their income for the same purpose. The expenditure on naval and military preparations for the six leading Powers of Europe was, before the war, \$5,000,000 a day. It is now twenty times as much. The money cost of the present war makes the cost of all previous wars seem almost insignificant. The total direct military cost for three years is estimated by an expert in the Mechanics and Metals National Bank of New York

City ¹ at the staggering figure of \$75,950,000,000; the cost to the Central Powers being about \$27,750,000,000, and the cost to the Entente Allies not less than \$48,200,000,000. These figures hardly vary from those offered by Count von Roedern, Secretary of the Imperial German Treasury. It seems not unlikely that this war will cost three times as much as the Napoleonic wars, the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War combined.

Nor is the military cost all that must be posted on the debit side of the ledger, though that alone represents a sum twice as large as the total indebtedness of every nation of the world in 1914; a sum seven times greater than the combined deposits of the 7,600 national banks in the United States, and seven times greater than the whole world's supply of minted gold; a sum sufficient to build and equip railroads equal to five times the number now operating in the United States; to pay for two hundred such projects as the Panama Canal; to provide schools and teachers for every child living

¹ See booklet on *War Loans and War Finance*. In reply to an inquiry the *New York Times* stated that at the end of the second year of the war the following approximations were made of the cost for the principal countries involved: Great Britain, \$7,670,000,000; France, \$6,643,000,000; Russia, \$4,118,000,000; Italy, \$2,464,000,000; Germany, \$9,075,000,000; Austria, \$3,000,000,000; Turkey, \$2,000,000,000; Bulgaria, \$150,000,000.

to-day. But in addition to this direct military cost, there is the outright destruction, in terms of tangible wealth, of cities, railroads, ships, factories, warehouses, bridges, roads, and agricultural values. And, besides all this, there is the loss of that percentage of Europe's manhood that is maimed and destroyed; the loss of production in occupied territories; the decrease in stocks of food, metal and other materials; the derangement of the machinery of distribution; and the loss involved in taking between thirty and forty millions of soldiers and many other millions of people, to do other things than fight, away from the opportunities of productive work.

While the staggering cost, in dollars and cents, of the war between the nations has almost set at naught the total economies achieved within the nations, and while no statistician or actuary could possibly estimate the moral damage that has been done, the terrible loss of human life is even more appalling.

Where are the brave, the strong, the fleet,
The flower of England's chivalry?
Wild grasses are their winding-sheet,
And sobbing waves their threnody.

The War Study Society of Copenhagen presents

figures of the cost in human life for the first twenty-four months of the war.¹ They do not greatly differ from those published by the *New York Times* in reply to a recent inquiry. "The estimates of casualties," says the *Times* article, "based on official data show that the second year of the war cost more than 3,000,000 lives and inflicted wounds on more than 6,000,000. Estimates for the first year ranged between the German report of 2,500,000 killed and more than 5,000,000 wounded to Beach-Thomas's estimate of 5,000,000 killed and 7,000,000 wounded. Up to the period of the Somme offensive and the Brusiloff drive, both of which began towards the end of the second year of the war, the British had lost in killed or totally incapacitated, 228,138; in prisoners, 68,046. German losses were, killed or totally incapacitated, 664,552; prisoners, 137,728. France gives out no figures, but Deputy Longet estimated the losses in killed and totally incapacitated at 900,000; prisoners, 300,000. German reports of Russian casualties amounted to 3,000,000, of whom 1,000,000 were prisoners." The figures for all the belligerents make a veritable "army of the dead," totalling more than fifteen mil-

¹ See also Article on "Human Losses in the First Two Years of the War" in *Current History* for December, 1916.

lions killed and wounded. How can we ever justify these extravagant expenditures before the certified auditors of history? And yet, we are told that all this was known in advance. Nobody had any doubt that a modern world war would cost an inconceivable amount. In fact, it was commonly said that its cost would make it prohibitive. And still the war came.

It seems almost fraudulent and hypocritical to so much as mention the word "efficiency." It has been the watchword of this generation. Intensive farming, the reclamation of arid regions, the conservation of timber lands and water power, the elimination of avoidable accidents, preventable disease, premature toil, excessive poverty, these have all been moves in the general direction of social efficiency. But, of course, it is cant and nonsense to talk excitedly about prevention of fires in cities and then neglect to provide protection against world conflagrations. We have strained at gnats and swallowed camels.

So far from business being a deterrent of war it has actually been a provocative of war, in at least two ways. First, it has laid the fuse for explosion by dollar diplomacy, or financial imperialism, or *Realpolitik* — call it what you will. Among back-

ward peoples, in undeveloped regions of the earth, it has sought markets for its surplus production and fields for the investment of its surplus wealth. Then it has brought pressure to bear upon the "foreign office," manipulating diplomacy to secure privileges and concessions and to back up its adventurous undertakings with fleets and regiments. The resulting friction has more than once precipitated conflict.¹ The second way in which business has hindered rather than helped the cause of peace among the nations is in respect to abnormal profits reaped by the manufacture and sale of instruments of destruction and by trade in the thousand and one things that are necessary to the conduct of war. That the makers of madness have, time after time, been the manufacturers of munitions need not be proved all over again in this place. The evidence is both ample and conclusive. It is too bad to have to believe that human nature can and does stoop so low as to conspire to bring about war for the sake of the gain there is in it. But facts are stubborn things.

¹ For a more detailed discussion of this subject see Chapter XV, "Draining the Swamps."

CHAPTER VI

WHAT'S WRONG WITH DIPLOMACY?

WITH as much vigour and with more justice it has been said over and over again since August, 1914, that when we put our trust in diplomatic negotiations we deserved to be deceived. This, of course, is not the same thing as saying that the individual diplomats were at fault. Nothing is more certain than that Sir Edward Grey employed every means known to diplomacy to compose the differences and bring about a settlement by conference. But the machinery broke down under the strain. The "system" was at fault. The romantic diplomacy of *haute politique* was unequal to the task of preventing the calamity.

Interested in national success and devoted to power and prestige, diplomats have used the actual and potential strength of the nation, the lives and money of the people, to play the game of international chess. But diplomacy should be more than a game that is played with loaded dice or loaded guns. A change is absolutely imperative.

We must substitute scientific politics for sentimental politics, and statesmanship for subtlety. We must come to think of it as being the business of diplomacy to reduce friction between States and thus forestall war. The real task of the diplomat should be to keep things running smoothly between nations.

At the close of this war there will probably need to be two congresses. The first, a Peace Congress for the purpose of drawing up the terms of settlement. At this Congress only the belligerent nations will be represented. The second will be a *bona-fide* Congress of Nations and will include neutrals. This should be assembled as soon after the close of the first congress as is practicable. Some action looking toward a second congress will doubtless be taken at the first congress. Or it may be possible to effect a compromise arrangement by protracting the Peace Congress, by having an "after meeting," so to speak. At the first part of the Congress, at which only the belligerents would be represented, all the terms of settlement could be agreed upon, except the question of future securities. The progressive neutral nations, particularly the United States, might then, by right and not by favour, participate in the latter part of the discussion having

to do exclusively with guarantees of future peace.

The personnel of both congresses will be a very important consideration. It is probably too much to expect that the type of men who represent the nations in the first congress will be so very different from the type of diplomat, now more or less discredited, with which we are all too familiar. In all likelihood the character of representation at the second congress will be altogether different.

But this is not at all certain. It may be that the old school diplomacy will appreciate the fact that it is played out. It must not be forgotten that tremendous influences have been operating during the past two years which may, very possibly, have brought about something of a conversion or change of heart. The whole world has been shocked by the present war into a vivid realisation of its enormity. It seems almost inconceivable that at the close of this war, even in the first Treaty Congress, statesmen should sit supine and indifferent as to the future. Besides re-drawing the map of Europe and pulling and hauling for national advantage as to strategic coast lines, naval bases, fortresses and railroad centres, it is hard to see how they can do less than ponder the problem of the possibility of preventing such wars in the future. It will mean

sacrifice. It will mean giving up many ancient dogmas. It will mean that in the very terms of the treaty of peace something of generosity and magnanimity must enter. Unless Ephraim is joined to his idols, and is altogether impervious to changed conditions, then diplomacy must relinquish many of its traditions and doctrines and hasten on the double-quick to catch up with the spirit of the age.

The political problem is at bottom a moral problem, and morality is the problem of the relationship between man and man, as religion is the problem of the relationship between man and God. The business of social morality and of politics has to do with the establishment and maintenance of right relationships between individuals and groups and nations. A diplomacy that is thoroughly modernised would conceive of its task as being the "scientific management" of the nations, while the jobs of the diplomats would be, so to speak, those of international efficiency experts. Unless their business is to reduce friction between States, and to save the awful loss and waste that result from friction, carried to the extreme in war, then they have no *raison d'être*. War may be the most horrible and the most expensive solution of international problems, but it certainly is the easiest way out. Creative states-

men should conceive and construct new and better ways. Either that is the job of the statesman, or else he has no job.

The new diplomacy must keep abreast of the times and be aware of the vast revolutionary changes that have come over the world since the day of Metternich. It must do that, it must be more modern, but that is not all. It must be or become more practical. Here there is the possibility of confusion, for it will be contended by many that the trouble with diplomats has been that they have been altogether too practical, concerning themselves with the minutest details of profit and loss. But that is not the point. They have exercised what talents they had for practicality in the interests of privileged groups and then, for the rest, they have neglected the most pressing practical problems of our age. Very properly they might have conceived it to be their principal business to devise ways and means for relieving undue strain and stress and for ridding the world of burdensome war. But instead of leading they have, all too often, been led. They have been led by two groups within the State with whom they were altogether too familiar, — the group of militarists prepossessed with the idea of war, and the group of financiers seeking an

opportunity for profitable investment. Of course no blanket charge can be made against all diplomats on this score; but these things have been true of them as a class.

The acid test of value is being applied all through modern life. For example, when it is applied in the department of education and the work of the schools, we say that education must be more concrete and objective, so we institute vocational education and commercial training, establish "Gary" schools and "Modern" schools. The churches have had to face the same problem. The fear of futility constantly spurs them on to more and more social and political effort. In like manner domestic politics has had to come down to earth and concern itself with the details of improving the conditions of life and labour. "Practical" politicians, corrupt and contented, long asked the question, What has posterity done for me? And then, without waiting for a reply, they have fed their greed for sordid gain. But what has come to be known as the era of conscience in domestic politics means that the old style of "practical" politics is at an end. It means that grafters, profiting by crass methods of purchase, have had to shut up shop and go out of business. The new demand is for an-

other sort of practicality. Politicians, to be successful, have learned that they must concern themselves with the problems of the common people; must invent new ways of putting tools into the hands of those that can use them, of supplying land to those that can till it, of reducing the hours of labour to a reasonable minimum, and of fixing a standard living wage that must be paid. This new practical politics is obliged to wrestle with these very tangible problems. In America, for example, it is supposed to redeem the waste places and to exploit the natural resources for the benefit of all.

Now the time has come, and can no longer be put off, when international statesmen must likewise become more practical. On the one hand, they must become less metaphysical and mystical; and, on the other hand, they must refuse any longer to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the private profit of a few. They must become engrossed in the social and industrial interests of the ordinary people who make up the nations. This is the temper of the times. This is the humanistic spirit of the age in which we live. And surely, by all odds, the greatest service they could possibly render to the people of the nations would be to provide and enter upon

agreements that would reduce to a minimum the likelihood of war.

But the new diplomacy must be not only more modern and more practical; it must also be more responsible and more public. These two things are spoken of at the same time because of their very intimate connection. We have heard a great deal about the wickedness and menace of "secret diplomacy." Indeed some have gone so far as to place the whole burden and blame of the war on its shoulders. Nor is it to be doubted that secret diplomacy will have to render its account before the Grand Assize of History for its share of culpability. At the same time there is something in the contention that many affairs of state ought not to be spread in block type upon the front pages of the newspapers,—at least not during the early stages of negotiation. The people themselves, those who are asking for an end of secret diplomacy, would not infrequently be the greatest losers if their request for immediate and full publicity were granted. It is also true, and important to keep in mind, that responsible cabinets are often more wisely conservative than parliaments. Ministers are frequently less headstrong and hysterical than masses. But there must be a golden mean between instant

and complete publicity of all delicate negotiations and the method now too much in vogue of hiding the facts from the people who have the best right to know what is going on, since it is they that must pay the cost for every blunder. Again and again it has been pointed out as an anomaly that in this age of complete publicity the trade of the diplomat, on which the happiness of empires and generations is so often dependent, should continue to be secret. It is more than an anomaly, it is a tragedy. Diplomacy must be democratised, and parliaments must control foreign affairs.

Surprising as it may seem to those who have not given thought to the matter, it will have to be confessed that in many modern nations we have democratised practically everything else but foreign affairs. Religion has been democratised. Education has been democratised. Domestic politics has been democratised. Like the divine right of the financier to give or withhold credit, the divine right of the diplomat to prevent or precipitate war, remains as a sort of socio-political appendix. It is not nearly so important that foreign affairs should be open and public as it is that diplomats and foreign secretaries should be held to strict accountability.

This is probably the most important aspect of

the whole question of peace and war. Between democracy and world peace there is undoubtedly a very close connection. We shall have somewhat more to say of this in a subsequent chapter.¹ It is therefore not necessary for us to discuss here, at any great length, the question of absolutism in government. Probably a majority of the people of the world are convinced that monarchs with autocratic power are anachronisms. They are archaic and will soon be obsolete. They have had their day and must soon cease to be. But however we may feel about that question, there is everywhere to-day the feeling that inasmuch as it is the common people who at last must do the greater part of the fighting, they ought at least to have some voice in determining the question of whether or not war shall be declared and prosecuted.

It will be said that while ordinary, average men and women may be trusted with the management of domestic affairs and the solution of internal problems, when it comes to foreign affairs or international politics, why, that is quite another matter. In the first place, we are told, the people are not interested in foreign affairs. Now if that has been true, whose fault is it? Who has tried to interest

¹ Chapter XVII, "Souls in Revolt."

them in foreign affairs, or who has tried to make foreign affairs interesting? A veil of vagueness has been drawn over all things international. Nobody has tried to quicken the people with a desire for full and sound knowledge in these matters. Their curiosity has been neither excited nor encouraged. Some have even gone so far as to assert that relations between nations do not concern the people,—which of course is ridiculous on the face of it. If they do not concern the people, then they do not concern anybody; and if they do concern anybody, then they certainly concern the people. Furthermore, we are told that the people do not care anything about and cannot possibly understand international politics. But who has been at any pains to educate the people in these subjects? If they are ignorant, who is at fault? To speak very frankly, have they not been purposely kept ignorant by the high priests of statecraft so that they might not be tempted to interfere?

It is perfectly true that there are many academic matters that are not sufficiently tangent to the people's daily lives to arouse their interest and grip their attention. But, after all, this is very largely a matter of words and manner of presentation. For example, the ordinary run of everyday people may

not appear to be particularly interested in theology. They certainly do not bother their heads about profound problems of divinity; but they are tremendously interested in the practical problems of personal religion. Or again, they may be entirely unfamiliar with Buckle and Hegel and may not care a straw about the philosophy of history as such; but they are deeply interested in the question of whether the world is getting better or worse,—which is the philosophy of history. Or yet again, the man in the street is not worried very much over questions of moral philosophy — questions about purpose, and design, and the final meaning of life — but he does care a lot about whether his life is worth living and how he can make it more so. The first man you meet on your way home from work will tell you he does not know what you are driving at when you talk learnedly about psychology; in all likelihood he will tell you that he is not in the slightest degree interested in psychology. As a matter of fact, it is the name and the abstraction that he is not interested in, for he is vitally interested in human nature, his own and others', and not infrequently is himself something of an expert and boasts of the fact that he can read his friends like

a book. It is something very much like this when it comes to diplomacy.

To speak by the record, before this present war, the average man or woman was not overmuch concerned about foreign affairs. But this war, as has been true of no other war in history, has brought the concrete problems of diplomacy not only into the editorial leaders and the headlines of the daily newspapers, but also into the active consciousness of the daily lives of the multitudes. To-day when Presidents, Premiers and Chancellors talk about foreign politics, the common people hear them gladly. Diplomacy has ceased to be something remote and recondite, the intellectual indulgence of learned statesmen, and has become, or is well on the way to becoming, as much a matter of genuine concern as business or religion or domestic politics. And this is little less than a revolution.

Whether in the past the multitudes have or have not been interested in foreign affairs, whether they have or have not known or cared anything at all about international politics and the problems of diplomacy, this war has pointed a period to their lackadaisical indifference. They do care now, and they are going to care even more. Nor will their

interest stop short of actual participation. Their newly acquired knowledge will ripen into action. "If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them," and the people are going to do something about war and peace. And one of the first things they are going to do is to come to real grips with the problem of misplaced or irresponsible authority. How? By drafting and demanding the passage of bills which will take the authority for declaring war out of the hands of absolute monarchs and place it in the hands of the representatives of the people.

Paradoxically enough, foreign affairs are the most personal of all affairs. And this is only another way of saying that to-day, even in the more democratic countries, the actions and decisions of diplomats may precipitate war and rob the home of its most precious possessions. That is why it is a local issue, a personal matter. Without so much as a "by your leave," boys of tender years, whose lives might well have been cherished by the State for more profitable adventures, are hustled off by the millions to become fuel for the incinerators that follow in the train of every battle.

But the new diplomacy will be not only more modern, more practical, more public, and more re-

sponsible; it will also be more ethical. Make no mistake. We are not here discussing the question of the personal morality of diplomats. Our present interest is in something vastly more important than that. It is a question of standards. The doctrine of state sovereignty, which makes a nation a law unto itself — “a moral absolute,” as John A. Hobson puts it — implies the right of a nation to invent its own code of morals and then, of course, attribute it to revelation or to anything else that happens to suit its fancy. Then, when war is declared, it becomes possible to make null and void all the ethical standards of the race. Theoretically, a nation may do with impunity what no individual is allowed to do. It may commit every crime on the calendar, and then excuse its action on the grounds of military necessity. Theft, arson, rapine and murder, are all committed with as much *sans froid* as if there never had been any Moses and the Prophets, as if the race never had established any standards of morality more exacting than those of savagery and barbarism.¹

But perhaps all the unlovely deeds that shock our sense of right and decency are the necessary attendants upon war. Perhaps it will be just as well for

¹ See Chapter XVII, “Souls in Revolt.”

us to recognise the fact that any attempt to civilise warfare is like attempting to square the circle. And perhaps that is just why those who wrote the provisions in the Hague Conventions which had to do with the sufferings of civil populations, with the destruction of public buildings and works of art, with the sinking of ships and their passengers, with the use of fire and hunger as weapons, and with every other attempt to regulate warfare on land and sea, qualified their provisions by such saving clauses as, "as far as is compatible with military necessity," and so forth.

But what reasons have we for the hope that is in us, the hope that such revolutionary changes in diplomacy as we have suggested can possibly be brought about? With the history of the past in mind, how can we reasonably expect that statesmen will do now what they never before have done, — never before have even attempted to do? There are several very excellent reasons for believing that at the close of this present war a sincere and genuine attempt will at last be made to establish permanent peace.

First among these reasons may be mentioned the fact that there is such a thing as the hand of God in human history, call it Providence, Fate, or what

you will. There is in the affairs of men a tide which taken at its flood leads on to certain great objectives. The present tide is swiftly running in the direction of international organisation, or at any rate, in the direction of a closer fellowship among the nations of the world; and this in spite of the war and all its aroused hatreds. Potent as is the will of the individual and of the social group in determining human affairs, there seem also to be, at the same time, certain strong currents of history or destiny which hasten us onward towards far-off divine events.

But it will not do for us to be fatalistic optimists who believe that to achieve certain consummations all that is necessary is devoutly to wish for them. Therefore, the second fact on which we base our faith is the development of what has been called an international mind. It does not make a great deal of difference whether or not we believe in "Internationalism." The important fact, which cannot be gainsaid, is that countless forces are making for the cohesion and integration of the whole world.

Nor is this all. What has already been said in the conclusions to all the earlier chapters should be reviewed and recalled at this point. The new emphasis in pacifism, the changed accent in religion,

the tremendous force of public opinion, the determined mood of modern business, the growing opposition of women and the threatened revolt of the workers,—these all furnish additional reasons for believing that statesmen, however obscurantist and near-sighted, will see the handwriting on the wall.

These are the forces that have failed. The war came in spite of the pacifists, the Christians, the workers, the women, the bankers and the diplomats. But what of the future? Is there nothing that will prevent war? Is there nothing that will diminish the probability of its recurrent return? It is too soon to give up hope and lose heart. The future is fertile with possible plans that may prove practicable. In the succeeding chapters we shall study in detail the proposals of one of these projects.

PART II

A PROGRAMME TO PREVENT WAR

THE GREAT DIVIDE OF HISTORY

We are on the verge of a Great Divide. As we look down the slope of the past three years we are sobered and saddened. Faith and optimism are at a premium. Despair has come up like a miasmatic fog from the blood-swamps of Europe. We are choked by the poisonous gases of doubt. It is not surprising if many have grown sceptical of reform and are saying that civilisation has collapsed. But civilisation has not really collapsed. This is not the débâcle of civilisation. The treasures of a hundred ages have not been altogether swept away by the cyclone of war. When the debris has been cleared we shall doubtless find that the accumulated wealth of art, and literature, and culture, and tolerance, the love of liberty and the passion for justice, are secure in the war-proof vaults of heart and mind. We must not permit our tears to blind us to this fact.

Some of us, fatuously enough as it now appears, had supposed that the pillars of society were religion and culture and democracy—the church, the school, and enlightened public opinion. Evidently we were mistaken. Not these, but brute force alone was the foundation upon which the towering structure of the State had been based! Paradoxical as it may seem, the sills and girders of fear and force can no longer be trusted to bear the weight and stand the strain of modern skyscraper States. New underpinnings of reason and justice, along with the practical means for making reason and justice operative in international relations, must be substituted if we would have the edifice endure.

CHAPTER VII

A LEAGUE OF STATES

“THE federative system,” says Guizot in his *History of Civilisation in Europe*, “is that which evidently requires the greatest development of reason, morality, and civilisation in the society to which it is applied.” From this we may infer that the goal of progress, the happiness of the nations, is to be discovered and attained by the gradual substitution of co-operation for competition. The gregarious instinct slowly evolves into conscious organisation, first for protection, and then, later on, for conquest and enterprise. Necessity is the mother of invention in more ways than one. The family was “invented” to protect the child and states were “invented” to protect the family, the clan, and the tribe. Primitive men, naturally wary of strangers in spite of the instinct for fellowship, got together and formed mutual aid societies, so to speak, in order the more successfully to defend themselves against wild beasts, untoward environment, and other threatening groups. Families combined into

clans — close corporations of kindred — and these in turn were merged or federated into tribes. The struggle between tribes, usually over proprietary rights in nature, resulted in the firmer union of each group in opposition to hostile groups.

Organisation for defence and conquest became a more effective weapon than individual slings and arrows. After long generations of futile fighting that never got anybody anywhere, tools were invented, and tilling began to be considered almost as important as killing. Perhaps the curse of the world has always been that men have preferred stealing to working. Even Adam tried to get his food by some other method than “trimming the vineyard.” The exploitation of the weak by the strong in order to get something that you want and that doesn’t belong to you has been the chief cause of most of the wars of history, dating back to very earliest times and coming down to the day before yesterday. Treitschke says that “it is a false conclusion that wars are waged for the sake of material advantage.”¹ He tells us that “modern wars are not fought for the sake of booty.” But he would find it difficult to maintain this position. The predaceous instinct, and not the fighting instinct, is

¹ *Politics*, Vol. I, p. 15.

really at the bottom of all wars. The desire for aggrandisement and not the lust for combat is the true explanation why people and nations war upon one another.

“The progress of man,” writes Walter Bagehot, “requires the co-operation of men for its development. That which any one man or any one family could invent for themselves is obviously exceedingly limited. . . . The rudest sort of co-operative society, the lowest tribe and the feeblest government, is much stronger than isolated man. The first principle of the subject is that man can only make progress in ‘co-operative groups.’ . . . For unless you can make a strong co-operative bond, your society will be conquered and killed out by some other society which has such a bond.”¹ Certainly it has been discovered in modern business and industry and all constructive undertakings, that the big tasks of civilisation can best be done by co-operation. It is hard for one man to build a city or drain a swamp or span a trestle across a river. And that is why we have partnerships, companies, syndicates, corporations,—and government. Government may be defined as the organised attempt of thousands or millions of individuals to “consoli-

¹ *Physics and Politics*, Chapter VI, p. 131.

date" the advances made by civilisation, and to make some particular part of the earth a better place for people to live in. This is the most important task of government. More often than not it botches the job or shirks it altogether.

The authors of *The Federalist* papers have called attention to the striking similarity between the American federal system and the confederation of Greek republics associated under the Amphictyonic Council. Compare the authority of this Council with that which the Constitution of the United States placed at the disposal of our national administration: "The members retained the character of independent and sovereign States, and had equal votes in the federal Council. This Council had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies between members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against the disobedient. . . . They had a declared authority to use coercion against refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this authority on the necessary occasions."¹

Another society of Grecian Republics, at first and

¹ Essay No. XVIII, p. 89.

up till the time when the Amphictyonic Council was destroyed by the machinations of Macedon, was comprised of the less important cities. It was called the Achæan League and later on embraced almost all of Peloponnesus. The same authors quoted above¹ defined the powers of this league as follows: "The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The Senate in which they were represented had the sole and universal right of peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of appointing a Chief Magistrate or Prætor, as he was called, who commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the Government in the recess of the Senate, but had a great share in its deliberations when assembled."

Montesquieu tells us that "it was these associations that so long contributed to the prosperity of Greece."²

States, as has been pointed out, have not long remained static, but have expanded in size and importance by increases in population and forms of com-

¹ Essay No. XVIII, p. 92.

² *The Spirit of Laws*, Book IX, p. 126.

bination. The time was when cities were independent and sovereign States — Athens, Sparta, Florence, Venice. Because Mr. Stentor's voice could not proclaim the news so as to be heard by more than ten thousand people the maximum size of cities was arbitrarily fixed at that number. With the invention of the printing press, of modern means of communication and transportation, the borders were gradually pushed back towards the horizon. The basis of a common government is common interests. Transportation and communication facilities, trade, commerce, the universal translation of learning and literature,—all these things tended to broaden the base of the common interest and thus at the same time extend the frontiers of government. States have drawn nearer and nearer together until propinquity has ended in marriage. Again and again this has happened.

It may be interesting to recall that in the early ages of Christianity Germany was occupied by seven distinct nations, each having sovereign jurisdiction and independence. To-day there are twenty-six states and provinces in the close-knit German Confederation.

The Swiss cantons furnish another modern instance of the application of the federative princi-

ple.¹ The several and separate cantons, or departments, have delegated less authority to the Central Government than any other confederacy, ancient or modern. Perhaps for this reason they furnish a better analogy, or prototype, of the sort of society of nations that is sometimes conceived of as not improbable.

Much the same thing is true of the United Netherlands, which is a confederation of co-equal and sovereign States-General.

Alexander Hamilton builded better than he knew when, with Washington and Franklin and Madison, in 1788, he constructed the foundation walls of the nation by forcing the adoption of the Federal Constitution. From these early beginnings, and not without toil and struggle, the United States of America has grown. States and sections have yielded more and more to increasing demands for

¹ See Bryce's *American Commonwealth*, Chapters 27, 28, 29 and 30; also Woodrow Wilson's *The State*. John Fiske, in his *American Political Ideas* (p. 133), says that, stated broadly, the principle of federalism is just this: "That the people of a State shall have full and entire control of their own domestic affairs, which directly concern them only, and which they will naturally manage with more intelligence and with more zeal than any distinct governing body could possibly exercise; but that, as regards matters of common concern between a group of States, a decision shall in every case be reached, not by brutal warfare or by weary diplomacy, but by the systematic legislation of a central government which represents both States and people, and whose decision can be enforced, if necessary, by the combined physical forces of all the States."

national unity. We probably need no reminder of the fact that the thirteen original States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, after entering into a "firm league of friendship and perpetual union," still retained their "Sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and Right which was not expressly delegated to the new united states in congress assembled," etc.¹ The treaty of peace concluded with Great Britain at Paris, September 3d, 1783, closing the War of Independence, expressly said "his British Majesty acknowledges the said United States² . . . as free, sovereign and independent states."

The process towards amalgamation (for America is now more than a federation) has been a gradual development. The need of presenting a solid front for defence against foes from without tended to accelerate its evolution. "United we stand; divided we fall" and "In union there is strength" were more than high-sounding political slogans. Also,

¹ Articles of Federation, Article II. (1781.)

² Here the several States are individually listed.

one invention after another had the effect of binding the several communities and states more intimately together. The result was the all but imperceptible erasure of the lines of separation. Boundaries began to appear more as things that bound States together than as frontiers which set the limits and marked the confines of common interest and purpose. It became increasingly difficult to remain provincial, and to keep up the illusion of a dozen absolutely sovereign States operating independently of one another. The facts of modern life made the fiction appear too romantic. The common notion that the Civil War was fought merely to maintain an abstract theory of political philosophy is incredible. The war was precipitated to free the slaves. Freeing the slaves was the next step towards democracy. Calhoun's arguments in defence of States' Rights have never really been refuted. They are probably unanswerable as logic. But, as F. C. H. Schiller has pointed out, logic is made for life and not life for logic. Another way to put it would be to paraphrase the philosophy of pragmatism and say that the doctrine of sovereignty was true so long as it served a useful purpose. After a certain point had been reached and passed, it became a fond delusion, a vain super-

stition, a political heirloom,—intellectual bric-à-brac.

But we must not think that the idea of a sovereign state or nation is as old as the hills, for it is not. It is like the “wage-system” and so many other things to which we have grown accustomed. We think it must be rimy with age just because the mind of the oldest inhabitant runneth not to the contrary. As a matter of fact, the idea of human sovereignty probably dates back to the time when God was supposed to have delegated his power on earth to a vicar of Rome. Then when the schism arose between the Roman Church and the Protestant Sects at the time of the Reformation, Luther convinced the reigning kings that they, as well as the Pope, ruled by “divine right.” Nor did the revolt against absolutism in government put an end to the notion of sovereignty. It transferred the seat of authority to the people. The relativity of all human life makes the doctrine of absolute sovereignty untenable. You can no more have a score or a hundred conflicting and competing sovereignties and sovereigns than you can have three or four universes, or a half-dozen infinities. But superstitions die hard and nobody likes to acknowledge that he has been worshipping a fetish.

It is true that such a tentative society of nations as is here proposed is, in one sense, a new departure; in another sense it is but the next and most natural step to take in the direction in which we have been going right along. No revolutionary attempt will be made to abolish by an emancipation proclamation men's slavery to ideas. There will be no prohibition against any and all nations and rulers still believing in the "divine right of kings" or "the sovereignty of States"; but the practical effect of a successful league of nations would be to limit the possible harm that these theories could do. It is safe to say that the movement away from national individualism and towards international mutualism would more than likely result in protecting small states in the assertion and maintenance of their inalienable but alienated rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In fact, in the course of a speech at Dublin (September 25, 1914) Premier Asquith took occasion to speak of "an equal level of opportunity and of independence between small States and great States — as between the weak and the strong; safeguards resting upon the common will of Europe — and I hope not of Europe alone — against aggression, against international covetousness, against bad faith, against

wanton recourse in case of dispute to the use of force and the disturbance of the peace." The German Imperial Chancellor has said that the object of any league of nations, organised to secure the peace of the world, must "create political conditions that do full justice to the free development of all nations small as well as great."

And yet, the proposed League of Nations would not conceive its mission to be that of a Big Brother to the less powerful states. It would not take itself too seriously as a palladin of liberty and justice. Though ultimate democracy and universal brotherhood may be the not unreasonable hope of the world, the League would not mistake itself for a Political Messiah. True enough, in practice and actual operation, it would be more than likely to recognise and protect the "rights" of small nations as against the "wrongs" of large nations. On the principle of live and let live it would probably encourage small nations to work out their own salvation, and through its Court and Council guard them against depredations. But, on the other hand, it would not recognise the theoretical rights of backward nations to remain backward and thus halt the whole parade of progress. No man has an inalienable right to be a nuisance or a menace to the com-

munity; nor has any nation, however large or however small. They, too, must get in step or get out of line.

We are all more or less cabined, cribbed and confined by circumstance. It is hard to break with the past and tear ourselves up by our roots. With all of our boasted freedom of will and independence of mind we are subject slaves of the tyrant tradition. It has been pointed out that the beginning of progress, of "verifiable progress," probably dates from the day we arose in rebellion against "customary law."¹ Ibsen tells us in one of his plays:² "We are all of us ghosts. It is not only what we have inherited from our father and mother that 'walk' in us; it is all sorts of dead ideas and lifeless old beliefs." And that is true. We permit the corpses of custom and convention to remain unburied until they almost corrupt the world.

Ever since the founding of this Republic we have interpreted the advice of Jefferson in his First Inaugural³ — about not letting ourselves get tangled

¹ Bagehot: *Physics and Politics*, Ch. VI, p. 132. Alfred Russel Wallace: *Letters and Reminiscences*.

² *Ghosts*, Act II.

³ "About to enter, fellow citizens, on the exercise of duties which comprehend everything dear and valuable to you, it is proper that you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our government, and consequently those which ought to shape its administration. I will compress them within the narrowest compass they will bear, stating the general prin-

up in the skein of European alliances¹ — to mean that we should “come out and be ye separate.” This is doubtful exegesis, but even if it is precisely what he meant, it is hardly pertinent to-day. Perhaps it was sage counsel for his day and generation, but since then we have had more than a hundred years of comparative freedom from strife in which to work out our own salvation — without either fear or trembling. President Wilson undoubtedly had this advice in mind, when, on Memorial Day, 1916, he delivered a very notable speech in the course of which he said: “I shall never myself consent to an entangling alliance, but would gladly assent to a disentangling alliance, an alliance which would disentangle the peoples of the world from

ciple, but not all its limitations. Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship, with all nations — entangling alliances with none.”— *Inauguration Address*, March 4, 1801.

Much to the same purport is a letter written to J. Correa de Serra, from Monticello, October 24, 1820, in the course of which he said: “. . . Nothing is so important as that America shall separate herself from the systems of Europe, and establish one of her own. Our circumstances, our pursuits, our interests, are distinct, the principles of our policy should be also. All entanglements with that quarter of the globe should be avoided if we mean that peace and justice shall be the polar stars of the American societies.”— *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. XV, pp. 285-7.

¹ “A vendetta, where men are bound together to fight others and revenge injuries, is an entangling alliance; a police force is not. It is to the latter class that the League belongs.”—A. Lawrence Lowell in an Article on “The League to Enforce Peace” in *The North American Review* for January, 1917.

those combinations in which they seek their own separate and private interests, and unite the peoples of the world to preserve the peace of the world upon a basis of common right and justice. There is liberty there, not limitation. There is freedom, not entanglement. There is the achievement of the highest thing for which the United States has declared its principle." Surely this is a very different thing from endorsing what George Bernard Shaw calls the "equilibrist diplomacy" of European states.

Here, in America, we have not had time to feel lonely in our "splendid isolation." We have been too busy building the nation, winning the West, and making the desert to blossom with wheat. But much water has flowed under the bridge since Washington delivered his Farewell Address.¹ We

¹ Because of the interest in Washington's advice, in reference to its bearing on the proposal that the United States join a League of Nations to Enforce Peace, it has seemed worth while to quote the passage from his Address which dwells upon the subject:

"... The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have as little political connection with them as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

"Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collections of her friendships or enmities.

are closer to-day to the uttermost parts of the earth than New England was to the Great Divide when the Colonies signed the original Articles of Confederation. The question, therefore, that presses for solution is whether or not America shall share the responsibilities as well as enjoy the prestige of a world power. Shall we assume the risks necessarily involved in becoming one of the signatory powers to a new kind of treaty? Shall we quit being simply ward politicians and become world politicians?

We are bound to have to face this question sooner or later; why not face it now? Mr. Wilson faced it when at Shadow Lawn he said: "The world will never be again what it has been. The United States will never be again what it has been. The United States was once in enjoyment of what we used to call splendid isolation. The three thousand miles of the Atlantic seemed to hold all European affairs at arm's length from us. The great

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon, to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. . . ."—Farewell Address, September 17, 1796.

spaces of the Pacific seemed to disclose no threat of influence upon our politics. Now, from across the Atlantic and from across the Pacific we feel to the quick the influences which are affecting ourselves. . . . It does not suffice to look, as some gentlemen are looking, back over their shoulders, to suggest that we do again what we did when we were provincial and isolated and unconnected with the great forces of the world, for now we are in the great drift of humanity which is to determine the politics of every country in the world.”¹

Mr. Hamilton Holt, in the course of an address delivered at the Lake Mohonk Conference on May 25, 1915, said: “It would seem to be the manifest destiny of the United States to lead in the establishment of such a league. The United States is the world in miniature. The United States is a demonstration to the world that all the races and peoples of the earth can live in peace under one form of government, and its chief value to civilisation is a demonstration of what this form of government is. And when we get the League of Peace, we shall find it will not satisfy the world any more than did the Articles of Confederation satisfy our forefathers. As they had abandoned their Con-

¹ November 4, 1916.

federation and established a more perfect Union, so we shall have to develop our League of Peace into that final world federation, which, the historian Freeman says, when it comes into existence, will be the most finished and most artificial production of political ingenuity."

For America this is the cross-roads of destiny. If some are still uncertain as to which path we ought to tread, others are thoroughly convinced that we should turn away from our splendid isolation and turn towards a more splendid fellowship with all the progressive nations of the earth.

CHAPTER VIII

A COURT OF REASON

THE idea of appealing to reason rather than to force — of settling vital disputes in court rooms instead of bloody angles — is not novel. Nor is the working out of the idea in programmes and proposals similar to those advocated by the League to Enforce Peace. More than two hundred years ago (1713) the Abbé Castel de St. Pierre published a book entitled *Projet de Traite pour rendre la Paix Perpetuelle*. It will be recalled that this was directly after the Treaty of Utrecht had been signed concluding the wars waged on the Continent during the early years of the eighteenth century. As outlined in this Project, it was proposed to organise a League of Nations whose members would all bind themselves to uphold and maintain public law by agreeing to the following six proposals:

1. The Sovereigns are to contract a perpetual and irrevocable alliance, and to name plenipotentiaries to hold, in a determined spirit, a permanent diet or congress, in which all differences between

the contracting parties are to be settled by arbitration or judicial decision.

2. The number of the Sovereigns sending plenipotentiaries to the congress is to be specified, together with those who are to be invited to accede to the treaty. The presidency of the congress is to be exercised by the Sovereigns in turn at stated intervals, the order of rotation and term of office being carefully defined. In like manner the quota to be contributed by each to the common fund, and its method of collection, are to be carefully defined.

3. The Confederation thus formed is to guarantee to each of its members the sovereignty of the territories it actually possesses, as well as the succession, whether hereditary or elective, according to the fundamental laws of each Country. To avoid disputes, actual possession and the latest treaties are to be taken as the basis of the mutual rights of the contracting Powers, while all future disputes are to be settled by arbitration of the Diet.

4. The Congress is to define the cases which would involve offending States being put under the ban of Europe.

5. The Powers are to agree to arm and take the

offensive in common and at the common expense, against any State thus banned, until it shall have submitted to the common will.

6. The plenipotentiaries in congress, on instructions from their Sovereigns, shall have power to make such rules as they shall judge important with a view to securing for the European Republic and each of its members all possible advantages.

It will be noted that the fifth proposal does not differ in principle from the third proposal of the League to Enforce Peace — except that the League does not propose to enforce awards and decisions, nor compel submission of disputes so long as actual war is not begun. If the Abbé's plan was not accepted and made operative at once it was not because it was impractical but because it was not practicable then. "I have yet many things to say unto you," said Jesus to his impatient disciples, "but ye cannot bear them now," (John 16:12). Great ideas, like great men, are sometimes born into the world before the world is ready for them. In 1713 the "fulness of time" had not come. But the seed that fell on stony ground has not died. This time we shall plant it in more fertile soil.

Nor was St. Pierre's plan the only one evolved and elaborated. As early as 1623 M. Emeric

Crucé¹ launched a similar project. And twenty years before St. Pierre's book was printed William Penn wrote and published his "holy experiment in civil government"² which also contained a proposal to use military force against any sovereign who refused to submit a dispute to an international body to be set up for the purpose of hearing and deciding international questions. Penn's plan, like St. Pierre's, included the enforcement of compliance with decisions. William Ladd's essay on a Congress of Nations was published in 1840. Kant, Bentham and the elder Rousseau also promulgated similar ideas in their generation.

Now, at last, it seems to be the consensus of opinion that the time is not premature for a definite movement in the direction of an international understanding and agreement that will make for international concord and the lessening of the likelihood of war. Beyond question it is the fact that the League does not essay the impossible which accounts for the enthusiasm with which it has been received and approved by practical statesmen, diplomats, and men of affairs all over the world.

The fact that the President of the United States

¹ See his book, *Le Nouveau Cynée*.

² *Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Dyct. Parliament, or Estates.*

has enthusiastically endorsed not only the central idea of a league of nations but the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace for insuring the world against future wars is a matter of first importance to all Americans. In his address before the first national convention of the League held in Washington, D. C., May 27, 1916, he said: "The peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, and as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilisation is at last in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established. . . . So sincerely do we believe in these things that I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realise these objects and make them secure against violation. . . . If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a movement for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people of the United

States would wish their Government to move along these lines: First, such a settlement with regard to their own immediate interests as the belligerents may agree upon. We have nothing material of any kind to ask for ourselves, and are quite aware that we are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Our interest is only in peace and its future guarantees. Second, an universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world, — a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence. . . . I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, when some common force will be brought into existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interest of all peoples and all governments, when coercion shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common justice, and a common peace."

In the previous chapter it was pointed out that the American States were independent and sov-

ereign. That is true. As a matter of fact, they were quite as jealous of their rights and prerogatives as are the several nations of Europe to-day. But the time came when, as a people, we grew so thoroughly convinced of the value of the Union that the majority were willing to fight for its preservation when secession and disunion threatened.

The principle of federation involves the fundamental principle of politics, which is compromise. Compromise is the price of peace in a complex world of conflicting interests. It is the price we pay for happiness and concord. And this is as true in public life as in private life. Without reciprocity, give and take, live and let live, we could have no family accord, no business harmony, no industrial amity, no social relations whatever.

The several units of the American federation agreed to disagree as to local matters, and either to agree on national and interstate matters, or else, in the event of disagreement, to refer the matter in dispute to some court for adjudication and settlement. The tribunal instituted for this purpose in America is the Supreme Court of the United States.

Now it so happens that at this writing there is a sharp controversy between the people and gov-

ernment of one of these states, Virginia, and the people and government of another state, West Virginia, over the question of whether or not West Virginia shall pay its share of the original debt of old Virginia, amounting to more than twelve million dollars.¹ Between any two European States this might very possibly constitute a *casus belli*. The reason why the borders of these states are not bristling with bayonets, the reason why their citizens are not arrayed in serried ranks along the frontiers, is not because Americans are any better than Europeans, nor because Virginians are any more just or sober than Frenchmen. It is because the machinery is all set-up and oiled for the settlement of just such disputes. The matter has gone before the United States Supreme Court, behind which is the "sanction" not only of public confidence (not earned by one decision, either), but also, as a matter of fact, the potential strength of the entire nation, of all the separate and several states, to back up the national will. There, at Washington, the issue will in all likelihood be settled, not amidst the clamour of battle, but in the tranquil atmosphere of reason; not by fists, but by facts; not by war, but by law. That something

¹ The exact amount of the award was \$12,393,000.

not unlike this may be brought to pass among the nations of the world, both as to federation and arbitration, is the ardent hope of many forward-looking men in all the leading countries.

Back of federation is arbitration. Here again, as was found to be true of federation, the principle itself is not novel or even experimental. It has been planted and has thrived in many fields of social activity. The present purpose is simply to extend the application of the principle to international relations. It is seldom or never true that an issue is so sharply drawn between right and wrong that there is absolutely nothing to arbitrate. Prejudice and willful misunderstanding are responsible for many of the conflicts of history. Surely it is as absurd to attempt to determine the right or wrong of a given matter by ordeal of battle as it is to judge the guilt or innocence of an alleged witch by trial by fire.

Perhaps we need once more to be reminded — even though the analogy may not go on all fours — that the time was when individuals took the settlement of their grievances in their own hands, and the *code duello* was everywhere in vogue. In the tenth century “trial by battle” was fully sanctioned by the State. The disputants went out into

the public field and fought it out. The Judge by law was obliged to adjourn court and render a verdict in favour of the winner. In the early days in America the ethics of frontier life gave to the buckskin pioneer the right to use a handy revolver in settling his dispute with an adversary. We had six-shooter diplomacy in America long before we had shirt-sleeve diplomacy, and Colonel Bowie was more popular in those days than Machiavelli. As these outlying communities became more thickly populated, and grew more "civilised," the disputants took their quarrels to an established court for settlement. Much the same thing was true as to controversies between families, groups, communities, and states. Compulsory arbitration is never welcomed by the party that knows itself to be in the wrong, nor feared by the party that is sure of the righteousness of its cause. Before long the sanction of society and the approval of mankind will be given to this principle of arbitration, as among the nations of the world.

In his introduction to Mr. Woolf's splendid book,¹ Mr. George Bernard Shaw says, "In the territories of the United States, pioneered by men quite as civilised by teaching and traditon as their

¹ L. S. Woolf, *International Government*, p. XVI.

cousins in London and Brighton, the revolver and the bowie knife reigned where the sheriff and the vigilance committee fell short. And the sixteen-inch gun and the submarine torpedo reign in Europe at present solely because there is no super-national sheriff or vigilance committee to adjust the disputes of nations."

Nor is the application of the principle of arbitration novel in international relations. Two Tribunals have been established to decide such controversies as arise from time to time between the United States and Canada; one to deal with such questions as boundary waters and the other with claims between the citizens of the two countries.

It will surprise many to know that no less than thirteen cases have been decided by The Hague Tribunal and that about two hundred arbitrations took place between 1815 and 1900.¹ It will be said that these were relatively unimportant matters; that nations do not and will not submit questions of honor or vital interest. In the main, it

¹ W. Evans Darby in a Supplement to his *International Tribunals* entitled *Modern Pacific Settlements*, lists 477 cases between 1794 and 1900. It is estimated that there have been about 200 since 1900 and that there were 82 or 83 before 1794, making a total of 960. Two hundred and nine arbitration treaties were in force in 1914 when the war broke out.

is true that the questions referred to the International Tribunal for consideration (for without the "sanction" provided for in the League's programme an International Tribunal could do little more than consider matters voluntarily submitted) were of minor importance and did not involve in any way the prerogatives of sovereignty. But surely the Dogger Banks Fisheries case was a question of "honour." Those who know say that England, particularly London, was stirred with indignation and excitement as it seldom has been. The action of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, in firing on the trawlers, sinking the *Crane*, wounding six fishermen, and killing two, was described as "an unspeakable and unparalleled and cruel outrage." The findings and indemnity (£65,000) of the International Commission of Inquiry was accepted and the dispute was at an end.¹

The execution of the first proposal of the League would mean the setting-up of an International Judicial Tribunal to interpret existing treaties and to administer the existing international law. The Hon. William Howard Taft, President of the League to Enforce Peace, has pointed out that a

¹ For a more detailed statement of the issues involved in this celebrated case see Appendix, page 303.

Court to administer international justice is not new. In an address delivered before the National Educational Association at Madison Square Garden, New York, on July 3d, 1916, he said, referring to this proposal, that "the proposal is practical and is justified by precedent. The Supreme Court of the United States, exercising the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Court, sits as a permanent international tribunal to decide issues between the States of the Union. From time to time questions arise between States not settled by the Federal Constitution or Federal statutes. Take the case of Kansas against Colorado, heard and decided by the Supreme Court. Kansas sued Colorado, complaining that Colorado was using for irrigation the Arkansas River running through both States, so as to deprive Kansas of its use. Congress had no power to control Colorado. The case was decided, not by a law of Congress, not by the law of Kansas, not by the law of Colorado, for the law of neither applied. It was decided by the principle of International Law. It was International Law alone that fixed the lines between the States and the Supreme Court enforced them." ¹

The Wilson-Bryan treaties, accepted in principle

¹ See also the first of the Taft-Bryan debates.

by thirty-three nations, signed by thirty nations and ratified by twenty nations up to this writing, are really an application of the idea of a Commission of Inquiry, concerning which we shall have somewhat to say in the following chapter. But because of the likeness, as well as the difference, between the central principle of all these treaties and the essential idea of the League to Enforce Peace (dilatatory treatment) it seems desirable to quote the articles of one of these treaties at this point. Save for a few changes introduced into the treaties with the Netherlands and with Great Britain, all the treaties signed are identic, *mutatis mutandis*.

ARTICLE I. The high contracting parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, which diplomacy shall fail to adjust, shall be submitted for investigation and report to an International Commission, to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding Article; and they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and report.

ARTICLE II. The International Commission shall be composed of five members, to be appointed as follows: One member shall be chosen from

each country, by the Government thereof; one member shall be chosen by each Government from some third country; the fifth member shall be chosen by common agreement between the two Governments in equal proportion. The International Commission shall be appointed within four months after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty; and vacancies shall be filled according to the manner of the original appointment.

ARTICLE III. In case the high contracting parties shall have failed to adjust a dispute by diplomatic methods, they shall at once refer it to the International Commission for investigation and report. The International Commission may, however, act upon its own initiative, and in such case it shall notify both Governments and request their co-operation in the investigation. The report of the International Commission shall be completed within one year after the date on which it shall declare its investigation to have begun, unless the high contracting parties shall extend the time by mutual agreement. The report shall be prepared in triplicate; one copy shall be presented to each Government, and the third retained by the Commission for its files. The high contracting parties reserve the right to act independently on the sub-

ject-matter of the dispute after the report of the Commission shall have been submitted.

ARTICLE IV. Pending the investigation and report of the International Commission, the high contracting parties agree not to increase their military or naval programmes, unless danger from a third power should compel such increase, in which case the party feeling itself menaced shall confidentially communicate the fact in writing to the other contracting party, whereupon the latter shall also be released from its obligation to maintain its military and naval *status quo*.

ARTICLE V. The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof; and by the President of the Republic of Salvador, with the approval of the Congress thereof; and the ratifications shall be exchanged as soon as possible. It shall take effect immediately after the exchange of ratifications, and shall continue in force for a period of five years; and it shall thereafter remain in force until twelve months after one of the high contracting parties have given notice to the other of an intention to terminate it.

CHAPTER IX

A CONGRESS OF NATIONS

To say that it is none of our business how the other half lives is to invite disaster. It isn't necessary to discuss the ethical question: Am I my brother's keeper? We are not especially interested right now in what Mazzini calls the philosophy of Cain. To-day it is as true in respect to the relations between nations as it is in respect to the relations between groups and classes within a nation,—that the outside public is no longer an "innocent bystander." We are a part of the controversy and are driven by the exigencies of modern life to take sides in practically every issue. To remain parochial and live a sequestered life of ease apart in this age of hourly newspapers and of radiograms, of common wants and of common sources of supply, it would be necessary to build a cabin and dwell in the backwoods.

"There must be a just and settled peace," said the President of the United States in his Speech

of Acceptance,¹ “and we here in America must contribute the full force of our enthusiasm and of our authority as a nation to the organisation of that peace upon world-wide foundations that cannot easily be shaken. No nation should be forced to take sides in any quarrel in which its own honour and integrity and the fortunes of its own people are not involved; but no nation can any longer remain neutral as against any willful disturbance of the peace of the world. The effects of war can no longer be confined to the areas of battle. No nation stands wholly apart in interest when the life and interests of all nations are thrown into confusion and peril. If hopeful and generous enterprise is to be renewed, if the healing and helpful arts of life are indeed to be revived when peace comes again, a new atmosphere of justice and friendship must be generated by means the world has never tried before. The nations of the world must unite in joint guarantees that whatever is done to disturb the whole world's life must first be tested in the whole world's court of opinion before it is attempted.”

The time has indeed arrived when it has become

¹ Reply to the formal notification of his renomination. Read at Long Branch, N. J., September 2, 1916.

almost, if not altogether, as impossible for us to remain neutral in reference to international controversies as it is for us to continue neutral with reference to industrial quarrels and disputes in domestic affairs. With all the marvellous improvements in aerial navigation, it is not practicable for any neutral nation to pick up, bag and baggage, and move to another planet. Nations that happen for the moment to be neutral nations are as much concerned as are the belligerents in the paramount question of whether this world of ours is to be a world of fire-sides or firing-lines, of factories or fortresses, of wheat-fields or battle-fields.

If the way of the neutral is particularly hard to-day, there is a reason for it. It is very largely because the material conditions of current life, the machinery of industry, commerce, and finance, have changed more rapidly than the political machinery — and the mental outlook of most people. In spite of the pressing need, we have not yet developed an “international mind,” nor have we invented and constructed machinery that will operate both quickly and smoothly in adjusting international misunderstandings and disagreements.

The fact of interdependence among the nations

has become so clearly apparent as to need no proving. The masses of the people the world over receive to-day almost identical education. Similar religious beliefs prevail everywhere. All have practically the same access to sources of knowledge and information. The same sorts of papers are read all over the world. And not only do the people of one country read about the people of another country, but they visit them, which means an interchange of culture. What is grown in one hemisphere is often eaten in another. The spirit of the age is a sounding board that carries the voice to the uttermost parts of the world, thus providing, in effect, an international audience. Competent writers are now able to reach millions where once they could not hope to address more than hundreds. There are international organizations of labour and international congresses of every description. It is almost a fad to study foreign languages and conditions in groups and societies and clubs. The results of scientific research and political and sociological experience are, by means of the new machinery of intercourse, made at once available. If any question remains as to the interdependence of modern nations, it ought to be enough to point to the way the war

itself has spread from land to land, almost around the entire circuit of the globe.¹

But, some one may ask, What has all this to do with the second Proposal of the League's programme, which is what we have under consideration in this chapter? It has a great deal to do with it; for it means that the causes of conflict to-day are not what they were yesterday. The jealousies and petty personal quarrels of reigning dynastic Houses are not the real reasons why modern nations fight. Out of new conditions new problems have arisen. These new problems flow from the fact that the world is becoming more and more of a parish—"a great community," to employ the happy phrase of the late Professor Royce. These problems have to do with fears about disturbing the balance of power, with debates about spheres of influence, with discrimination as to immigration exclusion, with the unquenchable desire for a place in the sun, and so forth. To-day, nations are neighbours, and friendship is not fostered by tariff walls any more than by spite fences. We have simply got to learn to live together—since we must. The international problem is, after all,

¹ This paragraph paraphrases an Article by Sydney Brooks on "The Dream of Universal Peace" in *Harper's Magazine* for November, 1916.

nothing more than the social problem on a grand scale. The proposed Council of Conciliation, which would probably be composed of representative statesmen, publicists, financiers and men of affairs, would be, in character and purpose, not so very different from Commissions of Inquiry with which we are already more or less familiar. Its principal duty would be to investigate, with a view to discovering, the essential facts, to deduce conclusions from these facts, and then to make recommendations to the parties at variance.

The League does not propose to enter into argument with those who urge the desirability of a World Court whose decisions are mandatory and of an International Legislature with authority to lay down the law for all; it merely says that we should not attempt too much at once. The new idealist is very different from the old idealist who built his air castles without substantial foundations on the solid ground. He has only an academic interest in utopias and reads Plato and More and Morris more for entertainment than instruction. And that is why the proposal for a Council of Conciliation is at most but a tentative step towards what may ultimately prove to be a sort of international court for the amicable settle-

ment of all political troubles that carry the seeds of pregnant war.

It isn't all going to be smooth sailing. And if the details are not discussed here more fully it is not because they are being ignored or are considered in any sense trivial. Such details as the number and character of the personnel of such a Council, and precisely how it will function in a crisis, are questions of the first magnitude. But first of all, the idea must be grasped and accepted. After that the obstacles in the way will not prove insurmountable.

It may be well to remind ourselves at this juncture that the idea of a Commission of Inquiry for the purposes both of ascertaining the facts and of postponing hostilities with the hope that dilatory treatment will heal the wound, is not novel.¹ The First Hague Convention (1899) for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes created an International Commission of Inquiry of which Article IX reads as follows:

¹ Professor Frederic de Martens, the jurisconsult of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, is credited with having first suggested the idea in connection with international relations, but Darby lists no less than 118 "mixed commissions" in the nineteenth century and 250 conciliation cases in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Mixed commissions did not differ greatly from what are now called International Commissions of Inquiry.

“In disputes of an international nature involving neither honour nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on points of fact, the contracting powers deem it expedient and desirable that the parties who have not been able to come to an agreement by means of diplomacy, should, as far as circumstances allow, institute an International Commission of Inquiry, to facilitate a solution of these disputes by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation.”

Perhaps it will be urged that all this is very interesting, but that, as a matter of fact, Hague Conventions, with their International Commissions of Inquiry, *et cetera*, completely failed to prevent this present war and that therefore such conventions are quite worthless. Yet before the war the Hague Court had been appealed to no less than thirteen times by different nations and proved to be a satisfactory method of adjustment every time. Also it is important to make it clear that no authority was given The Hague (as Professor de Martens urged should be given) “for fixing, if possible, the responsibility for the facts,” nor was any arrangement made for requiring the submission of the matters of dispute other than by verbal agree-

ment.¹ The League wants these matters submitted and discussed and would not halt at "fixing the responsibility," but it is not ready to trust nations voluntarily to submit all questions of every nature, including points of honour, vital interests, and so forth, and that is why specific provision is made for the institution of a Council completely qualified to handle such issues as arise that cannot be determined by the established principles of international law. It also explains why provision is made in the Third Proposal of the League's programme for coercion and compulsion, for the employment of economic pressure and military force to require the submission of questions in dispute before any nation-member actually goes to war or commits acts of hostility against another nation-member.

In a great number of cases the Council of Conciliation would be called upon to act as a Court of Inquiry or, it may be, it would in practice be deemed expedient by the Council as a whole to select from its members a special Investigation Committee whose sole duty it would be to ascertain and elucidate the facts. Sometimes these facts would be events and sometimes they would

¹ See Hull's *The Second Hague Conference*, p. 291.

be motives. It will be seen at a glance that such an International Commission of Inquiry would have its hands full, especially when it came to exploring for motives and intentions. The task would be, as Dr. Talcott Williams has said, "a very difficult assignment to cover." But municipal courts tackle the problem every day.

It goes without saying that the integrity of such a Commission would have to be as high above suspicion and as far removed from prejudice as the Judicial Tribunal, though constituted of men of quite different training and temper. If the temperament of judges would need to be judicial, then the temperament of these investigators would need to be scientific. They would need to keep constantly in mind the admonition of an old French scientist, "You must use the utmost care, or you will find what you are looking for."¹

It is highly probable that the Council would appoint from among its membership an Executive Committee, or Ministry to the League, which would be vested with authority to act, or at least with authority to say to the several nation-members of the League: "The hour has struck when

¹ Quoted by Montrose J. Moses in his *Maurice Maeterlinck: A Study*.

you should call your armies into the field to fulfil the obligations of your treaty." Just what degree of authority would be conferred upon this quasi-cabinet, quite certain to be made up of the direct representatives of the rulers of the great powers, and just how its members would be elected or appointed, are matters that must be decided later on, probably at an international conference.

How much of a law-making body the Council would turn out to be in actual practice, by virtue of its awards, decisions and conclusions, is as yet problematic. It could hardly, in justice, actually make laws for the whole world unless all the nations in the world were represented. And it is not as yet finally decided whether or not to include in the League the so-called "backward states." Many urge that to do so would be to throw the door wide open for every sort of local quarrel becoming the occasion of a world war. It seems more likely that legislative functions will be assumed by the International Assembly to be set up. This matter is fully discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER X

THE AGE OF DISCUSSION

WE are living in what Bagehot has called "the age of discussion" and it is a sad anomaly that we should be so willing to give power of attorney to fighting men to do our thinking for us. Bayonets are prejudiced judges, and matters of moment ought not to be debated in bloody forums by machine guns. Great policies should be thought out and wrought out — not fought out. This is more than an epigram; it is a truth. Only rarely in history do issues arise when war appears to be the one and only way out of a difficult situation.

There is no panacea that, over-night, will cure the world of the red plague of war. The political body is so permeated with the poison that it may take decades, or centuries, to get it out of the social system. But if the job is one that cannot be done on a Saturday half-holiday, that is only an added reason why treatment should no longer be postponed. A diagnosis shows that the causes of

war¹ are not obscure: Arbitrary authority, imperial ambitions, the need of room for expansion, commercial greed, false doctrines of prestige, patriotism, sovereignty, and so forth. What is wanted now is that the leaves on the tree of our political life shall be for the healing of the nations. To speak plainly, and without metaphor, what is desperately needed is an authoritative body to translate contemporary international morality into the terms of international law. A representative body should assemble periodically for the purpose of revising old, and making new, rules of conduct for the guidance of the society of nations.

Reference has been made to contemporary international morality: for there are fashions in morals — *sartor resartus*. Social character appears to be as much an attainment as individual character. Social morality is not fixed and stable. Its gradual growth is dependent on the slow evolution of conscience. The light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world was once as dim as a glow-worm. Writing on this interesting subject, Walter Bagehot tells us, in a familiar

¹ Some of the causes of modern war are discussed at length in Part III of this book.

passage in his *Physics and Politics*,¹ that "there are many savages who can hardly be said to care for human life, who have scarcely the family feelings, who are eager to kill all old people (their parents included) as soon as they get old and become a burden, who have scarcely the sense of truth, whose ideas of marriage are so vague and slight that they practice 'communal marriage' in which all the women of the tribe are common to all the men. If any reasoning is safe as to prehistoric man, the reason which imputes to him a deficient sense of morals is safe. . . . It is not now maintained that all men have the same amount of conscience. Indeed, only a most shallow disputant who did not understand even the plainest facts of human nature could ever have maintained it; if men differ in anything they differ in the fineness and the delicacy of their moral intuitions." There is no denying the fact that there are changing styles in social ethics.

And what is the reaction of the common conscience of the world to this present war? If it were possible to take a picture of the minds and hearts of men and women everywhere to-day we should doubtless discover from the composite

¹ Chapter IV, p. 72.

photograph that all sorts and conditions of men, on farms, in shops, and at the battle-fronts; men and women; belligerents and neutrals; the soldiers in the trenches and the citizens at home,—that the vast majority of them are opposed to war. This is not to say that the movement towards universal peace is necessarily going to be greatly advanced on account of the present war. In all probability it will be. But right now we know very little about that, and should not permit ourselves to forget that the peace movement in this country, which by 1860 had gained considerable headway, was set back perhaps a quarter of a century by the Civil War. This present war is quite as likely to retard as to advance the movement towards peace. Much depends on the final terms of settlement.

There never was a time in the history of the world when community sentiment and popular opinion, when the moral reaction of mankind, meant so much as to-day. If proof were needed for this assertion it is to be found in the way that favourable and friendly opinion is sought, solicited, cajoled and purchased; begged, borrowed, stolen and manufactured. This thing, public opinion, is difficult enough to assay and measure, and yet, there it is, as powerful as gravity, as force-

ful as radium, as real as cohesion, as weighty as the pressure of atmosphere, fourteen and sevenths pounds to the square inch. The assiduous cultivation of public conviction and sentiment is no small labour. Those that have entrusted to them the tremendous task of re-establishing peace on a more solid foundation at the close of this war, cannot possibly be deaf to the authoritative commands of their contemporaries. The sovereign authority that resides in public opinion can be ignored only with peril. The social judgment must be consulted and the social will obeyed. But this will be just as imperative in all the years to come, after the war, as immediately at its close. Therefore an institution must be permanently set up and dedicated to progress. The Palace of Peace must be re-christened the Palace of Justice.

How do we know that the time has at last come when the common conscience of the world is restive so long as war persists; that the public opinion of the world is arrayed in determined opposition to war? We do not know; not as a positive certainty. We are, however, fairly sure that men and women have seriously investigated the problem of war and appraised its cost and value. And we are reasonably confident that after this careful in-

vestigation and honest appraisal their minds are practically made up on this issue. The majority of people everywhere feel and think that the apologists for war have miserably failed to make their case. The survey of the problem from every viewpoint has only strengthened the case for civilisation. No wonder the nations are asking, What must we do to be saved? Saved from the awful waste of men and money! Saved from poignant sorrow and immemorial woe! Saved from the folly and futility of war! It is not going to be possible to legislate war out of the world by an executive proclamation of permanent peace. And yet the problem of peace is a problem of international organisation and international legislation. Like so many other movements away from barbarism and towards civilisation, advance is necessarily slow and tedious. Let us hasten, therefore, and get started without further delay.

The League to Enforce Peace, it will be recalled, proposes that "conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in

the decisions of the Judicial tribunal." Such conferences as are contemplated would be, in a way, a continuation of the First and Second Hague Conferences. Nor would their purpose be essentially different from such tentative international conferences as the Congress of Vienna, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle and the Congress of Verona. The Congress of 1815 (The Second Peace of Paris), it will be remembered, proposed that a series of similar meetings should be held at fixed intervals to discuss and decide questions having to do with "the peace and prosperity of the nations."

There are two distinctive types of legislation: one which lays down the law of the land; the other which makes rules to guide the conduct of individuals in their relations to one another. This latter kind of legislation, interpreting in specific and precise terms the concrete rights and duties of nations, might very possibly become the principal function of these Conferences for the clarification and elaboration of international law. They would constitute a rudimentary legislative organ, which might, in course of time, develop into a *bona fide* congress of nations, an international assembly, for deliberation and action. In a way they would adumbrate the coming "parliament of man," but

with no ambition to fulfil in a day or a decade the dream of Tennyson.

One thing is certain. Unless these Conventions are to end in sound and fury signifying nothing they will have to consider vital questions in detail. The condemnation of congresses and conventions is that they are too often little more than debating societies. If these periodical assemblies make it their business to consider, in practical fashion, first one pressing problem of international relations after another, they may, by the alchemy of discussion, transmute many non-justiciable questions into justiciable questions. This would, of course, increase the number of questions determinable by the detailed application of the principles of international law and decrease the number that do not admit of such decision. For it should be noted, as others have been at pains to point out, that nations are not, either in principle or practice, opposed to submitting for arbitration questions of honour or those that involve vital interest.¹ The word arbitration has a double meaning. Sometimes an international judicial tribunal

¹ Mr. L. S. Woolf calls attention to the fact that Sir Thomas Barclay has made the point that the ALABAMA case, the Venezuela Boundary case, the Alaskan Fur Seal difficulty, and the Alaskan Boundary case, all of them involved either national honour or vital interest or both.

is termed a court of arbitration when it ponders and decides a given question with reference to the facts in the case and the laws which apply. Other "arbitration courts" inquire as to the facts, material and psychological, and then offer suggestions which look towards a fair settlement. The first kind of court is not unpopular even when vital interests are at stake; the objection to the latter kind of arbitration is that it is likely to be arbitrary. There is no law to govern or determine the decision.

It is clear that both in these Assemblies and in the Council of Conciliation some decision will have to be reached as to whether or not the majority is to rule. It cannot be successfully denied that the provision that the conventions of The Hague Meetings, in order to become binding on all, had to be agreed to by all, made it next to impossible to come to any agreement upon anything. It is clear that the functions of the Convention, if not indeed of the Council also, would be at least quasi-legislative and the making of much needed laws cannot await unanimity. A new kind of filibuster would become discouragingly effective, and one obstreperous nation, or a caucus of obstructionists, would always be able to hold the whole world back.

What are some of the questions that must become the real "agenda" of these Conventions that it is proposed to hold from time to time? What else, in addition to the familiar question of the conduct of nations in war? A few that may be suggested are questions pertaining to the treatment of backward peoples by advanced peoples;¹ questions pertaining to the acquisition of new territory; questions pertaining to free trade and the open door; questions pertaining to the freedom of the seas;² questions pertaining to the neutralisation of buffer states, and of the highways of the sea; questions pertaining to simultaneous reduction of armaments;² questions pertaining to the treatment of the nationals of one country within the territory of another, both in the matter of transference of provinces and in the matter of

¹ See articles on this subject by Theodore Marburg in the *Independent* for June 20 and November 7, 1912; also letters written in reply by Count Apponyi (*Independent*, March 16, 1913) and by Prince Di Cassano (*Independent*, September 25, 1913). See also the fifth chapter of *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, by Arthur Greenwood, et al., and James Bryce's *The Relations of the Advanced and Backward Nations of Mankind*.

² If when the belligerent nations of Europe assemble to make a treaty of peace it becomes evident that the time is ripe for action on both of these questions, why that will be so much clear gain. The League to Enforce Peace, however, does not make their advance settlement a preliminary condition. It would be possible for the league of nations to be organised and for such questions to remain open for subsequent determination by Convention or Council or Court.

race discrimination,¹—these and many other questions.

It will be seen at a glance that if these Conventions are really to function in such a way as to convert the abstract principle of international morality into the concrete rules of right conduct for individual nations in specific relations, they will not sit with folded arms to while the hours away. They will have plenty to do.

Each one of these several questions deserves a chapter for adequate treatment—at the very least a paragraph. It will not be possible in this place to do more than mention them and call attention to the fact that they are all live questions, pulsing with the possibilities of good or evil. Some of them have several wars to their credit already and unless greed and prejudice are checked by the common conscience of mankind, backed up by puissant force, they will occasion still other wars. For example, Americans will need to develop a more fair and friendly attitude towards Orientals, or at the very least resolve to keep their treaties with them.²

¹ Sydney L. Gulick's *The American Japanese Problem and America and the Orient*.

² "When we turn, however, to the story of what many Chinese have suffered here our cheeks tingle with shame. The story would be incredible were it not overwhelmingly verified by ample documentary evidence. Treaties have pledged rights

This would bring the matter down from cloudland and impress us with the imperative necessity of dealing directly with one of the non-justiciable questions that is occasioning not a little friction and that might very possibly in course of time lead to the most serious of consequences.

It will not do for the United States to proclaim peace to the nations abroad and itself thoughtlessly do things that provoke war. Justice, as well as charity, begins at home, and international morality must be practised as well as preached.

immunities, and protection. They have nevertheless been disregarded and even knowingly evaded; and this not only by private individuals but by legislators and administrative officials. Scores of Chinese have been murdered, hundreds wounded and thousands robbed by anti-Asiatic mobs, with no protection for the victims or punishment for the culprits. State legislatures, and even congresses, have enacted laws in contravention of treaty provisions. . . . If the faithful observance of treaties between the nations of Europe constitutes their very foundation of civilisation, . . . is not the faithful observance of treaties with Asiatics the foundation of right relations with them?"—Sidney L. Gulick's *America and the Orient*, p. 59.

CHAPTER XI

IN RESTRAINT OF WAR

THE time has come for a Congress of Nations to assemble and become partners in an open conspiracy in restraint of war. That, in sum, is the central idea of the League to Enforce Peace. But the word must become flesh and the idea must take form and substance in the actual setting-up of such machinery as an International Judicial Tribunal and an International Council of Conciliation along the lines and for the purposes explained in the earlier chapters of this book. It will not do, however, to stop there. Originality cannot be claimed for either of these two institutions. The First Hague Conference, as has already been pointed out, organised International Commissions of Inquiry for the purpose of investigating and passing upon questions voluntarily submitted for study and award. The Second Hague Conference worked out the details of a plan for a World Court and agreed upon practically everything but the manner of selecting the person-

nel. Furthermore the obligatory postponement of all hostilities until the matter in dispute, whether a minor question or a question involving national honour, has been thoroughly canvassed in the eyes of the world is the essential thing in all the Bryan treaties. Sometimes this is called the dilatory treatment of international problems.

For the carrying out of either or all of these several proposals we have heretofore trusted to the sanction of the public opinion of the world. And, of course, in the long run, the democratic governance of the nations must depend on the sanctioning force of enlightened and humanitarian public opinion. But to trust in its immediate effectiveness is to take counsel of faith and not of knowledge, of hopes and not of facts. If States are not yet ready to trust uncompelled individuals to obey the mandates of public opinion in domestic affairs, how much less is the world at large ready to trust uncompelled States to act as ever under the great Taskmaster's eye. It is nothing but philosophical anarchism, anarchism of the chair; nothing more, nothing less. In his excellent book¹ Mr. E. V. Zenker defines anarchism as "the perfect, unstinted self-government of the individual, and con-

¹ *Anarchism; Criticism and History of the Anarchist Theory.*

sequently the absence of any kind of external government.”

We have already discussed the subject of public opinion in previous chapters. Suffice it to say here that it is not to deny the latent power of public opinion to insist that as yet this moral army of ideas and ideals, so far from being efficiently mobilised, is little more than a mob of tatterdemalions. Not infrequently the public opinion of the world is uninstructed; often it is cowed by might and duress, and, again and again, when it should be most outspoken, it is censored and muzzled.¹ These are faults that must be mended and the job cannot be done in a generation. Meantime the civilised world must protect itself against recurrent lapses into barbarism. Public opinion and moral fervour and Christian conscience did not prevent this war. What slightest assurance have we that they will prevent a similar or more horrible war a decade hence? None whatsoever.

But any effort that looks towards a larger grouping of States, any effort to organise even a very tentative society of nations, will be a tre-

¹ It is freely charged that both Lloyd George's first speech as Prime Minister and President Wilson's note of December 18 were temporarily "held up" by British censors.

mendously difficult enterprise. With what skill we can command we shall have to steer a course between the Scylla and Charybdis of sovereignty and nationality, to say nothing of stopping our ears to the siren songs of our admirable and sincere friends, the conscientious pacifists.

But how, asks the sincere sceptic? How can the world be born again when it is old? The answer to this entirely pertinent question that has been formulated by the League to Enforce Peace, in its Third Proposal,¹ is that we must make up our minds that at least for the present and probably for some time yet to come we shall have to depend upon force, organised not to make war but to make war less likely. We shall have to create something better than the old "offensive and de-

¹ "The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing."

The following interpretation has been authorised by the Executive Committee:

"The signatory powers shall jointly employ diplomatic and economic pressure against any one of their number that threatens war against a fellow signatory without having first submitted its dispute for international inquiry, conciliation, arbitration or judicial hearing, and awaited a conclusion, or without having in good faith offered so to submit it. They shall follow this forthwith by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be dealt with as provided in the foregoing."

fensive alliances," a new kind of "league" of progressive powers that will be offensive against the offender and defensive of the undeniable right of the majority of mankind to live in peace when a belligerent and pugnacious minority would heedlessly plunge the world into avoidable wars. That is why the League has introduced into its programme of action the feature of requiring and compelling by force of arms, if that become necessary, the submission of disputes for public hearing before actual war is undertaken by any signatory Power. It means, in effect, that until world order is restored and assured by international civil processes we must band ourselves together into a kind of International Vigilance Committee,¹ a *posse comitatus*.

Just how would the league of nations interfere and intervene? Intervention would be undertaken in four ways. In the first place the joint nations would attempt to influence any recalcitrant nation-member of the league by *moral suasion*,—that is to say, it would put a nation seeking war before the judgment seat of civilisation and require it to evidence a decent respect to

¹ See Edward A. Filene's address delivered before the first annual assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace at Washington, May 26, 1916, now published as Bulletin No. 16.

the opinions of mankind. It will not any longer be possible to maintain that there is no moral obligation on the part of a sovereign State. Perhaps it is not yet clear, as President Wilson affirmed in his Washington address before the League, "that nations must in the future be governed by the same high code of honour that we demand of individuals." Perhaps it may not at this time be practicable to demand at once a single standard of morality,—that is to say that nations must obey the Moral Law in precisely the same way that individuals must. But the tendency of modern times is certainly in that general direction. For a long while it was an aphorism of law that a corporation had no soul. To-day we say that guilt is personal and officers of corporations are held to strict accountability for the wrongs that they commit against the welfare of society. The feeling is rapidly growing that something very much like this must be demanded of the nations.

The second form of intervention which is implied in this proposal is intervention by *social ostracism*. This is implicit without being said in so many words. Any nation which pointblank refused to submit its grievance or dispute to the Court of Arbitration or to the Council of Con-

ciliation before initiating hostilities would, by virtue of its refusal, become an outlaw nation. It would, in a sense, place itself beyond the pale and would most certainly be made to feel the force of public disapproval. And, what is more, there is every likelihood that the intervention would go much farther than that and would practically amount to non-intercourse.¹

This leads us directly to the next form of intervention contemplated in the League's programme,—intervention by *economic boycott*. Because of the interdependence of nations in the modern world² it has become possible for one nation practically to ruin the economic life of another nation. For we are members one of another, and the hand cannot say to the head, I have no need of thee. A weapon of persuasion or compulsion that has not yet been taken from the wall and used is the economic pressure which one nation, or group of nations, can bring to bear upon another nation, or group of nations, by withdrawing not only diplomatic intercourse but by closing the postal and telegraphic systems, interstate transportation, en-

¹ Commercial intercourse with France was suspended by act of Congress of the United States, June 13, 1798; with Great Britain, March 1, 1809.

² See Chapter IX, p. 109.

try of foreign ships, and so forth. More than this, a commercial and financial boycott could be employed which would close all foreign exchanges to members of the outlaw state, would prohibit all quotations of foreign stock exchanges, all dealings in stocks and shares, all discounting and acceptances of trade bills, all loans for public or private purposes, and all payments of moneys due.¹

Many similar weapons are available in this arsenal but it is not improbable that the use of these few would so paralyse any modern state as to bring it to terms. The boycott is not a lovely weapon. It would not be a nice thing to have to use it, but it would probably be less brutal than military warfare and might very possibly serve to prevent hostilities. At any rate, the programme of the League involves its use — never as a measure of reprisal, be it understood, nor of economic warfare between rivals, but always for the world's welfare — with the hope that it would prove so effective that the actual employment of armies and navies might be rendered unnecessary. However, this is not at all certain. It is not inconceivable that by improved methods of production and dis-

¹ See John A. Hobson's *Towards International Government*, p. 91.

tribution, by scientific agriculture and modern industrial practice, nations might make themselves so self-sufficient as to be immune from this sort of attack. The use of the boycott is open to the very serious objections that not all nations would be equally harmed by its employment against them, and that, after all, it would injure non-combatants more than responsible aggressive governments.

The last form of intervention proposed is *military force*. The Treaty that would create such a league of nations as is contemplated would bind all the nation-members of the league, other than the recalcitrant nation, to use, if necessary, forcible means (by which, of course, is meant armies and navies), to require that the matter in dispute be submitted to the Court or Council before fighting is begun.¹ This is not the same thing as saying that the several nations, to become members of the League must pool their individual and independent military forces in such a way as to establish an international police force.² This is a common misconception of the purpose of the

¹ Mr. Hobson, in the same book, reminds us of the fact that on more than one occasion international force has been employed with quotas from several powers. Among them he mentions the Duleigno demonstration of 1880, the blockade of Crete in 1897, the case of Pekin in 1900, the demonstration at Antivari, and the occupation of Scutari in 1913.

² Cp. Chapter XII, p. 176.

League. It is not conceived as the function of the proposed league of nations to keep the peace in precisely the same sense that a police force conceives of its function in municipal life. Lawlessness and mob-riots occur only when a police force fails to do what it is purposely constituted to do. The armies and navies of the nation-members would be employed to apprehend the nation which begins hostilities and require it to bring its case to court before continuing to make war. More than likely this would resolve itself into a joint punitive expedition. The League would not subpoena a nation for trial as a wrong-doer.

The ultimate moral authority of the Court or Council of the League to determine, with finality, vital issues would not be assumed by the league of nations nor granted by the joint members. Therefore any member if dissatisfied with the decision, or award, or recommendation, might — according to the terms of the treaty — after a stated time had been consumed for investigation and report, take up weapons and appeal to the court of last resort — the arbitrament of arms.

Three motives impel to this proposed course of action. The first is the awakened conscience of mankind, the quickened sense of duty to do all that

is humanly possible to prevent the repetition of such a terrible war as this one which has filled the world with woe unutterable. The second is the motive of economy, the desire to escape the vicious circle of competitive armaments with all that is involved in the way of incalculable costliness. The third and tributary motive takes its rise among the nations that have every desire to live their lives in peace, and simply means that they have some rights which militarist nations are bound to respect. The practical impossibility of any nation which prefers to remain neutral escaping the disastrous effects of present-day war¹ leads all such to think of determined belligerents as disturbers of the public peace.

Now it is not the use of armies and navies but the abuse of them that has convinced the nations that their employment should, in some measure, be controlled. Armaments, as such, are not wrong; but the piling up of armaments may very well be dangerous. Explosives are always dangerous, and armies and navies are potential explosives. A license is required by municipal law, in most civil communities, for the privilege of

¹ See President Wilson's Speech quoted in note on page 155, Chapter XII.

carrying a pocket weapon, because of the constant temptation to use it. Always it is a latent menace. The League to Enforce Peace would not deny the right of any nation to carry a weapon, in other words to possess as large an army and navy as it cares to burden itself with; but it would keep its use under surveillance and insist that it be employed only in cases of dire extremity after every other means of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and conciliation has been tried and has failed to get satisfactory results. The consciousness of power and might is just as likely to make a swaggering bully out of a strong nation as out of a strong man. The adoption of the League's programme by the great Powers would tend to quell and control the temptation to threaten and menace other peoples and nations.

The League to Enforce Peace is not a cross between militarism and pacifism. It is a *modus operandi*. It is a strong thread by means of which the nations may possibly find a way out of the labyrinth of recurrent wars. It is not a case of carrying water on both shoulders; of trying to serve God and Mammon at the same time. It is a compromise with perfection. It is a frank acknowledgment of the fact that in this matter, as

in so many others, the truth is not in the bottom of a well, nor at the end of the rainbow, but in the middle of the road. It is practical idealism, a tentative effort in creative statesmanship. It is, if you please, political eclecticism. It would take the best that there is in military preparedness and avail itself of its value for physical defence and moral discipline and then it would use these means not for aggrandisement or ambition or revenge, but to protect the gains of civilisation and provide against a reversion to savagery, against "the rebarbarisation which is continually threatening civilisation."¹ It looks into the future far as human eye can see, but no farther. It does not fail to recognise the ultimate truth of the pacifists' position — as a consummation devoutly to be wished.

The temptation here will be to protest that one cannot serve two masters. Doubtless it will be said that those who urge the programme of the League to Enforce Peace are inconsistent. By rigorous definition and strict etymology that may be true, but consistency is a jewel which has lost a good deal of its lustre. After all, what is there

¹ See Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*. Read Oscar Straus' speech on "The Rebarbarization of the World," published by the League to Enforce Peace as Bulletin No. 21.

inconsistent in the proposals of the League? Is it inconsistent to maintain public and private charitable institutions for improving the condition of the poor at the same time that every effort is being made by legislation and education to reduce poverty to a minimum and perhaps to abolish it altogether? Is it inconsistent to support an army of doctors and to maintain an adequate number of hospitals at one and the same time that attempts are made by control of living conditions, by control of the birth-rate, and so forth, to remove the causes of contagion and transmission of disease and, perhaps, at length, to do away with disease altogether? One may take out an accident policy and at the same time consistently work for the installation of safety appliances and the reduction of railroad collisions. One may abhor every manifestation of vice and crime and still believe in courts and jails. In point of fact, one may believe in supporting an adequate and efficient state militia that is never to be used until every other instrumentality has first been tried and has failed to preserve the public peace.

The problem of preparedness goes much deeper than the surface and no off-hand solution ought to be attempted. Instinctive prejudice should not be

permitted to block the path of progress. Is it not rather pretentious to try to impale great numbers of intelligent people upon one or another horn of the dilemma? One may be neither a profiteer, who stands to gain by the propaganda for national preparedness, nor a guileless victim of militarist philosophy; and yet he may sincerely believe in preparedness. Of course armies and navies are very expensive, but so also is food; and while all of us might be better off with compulsory limitation and reduction of our rations, there is really no reason why we should go from the extreme of gluttony to the extreme of abstemiousness. The world can well be saved from the excessive cost of over-armaments. The operation of the League's programme would more than likely lead to this very thing.

The idea of complete disarmament, or of limitation of armaments, may be comparatively novel; but the principle of legal limitation is not new in social relationships, any more than we found the principle of federation or arbitration to be new. Already we have the limitation of hours of labour, of age for employment, of age of consent, of rates for transportation, and, in a measure, we also have the legal limitation of dividends. All these are accepted as just and desirable. The principle of

limitation by consent may well be gradually extended to cover armies and navies. It would come about as a sort of corollary and by-product of the improved organisation of the world. That is the way it has always been in the past. Just as rapidly as individuals and communities quit trying to settle their arguments by fighting them out — by invoking the law of the jungle — just so fast were they able to throw away their weapons of war and put their trust in something else. We hardly need to be reminded again that the time was when the individual, for self-protection, wore a suit of shining armour, because intrastate anarchy prevailed and personal hostilities were likely to start at any moment. But one does not need to go back that far. In more recent times American pathfinders and pioneers, living on the frontiers, were, as has already been pointed out, obliged to be constantly armed for self-protection, because they were subject at any moment to surprise attacks. As conditions gradually improved to the point where this likelihood of sudden attack was reduced to a minimum, these weapons of defence were thrown away. The time was when cities were military rivals and when the citizenry were in frequent armed conflict. Hence communities main-

tained, insofar as was practicable, independent armies. That day is now but a record in history. When small communities were organised into larger groups and those in turn became states, they were able to do away with competitive armaments and a great saving was effected.

Now it is quite reasonable to suppose that much the same thing will happen to the armaments of nations if anything approaching a federal arrangement can possibly be brought about. If by the mandatory provision for a preliminary submission of disputes before war is commenced the fear of sudden attack can be eliminated, then with it will also go the imperative need for extensive preparation for such possible attack. Not that there would necessarily be any "naval holiday" proclaimed, and not that there would necessarily be any positive fixing of the maximum limit of military preparedness, but merely that the desire for such extreme preparedness would die out with the need. If a nation could be insured and guaranteed against sudden attack it could afford to postpone military preparedness.

So far from proposing to do away with armaments in America, or even to reduce armaments, whether at once or in the proximate future, the

possibility would be that, on a basis of population, this country might even have to increase its military and naval forces,¹ in order to provide its quota for the international defence.

Some degree of preparedness is not only desirable, but absolutely necessary, and probably will continue to be for a long time to come. To be prepared for all probable contingencies and emergencies, personal and national, would seem to be but the plain duty of every self-respecting man and nation,—the part of wisdom and statesmanship. Complete disarmament is a counsel of perfection,—impracticable for the present. It is not inconceivable, of course, that the day may sometime come when the whole world can and will disarm; but that time is not yet. So long as there are gunmen in New York City who are ready to shoot a man down for two-dollars-and-a-half, that city must continue to support a police force of over ten thousand men. Surely no tax-paying citizen,—not even the ultra pacifists,—would think of

¹ After discussion of the necessity to correct misconceptions which had got abroad regarding the probable influence of the League on proposals for increased national defence, the following resolution was adopted without adverse vote by the Executive Committee of the League to Enforce Peace at its meeting on September 17, 1915: "The Executive Committee expresses the opinion that efficient preparation for adequate national defence is in no way inconsistent with the purposes of the League but on the contrary is essential thereto."

this small army as an army of aggression or as a menace to the community. It is not impossible for such a purely defensive organisation as a city police force or a state militia, by perversion (as in the Becker case and the Ludlow instance), to be used to harm and not to help the citizens and workers. But it is precisely because the armies and navies of nations have been treated as the tools of sovereign States, to do with as they pleased, that this plan of international control is advocated and urged.

Just so long as States and statesmen labour under the delusions ¹ that the State is a moral law unto itself, and that its end and aim is power; that States are natural enemies; that there is an economic advantage in privilege, in conquest, in colonies; and that Clausewitz was right in his celebrated dictum that war is but the extension of politics,—just so long will immense armies and navies persist and continue to menace the peace of the world.

¹ These several delusions are considered, at some length, in Part III as Articles in the Creed of Militarism.

CHAPTER XII

WILL IT WORK?

It is hardly worth while to waste time in replying to the objections of those who face every hard task with fear and doubt, who say it can't be done. These are the victims of inertia and their number is legion. Such friends of progress not only never help the world forward, but they clamp a brake on the moving wheels. Forward-looking and forward-moving people always have to ignore critics of this type. If they will not get out of the way then it is their own fault if they are run over.

Pessimism, a feeling of despondency, not to say despair, must also be reckoned with. This, however, is a very different thing from the mental and moral laziness we have just considered. It is the natural reaction to the horror and enormity of the war upon the human spirit. Faith in anybody and anything has been consumed by curtains of fire. It is hard to be hopeful to-day. The tide of optimism is at its lowest ebb. But in the presence of the

valiant heroisms of soldiers in the field surely civilians should not lose courage and morale. The obstacles in the way of realising the programme of a league of nations to insure and enforce peace are not insurmountable. Some of them that now seem so formidable as we vision them in the distance, may, as we approach nearer, and engage them one at a time, surrender to determined attack.

But there are more matter-of-fact objections from more respectable sources than scepticism or pessimism. These deserve to be frankly and honestly answered.

At the outset it should be acknowledged that in industry no fool-proof machine has ever yet been invented, and that the most perfect machine in nature (the human body) was long ages in building. In municipal and national politics the most efficient machine, the one that will produce, with the least waste of friction, the greatest good to the greatest number, has yet to be invented. If we were to postpone the setting-up of any machinery for the conduct of human affairs until we were certain beyond a shadow of doubt that it could not possibly go wrong, or even until all objections were finally and completely answered, we should never get anywhere and never do anything.

Almost as many objections can be urged against democracy, against woman suffrage, against labour unions, as can be advanced in their support. Ruskin's arguments against railroads are too well known to need re-statement here. The advocacy of a measure, and whether or not it is expedient to adopt it, must be determined by weight of opinion and the possibility of finding a way to initiate the experiment. If it seems at all reasonable to suppose that the experiment which the League proposes will tend to make future wars less likely, then by all means it ought to be tried. This is the only fair and sensible test. It is not a theoretical problem in metaphysics to be debated for the sake of debate, or as an exercise in dialectical skill. The matter is too important for wordy argument.

Many of the criticisms levelled at the League's proposals are due to ignorance of what those proposals really are, or to an honest misunderstanding of their purport and implications. For the most part, these difficulties will be cleared away by careful reading of the earlier chapters of this book, and if there remain some questions which occur to the sincere inquirer, seeking to understand fully and clearly, they will in all probability be answered in this chapter.

The caption which heads the chapter raises the question of the feasibility of the idea, the practicability of the proposals. Will it work? There are several directions from which to approach the problem. Perhaps it will be just as well to come at it from all sides. Let us first look at it from the angle of the name of the project, or rather, the name of the organisation which has conceived the project and is exerting every effort to convince responsible statesmen, and the people that stand back of the governments, that it ought to be put into operation as soon as may be after the close of the present war. A League to Enforce Peace — with the emphasis on Enforce! Some object to the word "League"; some object to the word "Enforce"; and some object to the word "Peace."

The first criticism is on the word "league." Objection is taken to the fact that the programme contemplates a league of nations. This objection is important enough to warrant serious consideration. Analysis reveals the fact that it is a three-fold question; at any rate there are three reasons why such a league of nations is by some considered undesirable.

The first reason given is that what is proposed is a world alliance. But this is a mistaken notion.

What is proposed is not a world alliance but a league of nations — a very different thing. Since the outbreak of the present war much has been said about the dangers which grow out of the doctrine of the desirability of maintaining groups or alliances to preserve poise. It is said that such alliances of states have more often tended to provoke than to prevent war. To estop premature action on the part of unscrupulous statesmen, representing ambitious nations, alliances have, time and again, been formed that were calculated to be so strong as to strike terror into the hearts of would-be aggressors. And, it must be acknowledged, to some extent the great European alliances have had exactly this effect. They have certainly served to postpone many and perhaps to prevent some wars. But the claim that alliances are sought in order to maintain what Sir Robert Walpole first called “the balance of power,” to insure perfect equilibrium, is a romantic fiction. It cannot be necessary to argue that diplomats move heaven and earth to bring about new alliances, not for the purpose of performing a trick in acrobatics, of perfectly balancing opposing powers, but for the purpose of making the scales tip in one or another’s favour in order that there will be a pre-

ponderance of power when the occasion comes to use it. The League to Enforce Peace does not propose anything analogous to the old style of alliances. It clearly states in the preamble to its proposals that "it believes it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations."

This present war has demonstrated that the old kind of alliances, whatever the motives be that inspire their formation, are, when once in existence, as prone to accelerate as to delay the coming of international strife. The opposing forces measure their relative military and naval strength, they weigh their ships and guns in the scales, and then begins the absurd and shameful business of competitive building, the piling-up of huge armies and navies, until war intervenes temporarily to halt the whole wretched process. This can hardly be denied. But it cannot be made too clear that the League does not have in mind any such alliance. It is, nevertheless, confidently believed that the League to Enforce Peace would have one effect that the old alliances sometimes had: It would be sufficiently powerful to overawe any member of the society of nations that happens to feel a temptation stirring within it to assert its indomitable will by challenging the organised forces of civilisation.

Such a nation would think twice before calling down upon its head the wrath of a dozen leagued nations.

The second reason for opposing the idea of a league of nations is that were such a league to become a reality it would be but the beginning of a gigantic Federal State which might result in the wiping-out of all national distinctions and thus deprive the world of the special contributions of the various nations.¹ We must be careful not to lose sight of the difference between a Federal State and a Federation of States.² But that aside, it is possible to preserve personality in a family and individuality in a community, and, unless some sort of Super-State, imposing rigid uniformity, were to develop out of the league, the fear that the personalities of the nations would be stamped out is fantastic and far-visioned. Such a league as is proposed would more nearly resemble the present federation of the churches than the kind of church union, sometimes dreamed of, that would demand the death of all denominations.

The third reason given for not being in favour of any league of nations that would include the United States, is the fact that American traditional

¹ See Chapter XVI, "The Frontiers of Friendship."

² See Treitschke's *Politics*, Vol. I, p. 30.

policy is against such alliances with European States as would give the monarchical system of government of the Old World a chance to get a foothold on the Western Hemisphere. This objection has already been studied in another connection.¹ Those who raise this objection are thinking of Washington's patriotic valedictory. But it is not proposed or even suggested by the League that we should "implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of Europe's politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities." It remains to add that we are living in another world than that inhabited by the founders of this Republic.² Trans-oceanic cables have tied the ends of the world together. Oceans no longer separate but join hemispheres, and steamships are palatial ferries. What is more, the United States was in Washington's time a nation of three and a half millions of people. To-day there are more than one hundred millions of people between the Atlantic and the Pacific and "from the quays of Florida where red flamingoes fly to where the great lakes bare their breasts

¹ See Chapter VII, "A League of States."

² See "The League to Enforce Peace Made Plain," by the Hon. William Howard Taft (Bulletin No. 20), and "Disentangling Alliances," by Dr. Talcott Williams (Bulletin No. 31).

unto their Lord the sky." Then we were a nation of thirteen states along the Atlantic coast. To-day we are a world power, with possessions on the other side of the globe and with interests in the Orient. We own Alaska; we own Hawaii; we own the Philippine Islands; we own Panama; we own Porto Rico. We cannot afford to hide the light of truth under the bushel of sentimental shibboleths. What is the use crying, Isolation, isolation, when there is no isolation — splendid or lacklustre? It is within our power as a nation to refuse to join with the other progressive nations in a united effort to prevent war; it is not within our power any longer to be like a star and dwell apart, to live in sheltered seclusion free from the danger of wars that can no longer be confined to a limited area.¹

1 "This is the last war of the kind, or of any kind that involves the world, that the United States can keep out of . . . the business of neutrality is over . . . war now has such a scale that the position of neutrals sooner or later becomes intolerable. Just as neutrality would be intolerable to me if I lived in a community where everybody had to assert his own rights by force and I had to go around among my neighbours and say, 'Here, this cannot last any longer; let us get together and see that nobody disturbs the peace any more.' That is what society is, and we have not yet a society of nations. We must have a society of nations. Not suddenly, not by insistence, not by any hostile emphasis upon the demand, but by the demonstration of the needs of the time. The nations of the world must get together and say, that nobody can hereafter be neutral as respects the disturbance of the world's peace for an object which the world's opinion cannot sanction. The world's peace ought to

At one time it may have meant something to say that the United States should not be unequally yoked together with unbelievers in democracy. It no longer means anything at all. England and France are not monarchies any more and certain of the smaller European countries have carried the standard of democracy even farther forward than the United States.

What is really conceived of as the principal objection to the United States entering such a league was recently voiced by the former Secretary of War, Mr. Lindley M. Garrison, in an address before the Lawyers' Club, in New York, December 16, 1916. In part he said: "If the United States joins she is perforce a party to every quarrel the wide world over. Is it not inevitable that instead of pursuing her natural development along lines expressive of her innate genius and energy she will surely be diverted therefrom and plunged into alien matters utterly foreign to her real concern and her best and vital interests? A self-respecting nation

be disturbed if the fundamental rights of humanity are invaded, but it ought not to be disturbed for any other thing that I can think of, and America was established in order to indicate, at any rate in one government, the fundamental rights of man. America must hereafter be ready as a member of the family of nations to exert her whole force, moral and physical, to the assertion of those rights throughout the round globe."—President Wilson in an Address before the Woman's City Club of Cincinnati, Ohio, on October 25, 1916.

walking the path of rectitude, strictly attending to its own affairs, seeking no offence and giving none, seems to me to be better serving the interests of mankind than could possibly be done by voluntarily crossing the path of every other nation in the world, pledged to feel offence where none was intended, and taking up the quarrels of others in which it can have no proper concern."

But why? Why, if the United States joins, with certain other countries, a league of nations, should we necessarily become embroiled in all the petty quarrels of Europe? Why must the United States "perforce become a party to every quarrel the wide world over"? A careful reading of the brief programme of the League should make it perfectly plain that the essential suggestion is that the progressive powers would band themselves together to arrest, by force if necessary, the premature action of any signatory which is tempted to break its treaty and start a war before first submitting its dispute for hearing. The risk involved is that the time might possibly come when we would have to engage with other nations in a joint punitive expedition against a national disturber of world peace. Is the United States willing to assume that risk, with the possibility, and

perhaps the probability, that the organisation of such a union of nations would reduce to a minimum the likelihood of war? It is for America to take her choice of policies. May no mistake be made.

We have so far considered but one main objection — the objection that the proposals contemplate a “league” of nations. The second objection to the idea is that it is a league to “enforce,” and there are many who are firmly opposed to the use of force. Some of those who object to the use of force are opposed because they think it is futile; others because they think it is wrong.

Attention is called to the fact that when Dr. Gatling invented his famous gun he thought that the more horrible and efficient the instruments of destruction were made the sooner there would be an end of all war. Alfred Nobel held the same belief. That they were both wrong is now perfectly patent. And not only in respect to the character of armaments, but also in respect to the amount of armaments, we have all been disappointed insofar as we trusted them to prevent war. Militarists all argued that preparedness was insurance against war and so they said that every nation was duty-bound to arm itself against all

possible contestants. Obviously, and on the face of it, this was and is impossible, for the moment one nation has acquired any considerable superiority and supremacy in the matter of preparedness, that nation becomes a potential menace. At once some other nation, that may be or become an enemy, sees itself as relatively defenceless and proceeds forthwith to make itself mightier than its opponent. And thus the vicious circle is described.

Military weakness is no sure guaranty of security. Unpreparedness will not stave off the coming of actual war, to say not a word about indignity and injustice. On the other hand, it has been proved that over-armament, super-preparedness, is no sure prophylaxis either. The opponents of force contend that we do not get peace and concord and amity by preparing for war and hate and enmity. On the contrary, they urge that the very process of piling up huge munitions of war is but the piling up of the provocatives of war. But is not the reason why ultra-preparedness has failed to furnish any real protection against war practically the same as the reason why ultra-pacifism has failed,—because both were irrational? A reasonable amount of national armaments, subject in some measure to international control, for the less-

ening of the likelihood of wars between nations,—to supply the “sanction” for international guarantees of national security,—surely this is a very different thing from the wanton use of force.

The impotency of sheer brute force to decide many matters of great importance may as well be acknowledged without quibbling. At one time we thought that the most effective way to make converts to a particular form of religion was to conquer them by the sword. This was the error of the Crusaders and the followers of Mahomet. The time was when many acted on the theory that the only way to educate a child was to pound knowledge into it, and that the only way to reform criminals was by employing the extremest forms of inhuman punishment. Indeed the time was when we insanely tried to cure lunatics with many stripes. To recognise the futility of force to accomplish certain purposes is, however, not to concede that there is no proper use for physical force.

We now come to those who are unalterably opposed to the use of force, in principle and practice, for any purpose whatsoever — to the non-resistants and conscientious objectors. These say that physical force is involved in the programme of the

League to enforce Peace and that this is contrary to the primary principles of pacific settlement. They argue that we should depend upon the enlightened public opinion of the world and the moral sentiments of mankind to back-up treaty obligations. All of this is somewhat confusing for the reason that we have failed to define our terms. The question is not, Shall we have force in the world or shall we not have it? Force is here and there is no getting away from that obvious fact. Indeed the very definition of life, with movement and change, and action and reaction, is that force of some sort or other is always operating in the world. This may be the force of gravity or the force of cohesion or the force of attraction. At the other extreme it may be the force of love. If this seems beside the mark then we may say very bluntly that the existence of brute force is undeniable and, furthermore, that it certainly always will be used by nature in the accomplishment of her ends and probably in social and political life by man in the accomplishment of his ends.

In the last analysis the problem has to do with the right use of the right kind of force. For there are varieties of force. Which kind of force shall we use to accomplish our purpose? In early times

it probably was necessary for primitive man to defend himself against wild animals and predaceous neighbours by the use of his bare fists. But as man advanced and became more intelligent he devised new and better ways of combating the things in life that were inimical to his interests. He invented clubs and arrows and indeed kept on improving his instruments of attack and defence until to-day we have mighty armies and navies. After awhile he came to a realisation of the fact that his brain was more powerful than his fists, with the result that more and more he substituted intellectual force for brute force. In all likelihood we shall continue to use brute force in social relations for some time to come. For just how long, and to just what extent, nobody really knows.

To many earnest lovers of peace, and advocates of measures to prevent war, the Tolstoian principle of uncompromising opposition to all use of any kind of physical force for any purpose however worthy or noble seems to be untenable. The League to Enforce Peace does not enter into any discussion of the conflicting philosophies of right and wrong. It does not hold that the extreme pacifist is necessarily wrong, in theory, when he believes in non-resistance. It simply recognises

the fact of force and the need of using force for the ends of civilisation. Theoretically it may be granted that it would be better never to use physical force for any purpose; that it would be preferable to employ such means as moral suasion and intellectual conviction. But the problem of force is not an academic problem for schoolmen; it is a practical problem for statesmen. It is not always possible to get all nations to agree as to what is right and what is fair and it is this very disagreement that has led to the ordeal of battle, the arbitrament of arms.

There is a justification for the use of force and the justification is purpose. The ethics of force hinges upon the question, For what purpose is force being used? The simple fact is that nations do use their armies and navies to defend themselves. The further fact is that they also use them to accomplish purposes less commendable, and there is every likelihood that they will continue to use them against one another unless and until some better road to Justice is built and macadamised. Recognising the absolute privilege of the pacifist to hold an adverse opinion, respecting his conscience and admiring his courage, the League would, nevertheless, without moral compunctions,

not hesitate to employ force in defence of civilisation as against any outlaw nation.

The third objection to the programme of the League is that its name says it is a League to Enforce "Peace." But perhaps it may be well before proceeding further to remind ourselves that a name, after all, is only a name. The League's name is a case in point. The word "peace" surely ought to be somewhere in the name of the society; first, because its aim is peace and second, because it solicits the support of the moderate pacifists and would attract them by its name as well as by its programme. Perhaps it would have been a more accurate description to have called it a "League to Enforce Pause," as Roland Hugins suggests,¹ but there are not very many pause-ists whose support would be an immediately available asset.

It may help towards a better understanding to emphasise that there are several things desirable in themselves that the League will not try to enforce. It will be noticed that it is not called a League to Enforce *Democracy*. Probably a considerable majority of the members of the organisation and like-as-not all the officers and executives are personally convinced that if the nations of the

¹ *The Possible Peace*, p. 115.

world were all democratic, if domestic affairs and foreign policies were controlled by the representatives of the people, if diplomacy and industry and finance were, as we say, democratised, war would be a remote contingency.¹ The reforms of this character that have already been accomplished in Russia, the reforms that are more than likely to be accomplished in Germany, gladden the hearts of liberals everywhere. But democracy is social character and character cannot be imputed by grace of any Jefferson or Rousseau. It is nobody's gift; it cannot be presented to a people with the compliments of a King. It is bought with a price — a price that is far above rubies — with ages of struggle and suffering. It is growth, development, education, victory! To paraphrase Malvolio, no nation is born democratic, nor can any nation have democracy thrust upon it,—it must achieve democracy. Even were it possible to do so it would be a mistake to enforce democracy.

¹ In an interview published in the *New York World* for November 5, 1916, President Wilson said: "I am convinced that only governments initiate such wars as the present one and that they are never brought on by peoples, and that, therefore, democracy is the best prevention of such jealousies and suspicions and secret intrigues as produce wars among nations where small groups control rather than the great body of public opinion." This pronouncement is consistent with a remark which Montesquieu makes in his celebrated *Spirit of Laws* (Book IX, p. 127), to the effect that the spirit of monarchy is war and enlargement of dominion, while that of a republic is peace and moderation.

Nor is the League called a League to Enforce *Justice*. This, too, is of great importance. It has been said ¹ that "justice is love with its eyes open." And there is little doubt that if absolute justice could be insured to all nations and peoples that would be the surest guaranty of lasting peace. What a pity that Maeterlinck's fantasy is not a fact. It will be recalled that when the children in the *Blue Bird* story reached the Kingdom of the Future they saw "a little pink child, who looks so serious and is sucking his thumb," and who when born "will wipe out injustice from the earth." The time may come, and it may come sooner than we expect, when a World Court will be set-up which will dispense perfect justice to men and nations, a court whose judgments and decisions will be executed by the Supreme Authority of Public Opinion and endorsed by the Moral Conscience of Mankind. Every nation, great and small, free and subject, would have its day in such a Court and Perfect Right would be upheld by Perfect Might. But the League's programme is not so ambitious. It does not say that the award of the Judicial Tribunal or the compromise suggestion of the Court of Conciliation must be accepted.

¹ Norman Hapgood, editorial in *Collier's Weekly*.

The League believes with its President, Mr. Taft, that "after we have gotten the cases into Court and decided and the judgments embodied in a solemn declaration of a Court thus established, few nations will care to face the condemnation of international public opinion and disobey the judgment."¹ But if the condemnation of the whole world proved incapable of restraining a nation bent on war after the decisions of the Court or Council had gone against it, then force would not be employed to compel obedience. As Cosmos says in his Twelfth Article in the *New York Times*.² "If the publicity attending the operation of such a court, the inherent and persuasive reasonableness of its findings, and a body of international public opinion that has turned with conviction to the judicial settlement of international disputes, cannot insure the carrying into effect of the judgments of an International Court of Justice, then the world is not ready for such a court."

Nor is the League called a League to Enforce the *Status Quo*. In other words it does not guarantee to preserve present conditions nor would it deem it desirable to guarantee the preservation of

¹ See *The United States and Peace*, p. 150.

² December 6, 1916. Republished in book form under the title *The Basis of a Durable Peace*.

present conditions. And this is not a mere negative virtue. It provides "a way of escape" from intolerable situations without the necessity for war, a peaceful method for changing conditions, and, failing these, the door would still be open for the final appeal to arms. For there are many men who are not Chauvinists, who are not militarists, who maintain, and rightly, that there are occasions which arise when wars are justifiable, when they remedy conditions that are unendurable, conditions worse than war itself.¹ Such instances were the War of the Rebellion and the War to Abolish Slavery. There are therefore occasions, very rare it is true, when it might be positively harmful to enforce peace and the perpetuity of the *status quo*, to prevent the possibility of a righteous and necessary revolutionary war. "Rebellion to tyranny is obedience to God."

The answer to the question of the feasibility of the League's programme, involving certain other objections to its proposals than those which have already been considered, may be reached by an altogether different route.

¹ "Knowing well what war means in suffering, in burdens, in horrors, they [the Allies] have still decided that even war is better than peace at the Prussian price of domination over Europe."—Premier Lloyd-George in a speech at the Guildhall, January 11, 1917.

Speaking broadly there are two classes of critics: those who complain that the League is attempting too much and those who complain that it is not attempting enough. Both groups are entitled to have their criticisms treated with respect. The first group — those who claim that the League would go too far — mean that the scheme is visionary, that it “is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream.”¹ This point of view is plainly stated by Professor Ellory C. Stowell, of Columbia University. In the course of a column interview in the *New York Times*,² he said that “when peace is concluded it is probable that an attempt to form a league to enforce peace may be made, but it cannot hope for any more successful career than its famous predecessor, the Holy Alliance. It is an out of date chimera.”

It is true that the enthusiasm and radicalism of youth need to be balanced with the sobriety and conservatism of maturity; but it is no less true that the pride of practicality is prejudice when it is not pretence. Man does not live by bread alone; he must have “bread and roses too.” It is the dreamer who writes the romance of reality — in

¹ Von Moltke.

² December 21, 1916.

art, and science, and discovery, and invention, and constructive reform. We should not forget that democracy was once a dream, that liberty was once a dream, that the destruction of the great plagues was once a dream, that universal education was once a dream; that Joseph was a dreamer,—and Disraeli, and Lincoln, and Fulton, and Edison. Peace may be a dream but it is more than an “iridescent dream.”

And then, too, it must be borne in mind that there are dreamers and dreamers. There are morbid dreamers and healthy dreamers; those who look upward merely, and those who look forward also; those who deny the hard facts, and those who make the hard facts malleable to their wills. Right now there are quite a few people in the world who may indeed be classified as idealists but who stubbornly refuse to yield to the temptation to make bread out of stones. It seems to them, just as a matter of common sense, that lots better bread can be made out of whole wheat and that stones ought to be used for building cathedrals and houses for people to live in. They refuse absolutely to make dreams their master,—these hard-headed dreamers who are the advance agents of civilisation. These men and women believe in universal peace, in the same

way that they believe in absolute justice and ultimate democracy, as a final goal of human endeavour; but they have no wish

To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
... and shatter it to bits — and then
Re-mould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!

They have the "will to believe" and with their will they control their faith. Real faith is never in a hurry; it can bide its time. Mine hour hath not yet come, said the patient Jesus. To-day there are many practical people — people who are not disobedient to the heavenly vision — who prefer, while waiting for the dawning of millennium, to get busy and to keep busy making the desert blossom with harvests. They feel that it is all very well to hitch our wagon to a star; but that we ought to keep tight hold of the reins and not let our imagination run away with our judgment. It is true, as Mr. Asquith said in a speech at Dublin,¹ that such a partnership of nations enforcing public right by the power of a common will, would have sounded like a Utopian idea just before the war, though now it is within the range if not within the grasp of statesmanship.

Another reason why the League's plan is said

¹ See Appendix, p. 284.

to go too far is that it would actually use force to maintain order. This objection to the use of force comes from an entirely different group and has been treated, it will be recalled, in considerable detail in the earlier part of this chapter. One phase of the subject, however, was not discussed. A word may be said about it here. The point is made that it is anomalous, that it is a perversion, to make war in order to prevent war; and it does seem a bit paradoxical. Much depends, of course, on just what you mean by "make war."¹ It is possible for political rivals to hold that the present Administration "made war" on Mexico because on April 20, 1914, the President went to Congress to obtain its approval for landing troops at Vera Cruz. But you can't very well make war on a people with whom you genuinely sympathise, a people that you are trying to help. Of course words can be stretched to cover almost any meaning, but it ought to be perfectly clear that there is all the difference in the world between this nation or any other nation "going to war" and band-

¹ When the three Powers — Russia, France, and Great Britain — by the Treaty of 1827 transformed a Turkish province into an independent kingdom, selected a king, and even went so far as to destroy the Turkish fleet at Navarino by means of a "pacific" blockade, they were not (as they protested) "making war" on Turkey.

ing itself with others to keep the public peace and to quell rioters — if necessary by force of arms. It is the latter and not the former which the League would undertake to do.

The third reason for the belief that the League's programme is impracticable is the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of determining with absolute certainty which nation is the aggressor,— who started the fight? If the plan of the League is made operative no nation that did not want to incur the disapproval of the civilised world, no nation that had not completely made up its mind to throw down the gauntlet and challenge a dozen nations at once, would be likely to take any chance of being thought the aggressor. It would spare no pains to avoid suspicion. It would be perfectly possible for any nation not seeking war to move all of its forces back a certain distance from the frontier so that the exact *locis* of the initial engagement, on any considerable scale, could be determined without difficulty. Then, too, the voluntary submission by one nation of the matter in dispute to the Court or Council, for arbitration or adjustment, would put the burden of blame upon the other nation which refused to submit its case. The first thing to do would be to stop the fighting for the time be-

ing, even if it became necessary to hold back both nations until the case had had a hearing and a verdict was given.

If the point is pressed that the League is attempting too much, that it would go too far, then it ought to be clearly stated in reply that there are, as has already been pointed out, several things which the League does not propose to do. After mature consideration it has refused to go as far as many other admirable societies and groups, whose programmes are urged upon the statesmen. For example, the four cardinal principles of The Union of Democratic Control, in England, are:

1. No Province shall be transferred from one Government to another without the consent, by *plébiscite* or otherwise, of the population of such Province.

2. No Treaty, Arrangement, or Understanding shall be entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy shall be created.

3. The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the Balance of Power; but shall be directed to concerted action between the Powers,

and the setting up of an International Council, whose deliberations and decisions shall be public, with such machinery for securing international agreement as shall be the guarantee of an abiding peace.

4. Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace settlement a plan for drastic reduction, by consent, of the armaments of all the belligerent Powers, and to facilitate that policy shall attempt to secure the general nationalisation of the manufacture of armaments, and the control of the export of armaments by one country to another.

It will be observed that a proposal which plans for disarmament, or at least for drastic reduction of armaments, is included. Now it may be that the League to Enforce Peace is mistaken, it may be that the nations are ready to begin a simultaneous reduction of armaments; but it seems hardly likely. And this is one reason why the League does not include among its proposals a definite demand for disarmament.¹ It is not because disarmament would not be desirable, but because it is thought that it would not be feasible. Nevertheless, a gradual limitation of armaments would almost certainly result from the acceptance and

¹ Cp. Chapter X, p. 125.

operation of the League's proposals, because the fear of sudden attack would be eliminated. It would not, however, require the immediate and complete disarmament of the nations that joined the League, nor would it make it a *sine qua non* of membership.

Another thing that the League does not propose to do is to meddle in any way with the domestic affairs or internal policies of its nation-members. It would begin with things as they are in respect to sovereign and subject peoples, and in respect to many other things. Changes will doubtless come in the future and more than likely the Court, Council, and Ministry will, one or all, have some share in controlling these changes; but no proposal of the League to Enforce Peace contemplates action that would interfere in connection with insurrections, rebellions, or revolutions within the bounds of any of its members. And the reason why it would not is because it conceives of itself as being in the nature of a quasi-international police force,¹ empowered to exercise the police function of keeping the peace in much the same way that policemen, sheriffs, committees of public safety and vigilance committees take it to be their primary duty

¹ Cp. Chapter XI, p. 136.

not to reform malefactors but to maintain law and order. Policemen do not intrude on the privacy of homes and families unless and until the trouble seems likely to spread to such an extent as to endanger the lives and property of the community.

It is not always going to be an easy task to draw the line. Practically the same difficulties will be encountered that now beset the path of jurists and statesmen in the "league of nations" which is called the United States of America. The conundrum, When is a local issue not a local issue? has bothered the brains of more than one lawmaker and interpreter. General Hancock said that the tariff is a local issue and it is — lots more than it ought to be; but then again it is a national and even an international issue. Was slavery a local issue? Southerners thought it was and they were right — and they were wrong. And so it goes. It is a very delicate matter which will require no end of skill, this fixing the bounds between affairs and issues that are purely domestic and policies and practices that, if persisted in, may put the times out of joint.

Mention has already been made of the fact that the League would not attempt to enforce the decisions or awards of the Court or Council, nor

would it enforce permanent peace and guarantee the perpetuity of the *status quo*. And now finally — in reply to those who complain that the League is trying to do too much — it should be plainly written down and underscored in red that the League has no diagram of duty for the nations, no pattern on the mount, no plans and specifications for constructing, at The Hague, or on any other site anywhere on the planet, an ideal world order. No effort is made by the League to cloak the obvious fact that its proposals do not constitute an ideal arrangement. It probably would be better to require all the nations to accept and abide by the decisions of the established Courts and Councils. But there are plenty of courses of action that are theoretically preferable to those that are practically possible, and it is the conscious desire and determined will of the League not to attempt more than can be achieved. For example, without the reservation of the right to reject the award and appeal to force, it is very doubtful if any of the great nations could be persuaded or induced to enter such a league of nations at this time. And the thing of paramount importance just now is not to perform the miracle of spontane-

ous international government, but to take the next step in the direction of world order. To some it may be discouraging that more is not attempted, but if this much is both attempted and achieved, there is no one who will deny that it is infinitely better than the present anarchy and the almost certain recurrence of wars.

We have considered at some length the objections of those who complain that the League is attempting the impossible. There are also some whose objections are based on the assertion that the League's programme does not attempt nearly enough. It is true, as has been explained, that it does not attempt to create instantanèe "a parliament of man, a federation of the world," it does not purpose to enforce justice, or democracy, or the *status quo*; it will not, by military force, compel the acceptance of the decisions of its Court or Council. And the reason why it will not undertake these tasks, is because it wants to concentrate its total energy, because it wants the whole world to hear "one clear call." This one thing it would do. It has no wish to sit by the side of the road and watch the world pass by. On the contrary, it is more than anxious to get up and go somewhere, but it

is satisfied that the next step is to enforce delay by compelling the submission of disputes before war is begun.

There is still another way to approach the subject in the effort to clear up all misunderstandings. Those who oppose the proposal of such a league of nations, not because it is undesirable but because they think it is impracticable, say in answer to the question, Why will it not work? that there are three reasons why it won't work: First, it is said that the scheme is chimerical because you can't get the nations to join such a league as is proposed; second, because the great nations will not submit major questions; and third, because the nations that become signatories to such a treaty creating a league of nations will not keep faith when the crisis comes.

Take the first reason advanced. Does it seem likely that so many hard-headed business men, men of practical affairs, would be giving their cordial approval to the idea if it were so impractical? Some of the best brains in this and other countries have voiced their approval of the programme. The list includes editors, educators, lawyers, clergymen, bankers, legislators, judges and statesmen.¹

¹ See Appendix, p. 263, for commendatory statements in full.

Among those who have written or spoken in praise of the plan are President Wilson, ex-President Taft, Premier Lloyd-George,¹ ex-Premier Asquith, Premier Briand, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, Mr. Balfour, Lord Grey and Viscount Bryce.

It will not escape notice that among those who have expressed themselves as friendly to the idea of such a league to enforce peace at the close of this war are several Government officials. Their personal utterances do not necessarily commit the nations they represent, but they at least foreshadow the probability of favourable Government action.² So much by way of answer to those who

¹ In his Guildhall speech of January 11, 1917, the English Prime Minister said, "The peace and security for peace will be that the nations will band themselves together to punish the first peacebreaker who comes out."—Reported in the *New York Times*, January 12, 1917.

² An official pronouncement on the subject was made in the Note of the Entente Powers dated January 10, 1917, in reply to President Wilson's Note of December 18. The second paragraph reads as follows: "In a general way they desire to declare their respect for the lofty sentiments inspiring the American note and their whole-hearted agreement with the proposal to create a league of nations which shall assure peace and justice throughout the world. They recognise all the benefits which will accrue to the cause of humanity and civilisation from the institution of international arrangements designed to prevent violent conflicts between nations and so framed as to provide the sanctions necessary to their enforcement, lest an illusory security should serve merely to facilitate fresh acts of aggression." The passage in President Wilson's Note to which this paragraph evidently refers reads as follows: "In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, more-

say the plan won't work because the nations cannot be induced to enter such a league.

A second group gives another reason why it believes the League's programme will not work, and that reason is because you can't get the great nations to submit major questions for arbitration or conciliatory treatment. It may be said in reply that great nations have submitted major questions for inquiry and arbitration and, what is more, they have accepted the decisions and have bowed to the judgment of the court. A case in point was the Hull affair.¹

There are many matters, open to dispute and discussion, that would not, strictly speaking, fall within the jurisdiction of the League. For example, England would, in no sense, bind herself to submit to an International Council the question of Home Rule for Ireland. The case is somewhat different when we come to the Monroe Doctrine. This is the way the question is usually asked, Is the United States ready to submit the Monroe

over, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready and even eager, to co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends when the war is over with every influence and resource at their command."

¹ See Appendix, p. 302, for a full statement of the facts in this case.

Doctrine to arbitration, if some European nation happens to consider it a dog in the manger policy? First of all we ought to keep in mind the distinction between the functions of the Judicial Tribunal and the Council of Conciliation: the Court to deal with justiciable questions, questions which it is possible to decide by established international law; the Council to deal with non-justiciable questions, questions such as national policy and necessary expansion. The Monroe Doctrine is not a part of international law; it is a part of American policy. So we really do not have to consider the question as posed: Is the United States ready to submit the Monroe Doctrine for arbitration? The answer to this hypothetical question would be, No, it is not. Clearly that is why the United States when it signed The Hague Convention (1907) for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes made the express reservation: "Nothing contained in this Convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquish-

ment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."

As a matter of fact the United States is now under contract, by treaties with some thirty nations, including France, Great Britain, and Russia, to do precisely this, namely to refer for investigation and report to an international commission all disputes between them of every nature whatsoever, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed. And what is more, we have solemnly agreed not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is submitted. A little study of our own existing treaties in comparison with the League's programme will convince any fair and intelligent critic that the second proposal of the League to Enforce Peace would commit the United States as much as, and no more than, it is already committed insofar as the Monroe Doctrine is concerned or involved.

If anything further needs to be said we may add that when it is clearly understood that most major questions (points of national honour and matters of policy) would not go to the Court but to the Council, and when, furthermore, it is clearly grasped that the recommendation for compromise growing out of the "hearing and consideration"

may be rejected if that is the judgment and will of the nation involved, there would certainly be less, and would probably be little, if any, reluctance to submit them.

The third, and last, reason given in the argument against the League's programme, as impracticable, is that you cannot be at all sure that the nations, after they have signed such an agreement, will make good the bonds they have given, will abide by their agreements. This is, of course, the question of good faith in the observance of treaties; it is to raise doubts as to the honour of the signatories. And to assume, as is assumed when the question is raised, that they will not keep their plighted word, is an assumption that is not warranted by history or precedent. Without such faith it would be impossible to conduct modern business of any kind. Why have treaties at all, if, in advance, it is assumed that they are but scraps of paper? It may be interesting, and it is certainly pertinent in this connection, to point out that there were between eight hundred and nine hundred treaties concluded between the years 1874 and 1883, and that of this total by far the greater number were all scrupulously carried out.

PART III

THE CREED OF MILITARISM

CHAPTER XIII

MORAL MAJESTY OR GUILTY MADNESS?

THE first article in the creed of militarism says that *War is Desirable*. And what is militarism? The celebrated German editor, Maximilian Harden, recently said, "Only statesmen can add up the possibilities and arrive at the necessities. Only they can be allowed to decide with what weapons and up to what end the war is to be conducted. It is only in Germany that these principles are disputed. Is it because militarism really reigns among us . . . ? Militarism is a form of civilisation and a state of mind. It presses for ever stronger armaments, and accustoms even the ordinary citizen to the idea that weapons alone can settle a strife of peoples, and that any other tool is unworthy and useless. Heroism and military virtue can flourish without militarism, but militarism alone guarantees the constant readiness of all the limbs of the people's body for rapid transition from peace to war. It is because militarism favours the temptation to war, and must either extend its depreda-

tions far and wide or be rooted out absolutely, that the war is to continue until militarism has been destroyed. That is what all the enemies of the German Empire say out loud and what all neutral powers say in whispers.”¹

Now there are indeed many alleged benefits of war, nor can it be altogether denied that oftentimes good does flow from evil. But to-day it would seem that the silent protest of six million dead, whose voices are choked with dust, ought to be an all-sufficient answer to those who still prate about the value and benefits of war. Contrast for a moment the moral majesty of war, as proclaimed by Treitschke and others, with the guilty madness of war as revealed in half-a-world in ruins, in wrecked homes, in demolished cathedrals, in burned cities, in devastated fields, in torpedoed liners, in hobbling cripples, and in broken hearts that are doomed to suffer the pangs of unavailing grief. How vain and hollow the praises of war sound in our ears grown too accustomed to the sobs and groans of the dying.

“Let us cling with love,” wrote Ernest Renan, “to our custom of fighting from time to time be-

¹ *Die Zukunft* for October 21, 1916. Reported in the *New York Times* for November 8, 1916.

cause war is the necessary occasion and place for manifesting moral force.”¹ Ruskin, in his essay on “War,” eloquently remarked that, “All the pure and noble arts of peace are founded on war; no great art ever yet rose on earth, but among a nation of soldiers. There is no art among a shepherd people, if it remains at peace. . . . There is no great art possible but that which is based on battle. . . . We talk of peace and learning, of peace and plenty, of peace and civilisation; but I found that those were not the words which the Muse of History coupled together; that on her lips the words were — peace and sensuality — peace and selfishness — peace and death . . . all great nations learned their truth of word, and strength of thought, in war; . . . they were nourished in war, and wasted by peace; taught by war, and deceived by peace; trained by war, and betrayed by peace — in a word, they were born in war, and expired in peace.”²

“We have learned to perceive,” sings Treitschke in one of his impassioned pæons to war, “the moral majesty of war through the very processes which to the superficial observer seem brutal and inhuman.

¹ See *La Reforme Intellectual et Morale*.

² John Ruskin, *Crown of Wild Olive*. Sec. 86.

The greatness of war is just what at first seems to be its horror — that for the sake of their country men will overcome the natural feelings of humanity, that they will slaughter their fellowmen who have done them no injury, nay, whom they perhaps respect as chivalrous foes. Man will not only sacrifice his life, but the natural and justified instincts of the soul; here we have the sublimity of war. . . . War weaves a bond of love between man and man. . . . To banish war from the world would be to mutilate human nature. . . . War is the sphere in which we can most clearly trace the triumph of human reason.”¹ And so he continues, paragraph after paragraph, page after page, decking war out like a painted lady. “The hope of banishing war,” he says, “is not only meaningless but immoral. Its disappearance would turn the earth into a great temple of selfishness.”

Or listen to the way Nietzsche proclaims his enthusiasm. “It is,” he says, “mere illusion and pretty sentiment to expect much (even anything at all) from mankind if it forgets how to make war. As yet no means are known which calls so much into action as a great war, that rough energy born of the camp, that deep impersonality born of hatred,

¹ *Politics*, Vol. II, pp. 395, 396, 599.

that conscience born of murder and cold-bloodedness, that fervour born of effort in the annihilation of the enemy, that proud indifference to loss, to one's own existence, to that of one's fellows, to that earthquake-like soulshaking which a people needs when it is losing its virility."

Now, over against these appreciations of war, read this account of what was done by Russian guns and winter cold: "At night under the glare of the searchlights," says a French official report, "the undulating mass of wounded made efforts to extricate themselves, then toward two o'clock in the morning they moved no more." Did Doré ever paint a picture of war more gruesome and horrid — and with fewer strokes?

Or read a realistic report of the correspondent of the *London Daily News*, in which he describes how, after the Russian trenches were charged by the Germans, corpses lay piled in wind-rows until they were dismembered and thrown into the faces of the Russian soldiers by explosion of German bombs.

Or read this passage from John Masefield's *Gallipoli*, describing a charge in which he himself took part. With others, he lies along a rough three-mile line, facing the necessity of taking a

slope one thousand feet in extent: "Let him imagine himself to be more weary than he has ever been in his whole life before, and dirtier than he has ever believed it possible to be, and parched with thirst, nervous, wild-eyed, and rather lousy. Let him think that he has not slept for more than a few minutes together for eleven days and nights, and that in his waking hours he has been fighting for his life, often hand to hand in the dark with a fierce enemy, and that after each fight he has had to dig himself a hole in the ground, and then walk three or four roadless miles to bring up heavy boxes under fire. Let him think, too, that in all those eleven days he has never been for an instant out of the thunder of cannon, that, waking or sleeping, their devastating crash has been blasting the air within a mile or two, and this from an artillery so terrible that each discharge beats as it were a wedge of shock between the skull-bone and the brain. Let him think, too, that never for an instant in all that time has he been free from the peril of death in its most sudden and savage forms, and that hourly he has seen his friends blown to pieces at his side, or dismembered or drowned or driven mad or stabbed or sniped or bombed in the dark sap, with a handful of dynamite in a beef-tin,

till their blood is caked upon his clothes and thick upon his face, and that he knows, as he stares at that hill that more of that band will be gone the same way, and that he himself may reckon that he has done with life, tasted and spoken and loved his last, and that in a few minutes more may be blasted dead, or lying bleeding in the scrub, with perhaps his face gone and a leg or an arm broken, unable to move, but still alive, unable to drive away the flies or screen the ever-dropping rain." Is it any wonder that the song of Pippa is not popular to-day?

Of course, if it be glorious to tear men limb from limb, men made in the image of God, why then war is glorious. The fact is, the glamour of romance has been thrown like a blanket over the corpse-strewn fields of slaughter; the blare of the bugles has drowned the piercing cries of pain; the cant religion of a false patriotism has hushed the wails of women. It will not be denied that loyal service is glorious, that generous devotion is glorious, that silent suffering is glorious, that dauntless heroism is glorious. One would need to be very callous and very stupid to deny these things. But that is not the point. These things are but the tinsel and motley. Stripped of its splendid robes of

purple and gold, and seen only in the drab and grey of plain fact, war ceases to be so thrilling and inviting. It becomes repulsive and obscene. True, there is that about war which grips the imagination with fingers of tempered steel; but, before we ever again give ourselves up to its fascination and thrall let us at least clean our minds of cant and try to see things steadily and see them whole.

Mr. William James, in his brilliant and much-quoted essay on "The Moral Equivalent of War," sums up the attitude of the militarist enthusiast. "Reflective apologists for war at this present day," he writes, "all take it religiously. It is a sort of sacrament. Its profits are to the vanquished as well as to the victor; and quite apart from any question of profit, it is an absolute good, we are told, for it is human nature at its highest dynamic. Its 'horrors' are a cheap price to pay for rescue from the only alternative supposed, of a world of clerks and teachers, of co-education and zo-ophily, of 'consumer's leagues' and 'associated charities,' of industrialism unlimited and feminism unabashed. No scorn, no hardness, no valour anymore! Fie upon such a cattle yard of a planet!"¹

Now when the contrast is put in just that way

¹ William James, *Memories and Studies*, p. 276.

and we are asked to choose between generous, ardent, vivifying war, with all it involves in the way of discipline and devoted service, and sordid, selfish, debilitating peace, few could be found who would not instantly select war as their preference. But the line is never so clearly drawn. All that glisters is not gold, and there is a lot of sentimentality that has found its way into the literature of militarism. We are not driven to choose between Yahveh and Baal; between noble war and ignominious peace; between enthusiastic devotion and sordid commercialism. The virtues are not all with one and the vices with the other. There is a bad side to war as well as to peace; and a good side to peace as well as to war. Surely it cannot be gainsaid that many, if not, indeed, most, of the wars of history have been occasioned by pride of place, ambition for power, dynastic jealousy, commercial greed, cruel revenge and blind hatred. And, in the prosecution of war, the flood-gates have been lifted, letting loose a torrent of falsehood, hatred, envy, malice, and lust to deluge the world. On the other hand, reluctant as some military writers seem to be to acknowledge it, there is in piping times of peace, much business that is enterprising endeavour, much commercialism that is not what Homer Lea calls "a

protoplasmic gormandisation and retching,"¹ many trees that thrive besides the Upas tree of greed.

A few fervent apologists for war are still to be found here and there and now and then who contend that it has many patent values. They say that it makes men and nations strong and noble and brave. Certain writers are still quoted in praise of war and we are told that it regenerates corrupt peoples, awakens dormant nations, and exercises a happy influence upon customs, arts and science. A frightful picture is painted of the rapid decline and fall of ancient Rome when Sybaritic peace sucked her strength like a vampire, though precisely the opposite cause for the fall of Rome is advanced by the great historian Mommsen.

And now over against all this shall we see what competent critics say of the moral damage of war. "War is not," writes Lecky, "and never can be, a mere passionless discharge of a painful duty. Its essence, and a main condition of its success, is to kindle into fierce exercises among great masses of men the destructive and combative passions — passions as fierce and as malevolent as that with which the hound hunts the fox to its death or the tiger springs upon its prey. Destruction is one of its

¹ Homer Lea, *The Valor of Ignorance*, p. 27.

chief ends. Deception is one of its chief means; and one of the great arts of skilful generalship is to deceive in order to destroy. Whatever other elements may mingle with and dignify war, this at least is never absent; and however reluctantly men may enter into war, however conscientiously they may endeavour to avoid it, they must know that when the scene of carnage has once opened, these things must be not only accepted and condoned, but stimulated, encouraged and applauded.”¹

“War,” writes Walter Walsh, “is the sum of all villainies and includes a corruption of moral sense that is the greatest of all its villainies. War kills, but the murderous spirit it creates is crueler than any particular act of murder. War lies; but the lying spirit it engenders is baser than any specific falsehood. War steals; but the pirate spirit it fosters is meaner than any single theft. War lusts; but the general debauchment of virtue is fouler than any one rape or violation. The glory of war is one thing; let it be put into the scale, and let the gain of war be put in with it. Then into the opposite scale let the moral damage of war be cast. Let the balance be true. Its destructive effect upon the

¹ Quoted from W. E. H. Lecky's *The Map of Life*, in D. W. Lyon's *The Christian Equivalent of War*.

moral character of the nation that wages it is war's final condemnation." ¹

And yet the disciplinary value of war is too real to be sarcastically set aside. It is perfectly true that long and arduous campaigns do make for virility and do train men to endure hardness; but so does daily labour and the struggle for bread. On the other hand it is no less true that the indolent life of the barracks is physically softening in times of calm, while camp life in times of war is very likely to prove not only physically debilitating but also morally degenerating and spiritually brutalising. In other words, the ledger has a debit side as well as a credit side.

In war, it is said, the chaff is winnowed from the wheat,² and that is true. But, unfortunately for the race it is the wheat that is destroyed and it is the chaff that is preserved. The value of struggle between nations as an eliminator of the weak and unfit has been immensely overstated. Even if it could be proved beyond dispute that evolution is a force as well as a fact, that it is more than a mere description of what happens in the way of change and modification through the long generations of

¹ Walter Walsh, *The Moral Damage of War*, p. 43.

² Treitschke, *Politics*, Vol. I, p. 67.

man's life on earth, it would prove absolutely nothing as to latter-day struggles between civilised states, in which the flower of the nations is purposely picked and selected for extinction. The lame, the halt and the blind; the weak, the diseased, the cowardly and the selfish; — these are left to propagate the future.

Novicov wrote, more than a score of years ago, that war "has invariably eliminated individuals physiologically the most perfect, and has allowed the weakest to survive. . . . Since the most ancient times men of the soundest constitutions, the most vigorous men have gone off to fight. The weak, the sick, the deformed have remained at home. So, every battle carries away some of the elect, leaving behind the socially unproductive." ¹

As a matter of fact, the war masters are very finicky in their selection of human material. Mars, like the God of the Ancient Hebrews, insists that only the unblemished of the flock shall be led to the sacrificial altar. No nation that cares about its future, as well as its present, can afford to destroy the pick of its citizenry and leave only the feeble and defective, the subnormal and the abnormal, to pollute the stream of its social life.²

¹ *War and Its Alleged Benefits*, p. 21.

² Henri Lambert suggests an international agreement to em-

In reply to Bernhardi's statement that "War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race and therefore all real civilisation,"¹ Herbert Spencer may be quoted. In his *Study of Sociology* he says: "Though during the earlier stages of civilisation war has the effect of exterminating the weaker societies and of weeding out the weaker members of the stronger societies, during the later stages of civilisation, the second of these actions is reversed. . . . After this stage has been reached the purifying process, continuing still an important one, remains to be carried on by industrial war — by a competition of societies during which the best, physically, emotionally, and intellectually spread most and leave the least capable to disappear gradually, from failing to leave a sufficiently numerous posterity."

Contemporary scientists of commanding reputation have recently repudiated as absurd the notion

ploy as combatants only those men who are *over* forty-five years of age. This, he says, would be a double benefit, inasmuch as most of the useful and stronger men would be spared, and most of the unuseful and detrimental would be periodically swept away. It is nearly certain, he adds, that with such a law operating there would be no more war.

¹ *Germany and the Next War*, Ch. I, p. 18.

that war is either a biological necessity, or the method of nature making for advance. In a paper on "Biology and War" read before the Annual Assemblage of the American Association for the Advancement of Science,¹ Jacques Loeb, head of the department of experimental biology in the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, said: "These war enthusiasts maintain that unless a nation engages occasionally in war it will lose all those virile virtues, especially courage, which are necessary for its survival. We do not need to argue whether the acts committed in a state of homicidal emotion are the real or only manifestations of courage; we may also overlook the manifestations of virility left behind by invading or retreating armies. The assumption that virility or courage (whatever may be meant by these terms) will disappear if not practised in the form of war implies an unproven and apparently false biological assumption — namely, that functions not practised or organs not used will disappear in the offspring. The statement that a nation by not going to war will lose any of its inherited virile virtues is not supported by our present biological knowledge. The 'strug-

¹ December 29, 1916, American Societies of Zoologists and Naturalists.

gle for existence' and the 'survival of the fittest' are no laws of nature in the sense in which the term law is used in the exact sciences."

Dr. G. Stanley Hall, the eminent psychologist, prepared a paper on "Psychology and War" which was read before the twenty-fifth anniversary meeting of the American Psychological Association as part of the Annual Assemblage of the American Association for the Advancement of Science on December 28, 1916. The whole paper ought to be carefully studied by all who are interested in the problem of peace and war. One of the most striking paragraphs is the following: "We shall surely have a new and larger psychology of war. The older literature on it is already more or less obsolete from almost every point of view, and James' theory of a moral and Cannon's of a physiological, equivalent of war seem now pallid and academic. More in point are the reversionary conceptions of Freud, Pfister and Patrick, that it is more or less normal for man at times to plunge back and down the evolutionary ladder, and to immerse himself in rank primitive emotions and to break away from the complex conventions and routine of civilised life and revert to that of the troglodytes in the trenches and to face the chance

of instant death when the struggle for survival is at its maximum in the bayonet charge."

However it may have been in the past it certainly is not true to-day that a nation is made strong by killing off the puny and unfit. It has been brought out by painstaking historical and scientific inquiry that exactly the opposite is what actually happens. So far from modern war being eugenic it is cacogenic.¹ There is little force and less cogency in the familiar argument that war is necessary because of some immutable law of nature which says that all advance is through struggle and that nations must meekly submit without protest to the operation of this natural law. If it were not so terribly tragic, it would be absurdly comic. Diplomats who make wars must laugh up their sleeves at all this profound foolery.

But say what one will, war certainly quickens the pulse and arouses the emotions. Its romance fires the imagination and lives, hard-caked with custom, are startled into new ways of feeling and thinking. Dormant faculties are quickened into new life. The

¹ This was pointed out by Herbert Spencer as early as 1873; by Jacques Novicov in 1894; by David Starr Jordan in 1907, and by George Nasmyth in 1916. See also Theodore Mommsen's *History of Rome*; David Starr Jordan's *The Human Harvest, The Blood of the Nation, War and the Breed*, and *The Aftermath*; C. W. Saleeby's *The Longest Cost of War*, and Novicov's *La Guerre et ses Prétendres Benefets*.

excitement of war taps the latent moral energies of men. Slumbering impulses towards generous action are awakened by the clarion call of war's alarms. But — and this is important — vicarious suffering is too precious to be prodigally and needlessly wasted. "The blood of man," said Burke, "should never be shed but to redeem the blood of man. It is well shed for our family, for our country, for our kind. The rest is vanity; the rest is crime." It has been demonstrated again and again in the course of this present war that however base and sordid men may seem to be in the ordinary round of their everyday lives, they will almost invariably respond to a dramatic call for high idealism. And war does make a tremendous appeal to the best as well as to the worst in a man. But, unhappily, noble self-sacrifice on the part of lords and drainers, inspired by the most generous emotions of loyal and kindly service, can be paralleled by equally authentic cases of selfish greed and brutal atrocity. All of which would seem to prove that what war does is to act as a powerful magnet to draw forth the latent nobility (or treachery, or cruelty) resident in the human heart.

Something like this must have been what Professor James had in mind when he wrote, in August,

1910, the essay already quoted, "The Moral Equivalent of War."¹ The idea there set forth had been clearly anticipated fifteen years before by Charles Ferguson in his pamphlet on "The Economics of Devotion."² The essence of the idea seems to be that militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and that human life with no use for hardihood would be contemptible. James says that the war party is assuredly right in affirming and reaffirming that the martial virtues, although originally gained by the race through war, are absolute and permanent human goods. He adds that "without risks or prizes for the darer, history would be insipid indeed; and there is a type of military character which every one feels that the race should never cease to breed, for every one is sensitive to its superiority."³ The world can ill afford to lose these qualities and characteristics. The new-born hope is that we may be able to switch this belt of moral power from the destructive machinery of war to the productive machinery of art and industry and civilisation.

Nor does war make men brave. War has no

¹ "The Moral Equivalent of War" was written for and published by the American Association for International Conciliation in 1910.

² Published in 1895.

³ *Memories and Studies*, pp. 277, 288.

more power to make heroes than industry has power to manufacture saints. Clearly, what war does is to bring out the potential courage (or cowardice) of men. It reveals men for what they are, as the lightning reveals the stout heart of the oak — or its rotten core. War, just because of its irresistible appeal to the imaginations of men, helps us to “become what we are.”¹ Deeds of courage and heroism are particular types of idealistic action, and it is with them as it is with the other forms of idealism referred to in the previous section — they are stimulated by the excitement of war. There can be no doubt that there is in war an extraordinary power of exaltation that calls forth the finest faculties of the soul. But that is not unusual. Danger always does this in the common walks of ordinary life. All that is wanted is the stimulus of imperative demand. When the *Titanic* went down off the coast of Newfoundland heroism was so universal as to be almost commonplace. When San Francisco lay torn and bruised and bleeding, everybody wore the red badge of courage.

But even if it were true that war stimulated only the virtues of valour, inspired no emotions less noble than generous heroism, that would not be a suffi-

¹ Pindar.

cient reason for perpetuating it as a desirable institution. Poverty sometimes acts upon the human spirit in much the same way. So also does disease and every form of suffering. We do not therefore argue that misery, injustice, disease and distress should be permanently endowed because the martyrs of maladjustment sometimes become devout saints. When a stimulant turns out to be a deleterious intoxicant it is the part of wisdom to find some substitute less harmful.

CHAPTER XIV

EARTHQUAKES OR AVALANCHES?

THE second article in the creed of militarism says that *War is Inevitable*; in a word, *Fatalism*. And why? Because, forsooth, civilisation is only skin-deep and progress is an illusion. "Man," writes Major-General J. P. Story,¹ "in his evolution from primitive savagery has followed laws as immutable as the law of gravitation. . . . A few idealists may have visions that, with advancing civilisation, war and its dreadful horrors will cease. Civilisation has not changed human nature. The nature of man makes war inevitable. Armed strife will not disappear from the earth until after human nature changes."

But is the notion of progress a great illusion, a vital lie? Is the world getting worse instead of better?² Can we move only in circles and cycles? Must history forever repeat itself? Is hope but the mother of regret and faith the child of folly? Is the progress of the nations only as a lizard that

¹ In an Introduction to Homer Lea's *Valor of Ignorance*.

² Edward Alsworth Ross, *Latter Day Saints and Sinners*.

scales the wall to find a place in the sun and then slip back again? Is the advance of the race but as the advance of the waves of the sea, that soon recede only to leave behind them the wetted sands of our disappointment? Is the rise of mankind like the rise of the tides of the ocean to full flood, only to be followed again by ebb-tide? When we think we are getting ahead are we merely going round and round with endless political, social, and industrial revolutions till dizzy with despair? Is it not more reasonable to suppose that when we go round we also ascend as one who climbs a circular staircase? Is not the escalator a fitting symbol of social progress? Or, in believing this, are we but hardened optimists, incorrigible idealists? For we must not forget that there is a "well-nigh universal persuasion that Progress *accomplishes itself*, that a benignant Fate drags the nations forward in an ascending scale, by the mere irresistible drift of elemental and evolutionary forces — without need of any intervention of human virtue or human will." ¹ But this common notion that evolution means social advance and that there is some law of nature that insures progress, quite irrespective of education or selection, is wholly without war-

¹ Charles Ferguson.

rant. Leponge tells us that such a forward and upward movement "exists in rhetoric, not in truth nor in history."¹

As we "look o'er the ravage of the reeking plain" from the verge of the Great Divide, we are bound to ask ourselves whether war is inevitable. The answer is, yes and no. When a keystone is kicked loose on a mountain side then the avalanche becomes "inevitable," but we should be more careful. An earthquake is "inevitable" in a radically different sense of the word for there is nothing that man can do to forfend its coming. War is an avalanche and not an earthquake.

It is frequently announced with an air of finality, as a sort of controversial ultimatum, that war is like birth and death, like growth and decay, like the changing seasons and the law of gravity. People who believe that the peace of the world is not an untenable ideal are accused of folly in attempting to command Destiny, as if they were to stand like traffic policemen amid the interstellar spaces and blow their whistles for the planets to stop. It would seem that all who argue in this fashion ought to fall in love with the Triple Fates.

¹ Quoted by David Starr Jordan in *The Blood of the Nation*, p. 31.

But is the idea that we should gradually move away from the ancient custom of war and towards an era of universal peace as visionary as some would have us believe? Surely it would be sheer stupidity to deny that progress has been made upward and away from long hours of labour in unsanitary conditions of employment, from the brutal treatment of the insane, from the burning of so-called witches,¹ and from cruel religious persecutions. By this token, may we not reasonably look forward to the time when man's inhumanity to man, in the form of dreadful wars, shall no longer make countless thousands mourn? Is there no justification for our faith that all people, everywhere,

¹ A book was published in 1682 entitled *A Tryal of Witches at the Assizes, held at Bury St. Edmonds, for the County of Suffolk, on the tenth day of March, 1664, before Sir Matthew Hale, K. T., then Lord Chief Baron of His Majesties Court of Exchequer,* which contains a record of instructions given to Jurors, that reads as follows:

"That there were such creatures as witches he (Lord Hale) made no doubt at all; for first, the Scriptures had affirmed so much. Secondly, the wisdom of all nations had provided laws against such persons, which is an argument of their confidence of such a crime. And such hath been the judgment of this kingdom as appears by that act of Parliament which had provided punishments proportionable to the quality of the offence. And desired them strictly to observe their evidence; and desired the great God of Heaven to direct their hearts in this weighty matter they had in hand; for to condemn the innocent, and to let the guilty go free, were both an abomination to the Lord. In conclusion, the Judges, and all the court were fully satisfied with the verdict and thereupon gave judgment against the thirteen witches that they should be hanged. And they were executed on Monday, the 17th of March following, but they confessed nothing."

will soon look upon war as a hideous anachronism, out of place in the modern world? "This too shall pass away."

It must constantly be kept in mind, as has already been pointed out, that there are fashions in morals. The pages of history bulge with illustrations of this fact. The time was, for example, when cannibalism seems to have been all the vogue. It had plenty of apologists and very few, if any, who troubled their heads or hearts about whether it was right or wrong, wise or foolish. From the scant information available we gather that our remote ancestors took it for granted without either personal or social qualms of conscience. If there were any societies for the abolition of cannibalism, any leagues to enforce vegetarianism, history says nothing about them. No propaganda literature has come down to us. For long ages men apparently found nothing repulsive in the hideous practice and then suddenly, or gradually, nobody really knows, there came a change in the people's thinking and feeling on the subject. Human nature refused any longer to tolerate this disgusting relic of a barbarous age. The decayed custom was thrown in the fires of Gehenna for the sanitation of society.

Take another example. When Trajan was Em-

peror many of the most respectable Romans found recreation and amusement in gladiatorial combats. Apparently with no shame and with keen enthusiasm, ladies of fashion and not a few statesmen and philosophers sat in the galleries around the amphitheatre and cheered the contestants. When the conqueror had worsted his opponent he placed his foot upon the unfortunate victim and turned to the spectators for their approving applause. If thumbs were turned down that meant, as everybody knows, it was the wish of the onlookers to see the vanquished murdered before their eyes. For a long time human nature stood for that sort of thing with very little protest. To-day, mankind does not get its relaxation in that kind of bloody show. It may be argued that we still have lynchings and that there are thousands who revel in the morbid excitement of that sort of horrid melodrama.¹ That is true, but is it not in the nature of a moral throwback, a kind of spiritual atavism? And is it not met with the reprobation of all decent

¹ In its annual review the *Chicago Tribune* points out that between 1882 and 1903 there were 3,337 lynchings in forty-four of our States. The only other place in the world, it is said, where lynching exists, is in certain sections of rural Russia where there are inadequate penalties for horse stealing. Lynching, we are told, exists nowhere under the British, French, Dutch or German flags, although they all cover frontier conditions and mixed races.

people? Or, again, we will be reminded of the modern analogue to the ancient gladiatorial games — bullfights in Spanish and Latin-American countries. It is interesting to note in this connection that in October, 1916, the Mexican de-facto Government placed its final ban on that pastime. Has human nature changed? We do not know. But, measured by this yard-stick, certainly something has happened to human nature, call it what you will.

Take still another example, for history is replete with illustrations of the principle. A century ago in England pauper children of tender years, sent from London workhouses, were forced to labour fourteen and fifteen and even sixteen hours a day¹ in mills and shops, while in the coal mines they were often harnessed like beasts of burden.² Little children, who ought to have been in God's great out-of-doors, wading knee-deep in June, were the unwilling prisoners of their unhappy fortunes. They were treated as slaves, frequently worked to death, and, it was said, even murdered, that fresh children and new premiums might be obtained.³ With

¹ Report of Royal Commission of 1833.

² Report of Royal Commission of 1841.

³ See article on "Child Labour" and "Child Labour and Legislation in Great Britain," in Bliss' *Encyclopedia of Social Reform*.

but few splendid exceptions human nature seems not to have been especially revolted by this shameful spectacle. The children were stunted and broken by premature and exacting toil and yet this crime against civilisation went on from decade to decade with scarcely an audible protest. And then, one day, Michael Sadler stood up in his place in the English House of Parliament ¹ and startled his dignified compeers by whirling a scorpion whip about his head. He explained that it was one of the whips used to drive listless and weary children to their arduous labour. When hands and feet were too tired for further toil, then a red welt across the children's backs would help to start their flagging energies. Then something happened and in 1843 Elizabeth Barrett Browning wrote her challenging poem, "The Cry of the Children," and the movement towards the abolition of child labour went rapidly forward in England, America and other lands. Society refused any longer to accept without protest the superstitious sacrifice of children in the Ganges of Greed. Now a federal statute has been enacted by the United States Congress and signed by President Wilson (September 1, 1916)

¹ See Hutchins and Harrison's *History of Factory Legislation*.

which at least stamps the stigma of social disapproval upon the baleful custom. The law of the land to-day forbids interstate or foreign commerce in goods that are made in mines which employ children under the age of sixteen, or in factories which employ children under the age of fourteen. This directly affects 150,000 children and is but the preface to the volume of reform which must follow to free the other 1,850,000 from the bondage of premature toil.

One more instance, and then we shall have to let that suffice for want of space. Chattel slavery, in one form or another, was for ages accepted as part and parcel of the normal order of things. It was countenanced and justified not only by the logic of precedent, but by the authority of valid law and revealed religion. There have always been bond and free, slaves and masters. Reformers who protested against the arrangement as unjust and unnecessary were patronised as harmless lunatics or impossible visionaries. They were reminded that "slavery always had been and therefore always would be." But the apologists for human slavery did not content themselves with the argument that it was natural and normal. They cited the fact that Saint Paul admonished the slave Onesemus to

return to his master Philemon. They revived the story of Canaan, the son of Ham.¹ Some said that human slavery was sanctioned and ordained by high heaven and had the approval of God himself. The blame for it, if any one was to be held culpable, was placed upon the broad shoulders of the Almighty. It was explained that the Maker had purposely designed and created some men to be beasts of burden to carry the rest of us on their backs. Abolitionists were urged not to debate with Destiny. They were exhorted to repent of their folly and fall down and worship the God of Things as They Are. They were cautioned not to fly in the face of the immutable laws of life. How very like the writings of Treitschke and Bernhardi all this sounds to-day! And yet, withal, chattel slavery has been altogether abolished. Is it so unreasonable to believe that some day the same thing will happen as to war? One might multiply examples² almost without number, not forgetting that what was called child-exposure in the days of "the

¹ "Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethern."—Genesis 9:25.

² Montesquieu reminds us that Gelon, the King of Syracuse, in "the noblest treaty of peace ever mentioned in history," insisted upon the conquered Carthaginians abolishing the custom of sacrificing their children.

The Bactrians exposed their aged fathers to be devoured by large mastiffs—a custom which, we are told by Strobe, was suppressed by Alexander.

glory that was Greece — the grandeur that was Rome," is now called infanticide; or that the necklace, bracelet and ring, now worn by women, are but the insignia of their erstwhile servitude.

But perhaps it will be maintained that these customs are, after all, man-made and hence may be modified or abolished by men, but that with war the case is different. It will be said, indeed it is frequently said, that war grows out of the natural character of man. A tree is known by its fruit and the fruit is determined by the tree. One does not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles.¹ Man, it is claimed, is by nature and ancestral disposition pugnacious. Because of his inherent love for combat he would die of ennui if he were to be deprived of an occasional opportunity to fight. No argument for war is more familiar than that human nature is essentially brutal and human nature never changes. This is sometimes called the psychological argument for war, or more strictly speaking, against peace. But is it not rather pretentious to settle off-hand, or nonchalantly to brush aside, the most profound problems of moral philosophy? It is far from settled that human nature is essentially brutal, lustful and predaceous. Nor

¹ Matthew 7: 16.

can it be settled by the mere say-so of scientist or theologian, much less by the polemics of popular writers on military subjects.

Dogmatising about the nature of man is beating the air. There seems to be something of the beast and something of the angel in all of us. Man's body probably came to him from and through the lower animals, but his soul is the breath of the living God. To assert that human nature is brutal is more than likely a libel. To proclaim that man naturally thirsts for blood and lusts for combat is to preach a dubious doctrine of pessimism. As well insist that because of perverted instincts we must always have glaring red-light districts in every city. It cannot be proved. It would be quite as reasonable to argue that the nature of fire is to transform the Museum of Alexandria into a heap of ashes, or to make torches of Christians to light the gardens of a Roman Emperor. Of course, uncontrolled fire will devastate and destroy, and so will uncontrolled human nature. In fact it is something like this that is happening in Europe to-day. The sparks have caught and the flames have spread like a forest fire. But what fire or human nature will do is very largely determined by the will of man. This is not to deny that the pugnacious instinct is

to be found in man as well as in the lower forms of creation, but that which distinguishes man from his relatives among the Primates is his intelligence and virtue—his something more than instinct. When reason steps down from its throne as the imperial ruler of man's nature, which is precisely what happens in private feuds and public wars, then man permits his conduct to be determined by the lowest forces in him and not the highest. The mob spirit is let loose, anarchy prevails, and ruin follows fast.

The probability is that man possesses both a higher nature and a lower nature and that his higher nature, of which his will is the general manager, is his real human nature. It would be difficult to prove that this is essentially brutal. Indeed all modern experiments in the treatment of juvenile delinquents and hardened criminals point in exactly the opposite direction. Fortunately we are not called upon to settle the dispute as to whether man is a god in ruins or something less noble. It is enough to affirm our persuasion that the inhuman characteristics of the nature of man are probably the qualities of an animal ancestry which conceivably may be transformed and re-di-

rected. "Forge and transform my passion into power."¹

There is, moreover, a further implication in this "human nature argument"; an implication even more dogmatic. War, it is said, will continue to plague this world of ours just as long as human nature is what it is, that is to say, forever, because human nature never changes. It is dinned into our ears that "human nature is the same the world over." Let us not be misled by cant phrases. This one has a double meaning. It means, in the first place, that "the Colonel's lady and Judy O'Grady are sisters under the skin." Nobody in his right mind will be disposed to doubt or deny the self-evident fact that human nature, regardless of race, or colour, or sex, or creed, is pretty much the same the world over. But it is one thing to say that human nature is the same the world over, at any given time, and quite another thing to say that human nature is the same throughout the long centuries of history.² To affirm this is to affirm what cannot be proved. It is a vast pretension.

For a long time the problem of permanence has

¹ F. W. Myer's poem *Saint Paul*.

² See Alfred Russel Wallace's *Social Environment and Moral Progress* and Mrs. John Martin's *Is Mankind Advancing?*

taxed the acumen of metaphysicians. Of late years several scientists have interested themselves in the question of the presumed immutable laws of nature.¹ More than a dozen years ago Charles Ferguson remarked in his brilliant and prophetic little book, *The Religion of Democracy*:² "You will not say as a man of science that gravitation will remain to-morrow just what it is to-day, but only that you are persuaded that if God changes *that* he will change everything else in proportion. And, doubtless, if the soul of a child should stand in the way the planets would pause and gravitation would turn out. God will have a care that the mill shall grind only ashes and bones."

Nor is this the place, were we competent, to discuss that other question as to whether or not the changes wrought in the individual by education and training (acquired characteristics) can be passed along in any degree whatever, thus making for gradual improvement. But aside from these speculative problems we are often admonished not to confound revolutionary changes in natural environment or social conditions with an essential

¹ See papers by Boutroux, Langevin and Henri Poincaré, read before the International Philosophical Congress in Boulogne. Also see Wilhelm Ostwald's *Natural Philosophy*, particularly p. 30.

² Page 112.

change in human nature. The point is well taken. But, on the other hand, we dare not ignore the intimate relation that subsists between conditions and character, between natural environment and the kind of human nature that is indigenous to a certain soil, so to speak. Hegel tells us that "the State is the realised ethical idea." We may add that the thing we call civilisation, which certainly changes, is very largely the product of human effort, and an author is known by his works.

It is not here maintained that human nature certainly changes and that whenever it changes it improves. This would be a very comforting doctrine; but unhappily it cannot be proved. Either affirming or denying anything positive and conclusive about something concerning which so little is known is rather futile business. We are scarcely more than strangers to what Maeterlinck has called the Unknown Guest within us. But it ought not to be difficult to prove that from generation to generation something happens to human nature which is tantamount to a change, call it what one pleases.

Surely it does not follow that because a habit, custom, convention or institution always has been it will always continue to be. We have seen that

this is repeatedly contradicted by history. But it is with social customs as with personal habits, the deeper rootage they have taken the harder they are to eradicate. Nobody will deny that ancient customs are extremely hard to throw off; but that is a very different thing from saying, with the calm assurance of dogmatism, that because something always has been therefore it always must be. So short a word as "therefore" cannot span so wide a chasm. It is too frail to bear the weight and stand the strain of analysis. The bridge of logic will collapse like that bridge which was twice suspended across the St. Lawrence. To argue in this manner is to reveal symptoms of sleeping-sickness of the brain. There is such a disease as mental hook-worm; intellectual laziness. Anybody who is not too tired to turn the pages of history can, as we have seen, discover for himself, while waiting for dinner to be served, not one but many institutions and conventions that society has supported and defended, for a year or an age, and then at length has cast them away as worn-out. One after another these customs have had their little day and ceased to be.

Most fighting men and their teachers are self-reliant. If they do not actually quote, they cer-

tainly believe the sentiment of Henley's poem, "I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul." And yet, oddly enough, one of the commonest arguments which they employ to dispel the dream of possible peace is that war is necessary because there is a law of nature which provides that all advance must be through struggle in which only the fit survive. If this is not fatalism then there is no such thing as fatalism. What the contention practically amounts to is this: The law of natural selection makes all advance contingent upon struggle — the struggle for existence: it applies among men as among lower animals, among nations as among men; when war "comes" we should be ready and should accept it without making a wry face; it is nobody's fault; let us, therefore, be patient and brave under the bludgeonings of fate; in the fell clutch of circumstance let us neither wince nor cry aloud; comets come whether we want them to or not, and so do wars, and so on, and so forth. This is the line of reasoning. Now, nobody is going to deny that there is an element of fatality in human life, a time and chance that happeneth to all men. That much can be granted without giving the case away. But we vehemently deny that we are straws blown by the vagrant winds

of Destiny. We are not, unless we permit ourselves to be, mere puppets or pawns in the drama or game of life. "The fatalistic view of the war function," wrote William James, "is to me nonsense, for I know that war-making is due to definite motives and subject to prudential checks and reasonable criticisms, just like any other form of enterprise." ¹

It will readily be granted that struggle is an important factor in development. But a natural law is not an edict of Destiny. What is called a law of nature is simply the rule established by recurrent repetitions — a description of what happens so often as to seem invariable. But surely it is a total misreading of the Darwinian law to contend that all advance is through combat.² Is it not the gist of the theory of evolution that man secures and maintains a foothold on this planet by meeting and conquering untoward conditions and hostile beasts? Does not the survival of the fittest merely mean the successful attempt to adapt one's self to one's environment? If the individual or the species succeeds in this process of adaptation (by virtue of protective colouration, elongated necks, and what-

¹ *Memories and Studies*, p. 286.

² See George Nasmyth's *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory*.

not) then it persists; if it fails, then it goes to the wall. This physical competition, often fierce and not seldom fatal, frequently goes on between persons and families and tribes, but it is not the *sine qua non* of progress.

Moreover, it has been explained by competent students, and among them Herbert Spencer¹ and Peter Kropotkin,² that the instinct towards mutual sympathy and aid is quite as natural and common among the lower beasts and primitive men as is antipathy and combativeness. It ought to be apparent that the real struggle of life is man's struggle with the hostile forces in his own nature and with the alien elements in the natural world, so dramatically pictured in the Forest Scene of Maurice Maeterlinck's *Blue Bird*.³ Hence it is by

¹ See Herbert Spencer's *Data of Ethics*.

² See Peter Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid a Factor in Evolution*.

³ Novicov, the brilliant Russian sociologist, in his *Critique du darwinisme Sociale*, emphasised the distinctions between numerous varieties of forces. Dr. Fried, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1911, summarises, in his recent volume, *The Restoration of Europe* (p. 35), the substance of Novicov's idea in the following fashion:

"The stars attract matter; the stronger animal eats the weaker, and by digestion transforms it into a part of its own self. But one celestial body can not chew another, nor can a lion attract cells away from an antelope. The astronomic struggle is different from the biological, and so is the sociological. The fact that the lion tears open the antelope does not imply that the massacre of the population of one state by that of another is a natural law. But imperialism leads us into just such a sea of error. It breeds conceit and turns a noble patriotism into Chauvinism."

co-operation, and not by competition, that man strengthens himself for his difficult test with the facts and forces in this world that make life hard.

CHAPTER XV

DRAINING THE SWAMPS

THE third article in the creed of militarism says that *Privilege is an Advantage*; in a word, *Imperialism*. Mediævalism in government is akin to imperialism in trade. Monarchy is monopoly in terms of politics, and monopoly is monarchy in terms of economics. The imperialism we are now thinking about is a new kind of imperialism, what Frederick Howe has called "financial imperialism."¹

At the close of the last century Charles Ferguson wrote:—"In politics two ideas, reducible to one, have dominated the century: the building up of huge political aggregates and the winning of foreign markets. Under Cæsar and Charlemagne the imperial idea was not without nobility and beauty—it was a world-communion; it aimed to take in everything. But this nineteenth-century market rivalry of subventioned traders—this ruck and drift of blind masses that huddle to the hunger-call

¹ *Why War?* by Frederick Howe.

and the shibboleths of Chauvinism — is a spectacle without nobility or beauty. One empire seemed an inspiring possibility; a multiplicity of empires — French, German, Austrian, Russian, English, Italian, Turkish, American, and so on — is mere unreason and the flow of fate. It is the obscurantism of politics and the evacuation of the ideal. Patriotism has become the refuge not necessarily of ‘scoundrels,’ but of traders, professional soldiers, and politicians.”¹

We have already pointed out that an examination of the wars of history and an analysis of their causes shows that they were motivated by either the passion for liberty, or the hunger for food, or the love for combat, or the lust for power, or the greed for gain, or the desire for privilege. It is neither fantastic nor extravagant to suggest that the real task of modern diplomacy should be to undertake an exhaustive study of wars new and old for the purpose of discovering not only the occasions which precipitated hostilities but what the underlying causes were and are which made war “inevitable.” Constructive statesmanship would then proceed to

¹ *Religion of Democracy*, p. 164. See also article by Henri Lambert entitled “International Morality and Exchange,” in the *Journal des Economistes*, now published in pamphlet form with a special introduction by the Rt. Hon. Lord Courtney of Penwith.

find and to administer such remedies as might be needed. Many of the causes that made for wars in past times no longer have any force, or at any rate they are less and less influential. For example, the cause of many primitive wars was undoubtedly the hunger for food. If it is urged that to-day wars are brought about by the exigent needs of nations to expand and colonise in order to provide for their increased population, the answer is that emigration is possible without colonisation. But if colonies are considered to be really necessary, then negotiation might very conceivably handle the problem by the peaceable partition of unexploited regions.

But of course everybody knows that a motive quite the opposite is now much more prevalent and dominant. Instead of underproduction of food and articles of common use, there is vast overproduction. Due to the invention of modern machinery, production has steadily gained on consumption. And consumption has not been able to keep up with production very largely because the distribution of the gains of industry have not been equitable. In other words, the workers who stood in need of things could not buy them with the wages that they were paid, and so new markets had to be

found for excess goods and they were found abroad. It is hardly open to doubt that the motive here is just plain greed for gain; nothing more, nothing less.

Akin to it is the motive that we have termed the desire for privilege, which has to do with what is sometimes called mercantilism, and sometimes called financial imperialism. In addition to the surfeit of goods, there has been in all the leading nations, because of maldistribution of wealth, a great surplus of capital. This surplus capital has sought and found investment in the backward parts of the world where excessive profits might be reaped. Algeria, Egypt, Tripoli, Turkey, Morocco, China, the Congo, Mexico,—these have presented virgin territory for quick gains. Concessions are sought and obtained in the way of harbour facilities and transportation facilities; concessions to open mines, cut forests, lay railroads, work rubber plantations, build irrigation dams, and erect power plants. Pre-emptions and monopolies are sought and secured. For the most part these investments are made and loans placed in countries which have little or no government. The risks are therefore large; but instead of taking these risks themselves and then accepting as their reward the enormous

profits which such investments yield, financiers manœuvred to win the favour of diplomats in order to obtain the concessions and then, for protection, they depended upon the principle that a country will always defend the persons and properties of its nationals anywhere on the face of the globe. The result is that when a quarrel arises over the Persian Gulf or over Bosnia and it becomes necessary to uphold the dignity of the nation and defend the rights of its citizens to their acquired property in far-off regions, large navies have to be built and equipped and great armies manned and made ready for such things as punitive expeditions and the formation of protectorates.

The grand total of all over-seas investments amounts to more than forty billions of dollars, England alone having no less than twenty billions. The endeavour to make these investments secure and to uphold the rights of adventurous financiers, who happen also to be citizens, involves the abuse of an organisation which is paid for by the people as a whole through taxation — namely the armies and the navies — when surely this military organisation is primarily intended for the defence of the realm and of the people as a whole. It is not so very different from the use of state militia by pri-

vate businesses for the protection of their threatened interests. Another perversion that is, unhappily, all too common.

The places where nations most frequently clash are on the territory of these weak and backward states. These are the "arenas of friction" and they constitute the "stakes of diplomacy," as has been clearly pointed out by Walter Lippmann and others.¹ We can hardly do better than borrow a passage from Mr. Lippmann's latest book:

"This whole business of jockeying for position is at first glance so incredibly silly that many liberals regard diplomacy as a cross between sinister conspiracy and a meaningless etiquette. It would be all of that if the stakes of diplomacy were not real. Those stakes have to be understood, for without such an understanding diplomacy is incomprehensible and any scheme of world peace an idle fancy.

"The chief, the overwhelming problem of diplomacy, seems to be the weak state—the Balkans, the African sultanates, Turkey, China, and Latin America, with the possible exception of the Argentine, Chile, and Brazil. These states are 'weak' because they are industrially backward and at pres-

¹ See Frederick Howe's *Why War?* H. N. Brailsford's *The War of Steel and Gold*, and John A. Hobson's *Towards International Government, Imperialism, and The New Protectionism*.

ent politically incompetent. They are rich in resources and cheap labour, poor in capital, poor in political experience, poor in the power of defence. The government of these states is the supreme problem of diplomacy. . . .

“The plain fact is that the interrelation of peoples has gone so far that to advocate international *laissez-faire* now is to speak a counsel of despair. Commercial cunning, lust of conquest, rum, bibles, rifles, missionaries, traders, concessionaires, have brought the two civilisations into contact and the problem created must be solved, not evaded. . . .

“It is essential to remember that what turns a territory into a diplomatic ‘problem’ is the combination of natural resources, cheap labour, markets, defencelessness, corrupt and inefficient government. The desert of Sahara is no ‘problem,’ except where there are oases and trade routes. Switzerland is no ‘problem,’ for Switzerland is a highly organised modern state. But Mexico is a problem, and Haiti, and Turkey, and Persia. They have the pretension of political independence which they do not fulfil. They are seething with corruption, eaten up with ‘foreign’ concessions, and unable to control the adventurers they attract or safeguard the rights which these adventurers claim.

More foreign capital is invested in the United States than in Mexico, but the United States is not a 'problem' and Mexico is. The difference was hinted at in President Wilson's speech at Mobile. Foreigners invest in the United States, and they are assured that life will be reasonably safe and that titles to property are secured by orderly legal means. But in Mexico they are given 'concessions,' which means that they secure extra privileges and run greater risks, and they count upon the support of European governments or of the United States to protect them and their property. . . .

"Imperialism in our day begins generally as an attempt to police and pacify. This attempt stimulates national pride, it creates bureaucrats with a vested interest in imperialism, it sucks in and receives added strength from concessionaires and traders who are looking for economic privileges. There is no doubt that certain classes in a nation gain by imperialism, though to the people as a whole the adventure may mean nothing more than an increased burden of taxes. . . .

"The whole question of imperialism is as complex as the motives of the African trader who subsidises the African missionary. He does not know

where business ends and religion begins; he is able to make no sharp distinction between his humanitarianism and his profits. He feels that business is a good thing, and religion is a good thing. He likes to help himself, and to see others helped. The same complexity of motives appear in imperialist statesmen. . . .

“Who should intervene in backward states, what the intervention shall mean, how the protectorate shall be conducted — this is the bone and sinew of modern diplomacy. The weak spots of the world are the arenas of friction.”¹

If it be true, and apparently it is, that these sections of the world are the swamp regions in which are bred the germs that spread the disease of war, then it would seem that the most pressing task of diplomacy is the draining of the swamps. A few General Gorgases among the statesmen who would not balk at the stupendous job of initiating an international movement that would result in the cleaning up of these backward regions, would go a long way toward reducing the probability of war.

¹ *The Stakes of Diplomacy*, Chapter VII.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FRONTIERS OF FRIENDSHIP

THE fourth article in the creed of militarism says that *States are Natural Enemies*; in a word, *Nationality*. It will not be an easy task to apportion the relative share of blame for this present war which each of the several articles in the creed of militarism must shoulder. But extravagant ideas of nationality, false doctrines of patriotism, and the theory that states are natural enemies,—these will have to carry a heavy load.

Charles Ferguson has somewhere pointed out in one of his profound and brilliant little books ¹ that if liberty means anything at all it means the right of a person to live his own life in his own way. What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own individuality? And what shall it profit a woman if she gain a world of comfort and security and lose her own personality? And what shall it profit a nation if it gain

¹ See *The Religion of Democracy, The Affirmative Intellect, The University Militant and The Great News*.

prosperity and assured peace and lose its nationality—its soul? We must not permit pleasant platitudes about internationalism and the brotherhood of man to blind us to the real differences between races and peoples. However these essential differences may have come about is a speculative problem for the philosophers of history.¹ Our business is to recognise the perfectly obvious fact that there are these vital differences and our pressing problem is to bring about a rapprochement, an adjustment, a *modus vivendi*. The poet sings that East is East and West is West and that never the twain can meet and we know that what he means is they can never mingle and fuse and amalgamate. But as for meeting,—that is precisely what is always happening and usually when they meet nowadays they clash. Something may be done, indeed something must be done, to soften the blow when they clash. But nationhood and nationalism are two quite different things. In other words, national boundaries are mostly superficial and arbitrary, and do not always or often coincide with essential racial differences. A constructive programme of international statesmanship will mini-

¹ See the Introduction to Hegel's *Philosophy of History*. Also Chapter III of Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*.

mise these artificial distinctions and yet not interfere with the development of the special genius of a particular people.¹

We shall probably have to cast about for a new principle of patriotism and frame a new definition. The time has come to discard old notions of patriotism and throw them into the wastebasket of history. They have already wrought enough havoc and woe in the world and we shall be glad when they are gone. There is really nothing at all revolutionary about this. Our loyalties reach out in concentric circles. We cannot love an abstraction or the ghost of a reality. But we can love and serve a person or an institution that is tangent to our daily lives. Whenever we come to feel that the one or the other has ceased to have any vital relation to our lives our love becomes only a recollection, our loyalty little more than cant or self-deception. On the other hand, as our genuine interests and vital contacts reach outward our hearts are very likely to

¹ In the course of an eight-column editorial article in the *New Republic* for January 13, 1917, Mr. Herbert Croly says, "The peculiar merit of the plan of a League to Enforce Peace, as compared with other plans of pacifist organisation, consists in the promise of its proposed method of escape from the burden of the baleful antithesis between national ambition and international order. It establishes international order on the foundation of national responsibility. It seeks to create a community of living nations rather than a community of superseded nations of denationalised peoples."

go with them. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.

The old patriotism was negative; the new patriotism is positive. The old patriotism meant hate of another nation; the new patriotism means love of your own country. The old patriotism has sown the seeds of sedition against humanity and civilisation. It has sown to the wind and reaped to the whirlwind. It has sown the dragon's teeth which have sprung up as soldiers, full-armed and panoplied and ready for the combat. And now we have garnered the awful harvest of hate. For generations children in school have been taught that the acme, the apotheosis, the perfection of patriotism was hate of somebody beyond the borders and frontiers of the nation. As a matter of fact there are no frontiers to friendship and the language of love is an Esperanto. Enmity is the perversion of patriotism. It is a good thing gone wrong, and the corruption of the best is the worst corruption. This is not to say that, when the nations are drunk with the intoxication of aroused hate, when their territory has been invaded by foreigners, their homes burned and their cities laid waste, there will not be aroused a spirit of revenge which, when once kindled, will spread like a prairie fire. But hostili-

ties would not often begin between one national group and another unurged and unbidden. Let the dead past bury its dead. The dawn is on the horizon.

The notion of patriotism as hatred is not only dangerous doctrine; it is false doctrine. There is such a thing as religious devotion, and then there is such a thing as sanctimonious cant. There is a difference as wide as the ocean between liberty and license, between love and lust, between enthusiasm and hysteria. So, also, there is a true patriotism and there is a false patriotism. It will never do to be vaguely idealistic about "the love of humanity" and then speak reproachfully about "narrow love of country." Patriotism is more than mushy sentimentality. It is all very well to be cynical about the value of mere sentiment, but it is probably more than an aphorism to say that the world is ruled by sentiment — or sentimentality. Take the matter of the conduct of war itself. No practical statesman, however cynical and blasé he himself may happen to be about the beautiful sentiment of loyalty, would, for a moment, discount the very real value of patriotism. He would know, as a matter of statistics, that no modern grand scale war could possibly be conducted for a month

without patriotism or something "just as good." Indeed this is precisely why he so sedulously cultivates the habit of patriotism in his subjects or fellow-citizens. There are not enough mercenary soldiers for sale in all the markets of the world and you cannot win wars without soldiers.

False patriotism, hate of another country, is fostered by pride, prejudice, envy, jingoism or fanaticism. True patriotism, on the other hand, is love of one's own country and love of one's own country does not mean love of a particular piece of ground, which may be provincialism; nor of a select kind of folk, which may be bigotry; nor of a certain sort of government, which is probably dogmatism; nor of a special style of culture, which is more than likely racial or national egotism. True patriotism, *per contra*, means four things: First, it means reverence for the past traditions of one's country; second, it means devotion to the present institutions of one's country; third, it means loyalty to the future ideals of one's country; and fourth, it means valour to fight, if needs must be, in defence of these same institutions and ideals.¹

¹ Nobody will quarrel with Mr. Homer Lea when he pleads the cause of duty and devotion to the homeland. "By the efforts men make," he writes in *The Day of the Saron* (p. 2), "to preserve their families from want, from servitude or destruction do we judge their domestic virtues. In such a manner, only to a

We may paraphrase Tertullian and say that the blood of the patriot is the seed of the State. But are crimson foundations necessary? We are told that it is our duty to obey and die at the command of the State.¹ But are we to have no choice in the matter? The time was when personal vengeance was considered a duty; but times have changed. Perhaps we shall some day have the higher courage to refuse to die — except for justice and liberty. May the time never come when we shall be too cowardly to lay down our lives for our friends. Now the sentiment of loyalty is as universal as humanity, but its pulse sometimes “skips” and is weak. War has the effect of quickening and stimulating loyalty. Frequently this is blind devotion, a feeling and a passion. But true loyalty must be reciprocal. If our friends betray us they are no longer our friends and we cannot continue to love

larger degree, should judgment be rendered upon these same men according to the efforts they make toward a like preservation of their race. If a man who gives over his family to the vicissitudes of his neglect is deserving of scorn, how great should be the contempt felt for him who evades the obligations he owes his race and gives over, not alone his family, but all his people to conquest or destruction. Public fealty is only a nobler conception of the duty a man owes his family. A nation is a union of families; patriotism the synthesis of their domestic virtues. The ruin of states, like the ruin of families, comes from one cause — neglect. To neglect one's family is to lose it; to neglect one's country is to perish with it. Individuals are a part of the world only in the duration or memory of their race.”

¹ See Charles Rann Kennedy's *The Terrible Meek*.

them. If we are led astray by princes or demagogues our loyalty to them is only a pretension, compelled by fear.

The theory of Hobbes that warfare is the natural state of man is far from proved.¹ The argument for racial and national loyalties is more reasonable. We may well believe that blood is thicker than water; but to-day unanimity is a stronger bond than consanguinity, and it frequently happens that people on opposite sides of a border are drawn into closer intimacies by mutual interests and purposes than unlike people in the same country. In the matter of personal habits and characteristics, we emphasise to-day the influence of environment above heredity.² Much the same thing is true as to national and racial inheritance. It is far less important than social environment and moral ideals. The time may come when we will be ready to say "the world is my country, to do good is my religion," but that time has not come yet, and forced growth often means premature death.

¹ See *The Forks of the Road*, by Washington Gladden.

² Alfred Russel Wallace, *Letters and Reminiscences*.

CHAPTER XVII

SOULS IN REVOLT

THE fifth article in the creed of force says that *Might Makes Right*; in a word, *Materialism*. War is universal sabotage. As far back as the record of human history goes, one group seems to have taken a malicious delight in throwing its wooden boot into the machinery of another group. Slowly it dawned upon the intelligences of men that all this was very stupid, that it was, in fact, social suicide. Men looked about them and saw that individual advance was dependent upon personal will. They observed that so long as they believed in the omnipotence of Nature they were bound to worship her might and crouch in abject fear. Just as soon as their wills awoke to consciousness they began to conquer and control the forces of environment and to remake the world to suit their fancy. It did not demand any considerable skill in reasoning to infer from this that social progress also must wait upon the integration of the social will.

It was seen that society would go ahead faster

if it could catch a ride. And so it was that institutions were invented—the vehicles of progress. The earliest form of social co-operation, the first state, was no doubt a clumsy and rickety affair. But the state has not remained static. The business of reformers has been to improve the model of the vehicle year after year, age after age. Revolutionists, losing their temper, have tried to smash the car of progress, while, on the other hand, impatient idealists have talked and acted as if they thought progress ought to be a joy-ride to Elysium. Again and again these vehicles have broken down, or their engines have gone dead, with the result that instead of helping us along they have blocked the traffic and hindered advance. This, in brief, is the history of the State, the Church, and the School.

Is government a necessary evil and is that government therefore best which governs least? Perhaps this is still a moot question. We may have our choice of several theories. We may, if we prefer, believe in philosophical anarchy, which is the notion that an ideal society would be a voluntary association of absolutely independent individuals. This idea, *reductio ad absurdum*, means that the best possible government would be no government

at all. Or, we may go all the way to the other extreme, and believe that society is more important than any individual, and that therefore we should forget ourselves and work always for the greatest good of the greatest number, symbolised in the State. A corollary of this proposition is the axiom that the seat of authority is a sovereign State. Or, again, we may not go to either extreme, but may put our faith in practical democracy, in government of, by, and for the people, to the end that Freedom, with Responsibility, may be denied to none. This is the doctrine of democracy and implies the fundamental principle of politics, which is compromise. The first and most important article in the creed of democracy is the belief that the pearl of great price is personality, and that the state, or government, is merely a means to an end, which end is the enhancement of all individuals by co-operative enterprise. This must be what Edmund Burke meant when he called government a partnership.

Florence Nightingale used to say that hospitals should not spread disease and make people sick. It is equally true that governments should not spread misery and make people unhappy. The perversion of government is privilege. It is now

and always has been. That is why progress has been so painfully retarded. Governments have been used by designing individuals or cliques to satisfy the lust for personal power and the greed for private gain. But how can one know that government is perverted unless one first knows the true purpose and proper function of government? What is government for? One answer is that given by Treitschke when he says, "The State must have the most emphatic will that can be imagined. . . . The State is the most extremely real person, in the literal sense of the word, that exists. . . . We cannot imagine the Roman State humane, or encouraging Art and Science. . . . The State would no longer be what it has been and is, did it not stand visibly girt about with armed might. . . . The State is, above all, Power."¹ If this is the accepted notion of what constitutes and characterises a true State, then certain consequences follow and one of them is almost sure to be war. One who spake not as the scribes said that the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath; that the individual is greater than any institution. This is as true in respect to government, and the instruments of government,

¹ *Politics*, Vol. I, pp. 17, 18, 22, 23.

as it is in respect to any other institution. The perversion comes in when we substitute, or pretend to substitute, the sovereignty of the state for the sovereignty of the soul; the divine rights of kings for the diviner rights of men — to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The problem of morality, or justice (which is social morality), is a difficult one to unravel. Modern militarists, like a certain ancient militarist, would cut the Gordian knot with a sharp sword. And this is a true symbol of the doctrine that might makes right.

Inasmuch as we have not been furnished with charts of character and detailed drawings of duty it is often very hard to determine what is right, particularly as moral values fluctuate like other values from age to age and sometimes with a change of climate. We blithely say that God is the final Judge of right, but as God does not write his decisions in letters of fire across the scroll of the heavens, how are we going to know? There are but two possible ways of discovering the will of God. The first is what we may call the method of Moses, the notion that the Infinite selects some mortal to hear and interpret the Voice that speaks from a burning bush or midst the lightnings of

Sinai. The other affirms that the Kingdom of God is within us, that the Moral Law is written on the fleshly tablets of the heart. The former is the theory of theocracy (which soon degenerates into priestcraft or statecraft, into religious or political aristocracy); the latter is the theory of democracy.

Our progress up out of barbarism has been so slow and tortuous that we are jealous of what gains we have made in respect to morality; personal, social, and international. This is why we have all been so revolted by the deliberate and even boastful declaration of this particular article in the creed of militarism; this doctrine that might makes right. Force is not atheism, power is not atheism, might is not atheism; but the brutal avowal that might makes right is both atheism and materialism. Militarism is the religion of violence.

In modern times we have witnessed the revolution of the people against the domination of kings and emperors who pretended that they were the earthly ambassadors of a heavenly Deity. We have witnessed the revolt of religion against the tyranny of tradition. We have witnessed the uprising of the workers in protest against the cramped conditions of their life and labour. We have witnessed the rebellion of the women against

prejudice and parasitism, against economic dependence and political disability. But the deeper meaning of all this unrest — religious, political, industrial — has been a sort of spiritual rebellion; *souls in revolt*. The souls of men have taken up arms against the menace of machinery and the menace of materialism, lest they be crushed by the cogs of the wheels within wheels or buried beneath the weight of mud and matter.

This is the true explanation for the hostility to Germany by those whose natural disposition would be friendly and not inimical. It is because they have been forced to believe that she has ruthlessly trampled all the ideals of the modern world into the bloody mire of an outworn creed. It is not because England is good and Germany is bad that public opinion, for the most part, has sided with the Entente Allies as against the Central Powers in this present struggle; it is because the former (at any rate for the moment) have symbolised the New Era, while the latter have seemed to deny, with cruel cynicism, the moral meaning of life.

If one man, or a thousand, believed and preached the Gospel of Materialism it would not be so bad. The harm has come because the doctrine that the voice of the howitzer is more mandatory and

authoritative than the Voice that thunders from Mount Sinai has become institutionalised in the diplomacy of a State. It is because the ruling class of one nation (the Prussian junkers) has evidently repudiated, with heartless scorn, the Sermon on the Mount.

When Maximilian Harden, British statesmen, or neutral publicists say that Prussian militarism must be stamped out before permanent peace can be established on enduring foundations this is what is meant: The theory that the State is the ultimate form of social evolution and that there is no authority beyond the authority of the sovereign State, must be disavowed and the Moral Law acknowledged to have an existence beyond and above the necessities of the nation.

A SEA WALL OF DEMOCRACY

A SEA WALL OF DEMOCRACY

A while ago I visited Galveston and strolled along the promenade that tops its Sea-Wall. The night inspired awe and wonder. It was like a splendid maiden, robed in a garment of raven's wing, whose dress was bejewelled with stars, and on whose head was a crescent moon. One by one these stars flickered and one by one they went out. Then swiftly the scene changed. On the western sky a cloud appeared, no larger than a woman's hand. It grew and spread across the heavens. I heard the clash of thunderous skies, the roar of tumultuous waves. I looked and saw, what seemed to be, a hand that drew from the scabbard of night a red-gold sword that flashed in the air. It was chained lightning. And then the storm broke in all its fury and awful splendour. The winds of Æolus left their caves to riot through the world. I looked to see on every hand death and destruction; the crash and ruin of the Day of Doom. Instead, the storm abated; the tide ebbed; the winds rested. The Master of Nature awoke and commanded the boisterous waves to be still. Only the skirts of the city were sprinkled with the spray. Behind her mighty bulwark Galveston slept secure.

I stood and looked, for I know not how long, into the starless sky. For a while I saw the changing clouds, and then I saw no more. In silence and reverence I waited. And then, on the far horizon, I watched in amaze the gradual gathering of an innumerable host. They were the children of soldiers slain in war. Their backs were bent with arduous toil but in their eyes was an uncounted light, a light that never was on sea or land. They were building a mightier sea-wall than that upon which I stood, and, what seemed to me the strangest thing of all, THEY WERE BUILDING IT WITH THEIR BODIES. I looked again and saw a Master-Builder who separated himself from the countless crowd and spoke with a voice that was as the voice of many waters, as the voice of a great thunder. And what he said was that the workers and the women were gladly giving their bodies to be the stones in a new sea-wall, the Sea-Wall of Democracy. He said that it would be built so high and broad and strong that when, twenty-five years from now, some misguided Princeps, some mad autocrat, some militant statesman, shall once again try to whip the waves of popular passion into a tempest, the sea-wall of restraint and justice and public opinion and common conscience—the Sea-Wall of Democracy—will boldly rise and seem to say: "Thus far and no farther. . . Here stay thy cruel waves."

APPENDIX

ENDORSEMENTS OF THE LEAGUE'S PROPOSALS

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

(Address to the Senate)

“GENTLEMEN of the Senate: On the 18th day of December last I addressed an identic note to the Governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy.

“The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace.

“The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely, and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement.

“We are that much nearer a definite discussion

of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power, which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man, must take that for granted.

“I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in those days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

“It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their policy and the approved practices of their Government, ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honourable hope that it might, in all that it was and did, show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot, in honour, with-

hold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

“That service is nothing less than this — to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a league for peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

“The present war must first be ended, but we owe it to candour and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged.

“We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made

lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant, and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterward, when it may be too late.

“No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples of the new world can suffice to keep the future safe against war, and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing.

“The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American Governments, elements consistent with their political faith and the practical conviction which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

“I do not mean to say that any American Government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the Governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand

it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organised major force of mankind.

“The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this:

“Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be not only a balance of power, but a community of power; not organised rivalries, but an organised common peace.

“Fortunately, we have received very explicit assurances on this point. The statesmen of both of the groups of nations, now arrayed against one another, have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all, may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

“They imply first of all that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own in-

terpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory, upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently but only as upon quicksand.

“Only a peace between equals can last; only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

“The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded, if it is to last, must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognise nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend.

“Equality of territory, of resources, there, of course, cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no

one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.

“And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of rights among organised nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognise and accept the principle that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.

“I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of Governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

“I speak of this not because of any desire to exalt an abstract political principle which has always been held very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace, which seem to me clearly indispensable — because I wish frankly to uncover realities. Any peace which does not recognise and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the convictions of mankind.

The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathise. The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

“So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling toward a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory it can no doubt be done by the neutralisation of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

“And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and co-operation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto sought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them.

“The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse

of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the Governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

“It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe.

“And the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programmes of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candour and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings and come to stay.

“Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armies are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

“I have spoken upon these great matters with-

out reserve, and with the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free voice and utterance. Perhaps I am the only person in high authority among all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great Government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say.

“May I not add that I hope and believe that I am, in effect, speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

“And in holding out the expectation that the people and the Government of the United States will join the other civilised nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named, I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment rather of all that we have professed or striven for.

“I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: That no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

“I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competition of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

“I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

“These are American principles, American policies. We can stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking

men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.”—*Address of President Wilson to the United States Senate, January 22, 1917.*

THE PRESIDENT'S IDENTIC NOTE TO THE
NATIONS AT WAR

“In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends when the war is over with every influence and resource at their command.”—*Dated Washington, December 18, 1916.*

THE REPLY OF THE ALLIES TO PRESIDENT
WILSON'S NOTE

“The allied Governments have received the note which was delivered to them in the name of the Government of the United States on the 19th of December, 1916. They have studied it with the care imposed upon them both by the exact realisation which they have of the gravity of the hour and by the sincere friendship which attaches them to

the American people. In a general way they desire to declare their respect for the lofty sentiments inspiring the American note, and their wholehearted agreement with the proposal to create a league of nations which shall assure peace and justice throughout the world. They recognise all the benefits which will accrue to the cause of humanity and civilisation from the institution of international arrangements designed to prevent violent conflicts between nations and so framed as to provide the sanctions necessary to their enforcement, lest an illusory security shall serve merely to facilitate fresh acts of aggression.”— *Dated Paris, January 10, 1917.*

THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN,

MR. LLOYD-GEORGE

“The world will then be able, when this war is over, to attend to its business in peace. There will be no war or rumours of war to disturb and to distract. We can build up, we can reconstruct, we can till, we can cultivate and enrich, and the burden and terror and waste of war will have gone. The peace and security for peace will be that the nations will band themselves together to punish the first peacebreaker who comes out. As to the armies of Europe, every weapon will be a sword of justice in the Government of men; every arm will be a constabulary of peace.”— *Address at Guildhall, January 11, 1917.*

THE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE, M. BRIAND

“The union of all the living forces of the country is an essential condition to success. It is that which will lead us to our goal — peace by victory — a solid, lasting peace guaranteed against any return of violence by appropriate international measures.”

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY,
DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

“Lord Grey finally dealt exhaustively with the period after peace and with the establishment of an international union to preserve peace. On that subject, too, I will say a few words. We never concealed our doubts whether peace could be lastingly insured by international organisations such as arbitration courts. I will not discuss here the theoretical part of the problem, but in practice now and in peace we shall have to define our attitude toward the question.

“When, after the termination of the war, the world shall fully recognise its horrible devastation of blood and treasure, then through all mankind will go the cry for peaceful agreements and understandings which will prevent, so far as is humanly possible, the return of such an immense catastrophe. This cry will be so strong and so justified that it must lead to a result. Germany will honourably co-operate in investigating every attempt to

find a practical solution, and collaborate toward its possible realisation, and that all the more if the war, as we confidently expect, produces political conditions which will do justice to the free development of all nations, small as well as great. In that case the principle of right and free development must be made to prevail, not only on the Continent, but also at sea.

“Of that Lord Grey, of course, did not speak. The guarantee of peace which he has in mind appears to me to possess a peculiar character, devised especially for British wishes. During the war the neutrals, according to his desire, will have to remain silent and patiently endure every compulsion of British domination on the seas. After the war, when England as she thinks, will have beaten us, when she will have made a new arrangement of the world, then neutrals are to combine as guarantors of the new English arrangement of the world.

“Such a policy of force cannot, of course, form the basis for an effective international peace union, and it is in the strongest contrast to Lord Grey’s and Mr. Asquith’s ideal state of things, where right governs might and all States form a family of civilised mankind, and can freely develop themselves, whether big or small, under the same conditions and in accordance with their natural capabilities. If the Entente wishes seriously to take up this position, then it should also act consistently upon

it; otherwise the most exalted words about peace union and harmonious living together in an international family are mere words."— *Speech of November 9 before the Chief Committee of the Reichstag.*

THE HUNGARIAN PRIME MINISTER,
COUNT TISZA

"Pursuant to our peaceful policy before the war and our attitude during the war, as well as our recent peace action, we can only greet with sympathy every effort aiming at the restoration of peace. . . . Only that limited realisation of the principle of nationalities is possible which the President of the United States rightly expresses in demanding that security of life and religion and individual and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples. . . . We feel ourselves therefore completely in agreement with the President's demands. We shall strive for the realisation as far as possible of this principle in the regions lying in our immediate neighbourhood. I can only repeat that, true to our traditional foreign policy and true to the standpoint we took in our peace action, in conjunction with our allies we are ready to do everything that will guarantee to the peoples of Europe the blessings of a lasting peace."— *Reply to question by member of Opposition Party in Parliament, January 24, 1917.*

THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER, MR. BALFOUR

“I gather from the general tenor of the President’s note that, while he is animated by an intense desire that peace should come soon and that when it comes it should be lasting, he does not, for the moment at least, concern himself with the terms on which it should be arranged. His Majesty’s Government entirely share the President’s ideas; but they feel strongly that the durability of peace must largely depend on its character and that no stable system of international relations can be built on foundations which are essentially and hopelessly defective. . . . There are those who think that for this disease international treaties and international laws may provide a sufficient cure. But such persons have ill learned the lessons so clearly taught by recent history. . . . Though, therefore, the people of this country share to the full the desire of the President for peace, they do not believe peace can be durable if it be not based on the success of the allied cause. For a durable peace can hardly be expected unless three conditions are fulfilled: The first is that existing causes of international unrest should be as far as possible removed or weakened; the second is that the aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples; the third is that behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or

limiting hostilities some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardest aggressor.”—*Arthur James Balfour to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, January 13, 1917.*

“When this tremendous war is brought to an end, how is civilised mankind so to reorganise itself that similar catastrophes shall not be permitted to recur? Law is not enough. Behind law there must be power. It is good that arbitration should be encouraged. . . . It is good that before peace is broken the would-be belligerents should be compelled to discuss their differences in some congress of the nations. It is good that the security of the smaller States should be fenced round with peculiar care. But all these precautions are mere scraps of paper unless they can be enforced. We delude ourselves if we think we are doing God service merely by passing good resolutions. What is needed now, and will be needed so long as militarism is unconquered, is the machinery for enforcing them, and the contrivance of such a machinery will tax to its utmost the statesmanship of the world.”—*Statement by Mr. Balfour on May 19, 1916. He was then First Lord of the British Admiralty.*

THE BRITISH CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER,
MR. BONAR LAW

“President Wilson’s speech [before the Senate] had this aim—to gain peace now and secure

peace for the future. That is our aim, and our only aim. He hoped to secure this by a league of peace, and he not only spoke in favour of such a league but he is trying to induce the American Senate to take the steps necessary to give effect to it. It would not be right to regard this proposal as something altogether Utopian. You know that almost up to our own day duelling continued, and just as the settling of private disputes by the sword has now become unthinkable, so, I think, we may hope that the time will come when all the nations of the world will play the part which Cromwell described as his life work—to act as constable and keep peace. That time will come, I hope. . . .

“Our aim is the same as President Wilson’s. What he is longing for we are fighting for, our sons and brothers are risking their lives for, and we mean to secure it. The hearts of the people of this country are longing for peace. We are praying for peace, for a peace which will bring back to us in safety those who are fighting our battles, and a peace which will mean that those who will not come back have not laid down their lives in vain.”—*Address on January 24, 1917.*

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE BRITISH WAR
COUNCIL, EARL CURZON

“They would be surprised if when the war was over the better judgment of mankind did not rally

in force and say that these abominations must not be again in the world. Mankind must be saved from the peril of its own passion. Machinery must be devised to prevent the reign of brute force in the world.”— *Statement made on May 16, 1916, as presiding chairman of the Atlantic Union.*

THE FOREIGN OFFICE OF THE RUSSIAN
GOVERNMENT

“Russia has always been in full sympathy with the broad humanitarian principles expressed by the President of the United States. His message to the Senate, therefore, has made a most favourable impression upon the Russian Government. Russia will welcome all suitable measures which will help prevent a recurrence of the world war. Accordingly we can gladly indorse President Wilson’s communication. President Wilson’s views on free access to the seas find an advocate in Russia, because she considers it necessary to have free access to the seas. The President’s proposal regarding limited armament has the support of Russia, who made representations of this nature at The Hague conferences. In expressing these convictions, the President of the United States is, at the same time, expressing the point of view of Russia. . . . Russia already has definitely announced her unalterable determination regarding the future of Poland. The Russian Emperor has declared one of the objects of the war is a free Poland, consisting now of

three separated provinces. As to the nature of the peace to be concluded, whether it be a peace without victory or not, one should remember that it never has been the aim of the Allies to crush their enemies and that they have never insisted upon victory in that sense over Germany. It is Germany who has taken that point of view and wishes to dictate peace as a victor.”—*Statement to Associated Press, January 26, 1917.*

THE GERMAN FOREIGN SECRETARY,
MR. ZIMMERMANN

“In the message which President Wilson addressed to the Senate, the Imperial German Government recognises with extreme satisfaction the fact that the aspirations and thoughts of the President continue to occupy themselves with the question of restoration of permanent peace. The exalted moral earnestness which collects itself in the words of the President insures them of an attentive ear throughout the world. The Imperial German Government earnestly hopes that the untiring efforts of the President to restore peace on earth may be crowned with success.”—*Interview with Wm. Bayard Hale, January 24, 1917.*

THE FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
MR. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

“Even if the risk of war to the United States would be greater by entering a League to Enforce

Peace than by staying out of it, does not the United States have a duty as a member of the family of nations to do its part and run its necessary risk to make less probable the coming of such another war and such another disaster to the American race? We are the richest nation in the world and in the sense of what we could do were we to make reasonable preparation, we are the most powerful nation in the world. We have been showered with good fortune. Our people have enjoyed a happiness known to no other people. Does not this impose upon us a sacred duty to join the other nations of the world in a fraternal spirit and with a willingness to make sacrifice if we can promote the general welfare of men? At the close of this war the governments and the people of the belligerent countries, under the enormous burdens and suffering from the great losses of the war, will be in a condition of mind to accept and promote such a plan for the enforcement of future peace."

THE FORMER BRITISH PRIME MINISTER,
MR. ASQUITH

"It means [the war], finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambitions, for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise, the substitution for all these things of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced

by a common will. A year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It is probably one that may not, or will not, be realised either to-day or to-morrow. If and when this war is decided in favour of the Allies, it will at once come within the range, and before long within the grasp, of European statesmanship.”— *Speech at Dublin, September 25, 1914.*

In a speech at Queen’s Hall, London, delivered on the occasion of the second anniversary of the declaration of war, August 4, 1916, Mr. Asquith said: “Early in the war I quoted a sentence which Mr. Gladstone used in 1870. ‘The greatest triumph of our time,’ he said, ‘has been the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European policies.’ Mr. Gladstone worked all his life for that noble purpose. He did not live to see its attainment. By the victory of the Allies, the enthronement of public right here in Europe will pass from the domain of ideals and of aspirations into that of concrete and achieved realities. What does public right mean? I will tell you what I understand it to mean — an equal level of opportunity and of independence as between small States and great States, as between the weak and the strong; safeguards resting upon the common will of Europe, and, I hope, not of Europe alone, against aggression, against international covetousness and bad faith, against the wanton recourse in case of dispute to the use of force and the dis-

turbance of peace; finally, as the result of it all, a great partnership of nations federated together in the joint pursuit of a freer and fuller life for countless millions who by their efforts and their sacrifice, generation after generation, maintain the progress and enrich the inheritance of humanity.” — *Reported in the London Times for August 11, 1916.*

THE FORMER UNITED STATES SECRETARY
OF STATE, MR. ROOT

“I heartily agree with the purpose and general principle of the League to Enforce Peace. It seems clear to me that if we are ever to get away from the necessity for great armaments and special alliances, with continually recurring wars, growing more and more destructive, it must be by a more systematic treatment of international disputes brought about by common agreement among civilised nations. It seems to me that any such system must include the better formulation of international law, the establishment of an international court to apply the law, and a general agreement to enforce submission to the jurisdiction of the court. I also think the Court of Conciliation for dealing with questions which are not justiciable is very desirable.” — *Letter to Dr. A. Lawrence Lowell dated February 10, 1916.*

THE FORMER BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY,
LORD GREY

“I believe the best work neutrals can do is to prevent a war like this ever happening again. . . . Nations fighting for their existence with daily increasing prospects of seeing victory nearer, still knowing that if they stop short of victory they stop short of everything for which they are struggling, cannot be expected to spend much time thinking about what might happen after victory is secured. But the neutrals can do it. I observe that not only President Wilson, but Mr. Hughes, is supporting a league [The League to Enforce Peace] started, not with the object of interfering with the belligerents in this war, but which will do its part in making peace secure in the future. It is a work of neutral countries to which we should all look with favour and hope. Only, we must bear this in mind: If the nations, after the war, are able to do something effective by binding themselves with the common object of preserving peace, they must be prepared to undertake no more than they are able to uphold by force, and to see, when the time of crisis comes, that it is upheld by force. The question which we must ask them is this: ‘Will you play up when the time comes?’ It is not merely the sign manual of Presidents and sovereigns that is really to make that worth-while; this must also have behind it parliaments and national sentiments.

Supposing the conditions of 1914 occur again, and there is such a league in existence, everything will depend upon whether national sentiment behind it is so permeated by the lessons of this war as to compel each nation, as a matter of vital interest, to keep peace other than by vital force.”—*Speech before the Foreign Press Association of London on October 23, 1916.*

“I sincerely desire to see a league of nations formed and made effective to secure future peace of the world after this war is over. I regard this as the best if not the only prospect of preserving treaties and of saving the world from aggressive wars in years to come and if there is any doubt about my sentiments in the matter I hope this telegram will remove it.”—*Cablegram from Lord Grey read at New York Banquet of League to Enforce Peace, November 24, 1916.*

THE FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES,
VISCOUNT BRYCE

“Is there anything further that the friends of justice and humanity in Europe can expect from beyond the Atlantic, since it is not now likely that the armed aid which would do so much to shorten the war will be forthcoming? Many of us here in Britain have been anxiously considering what can be done after the war to prevent the recurrence of such sufferings and calamities as we have been witnessing. There are those among us who have

framed schemes for the creation of some international machinery for that purpose, some league of peace-loving nations to secure the amicable settlement of disputes and restrain any Power which may hereafter be impelled by passion or selfishness to attack its neighbours. We have thought it best not to give publicity to these schemes so long as the national mind is so much absorbed with the conduct of the war as to be unable to give due consideration to them. Now, however, when victory seems to be coming into sight, and when we know that both we and our Allies are absolutely united in our resolve to prosecute it till that victory is complete, the reasons for reserve may soon disappear. In America, where those reasons do not exist, much has already been done. A league for the promotion of a permanent peace has been formed, including many weighty and distinguished names (with ex-President Taft for its president), which has formulated a plan for the establishment of such a permanent international machinery as I have mentioned, and which proposes that the United States should render to this worthy cause the immense service of taking part in the scheme. The difficulty in the way of such American participation has, of course, hitherto lain in that policy of complete isolation from Old World affairs which the United States has hitherto followed. But now two events of capital significance have happened."

At this point he quotes two pertinent passages,

one from President Wilson's speech at the first annual meeting of the League to Enforce Peace, and the other from Mr. Hughes' speech accepting the Republican nomination. Resuming his article, he concludes with the pregnant words: "The creation of some international alliance embracing all the peace-loving nations could hardly succeed without the co-operation of the greatest of all neutral nations. With that co-operation, difficult as the effort to construct such a scheme will be, there is at least a real hope of success. Largely in vain will this war have been fought and all these sufferings endured if the peoples of the world are to fall back into a state of permanent alarm, suspicion, and hostility, each weighed down by the frightful burden of armaments. Let us hope that the proffered help of America will encourage the statesmen of Europe and draw from them a responsive note."

He adds, that "if the opportunity which the close of the present conflict will offer for the provision of means to avert future wars be lost, another such may never reappear, and the condition of the world will have grown worse, because the recurrence of like calamities will have been recognised as a thing to be expected, and their causes as beyond all human cure."—*Article in the American edition of the Manchester Guardian for October 3, 1916, on "The United States During and After the War."*

THE PLATFORMS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES

The two leading political parties in the United States have both endorsed the idea of the League in their official platforms. The plank in the Democratic platform for 1916 reads as follows: "The circumstances of the last two years have revealed necessities of international action which no former generation could have foreseen. We hold that it is the duty of the United States to use its power, not only to make itself safe at home, but also to make secure its just interests throughout the world; and, both for this end and in the interest of humanity, to assist the world in securing settled peace and justice. We believe . . . that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression or disregard of the rights of peoples and nations; and we believe that the time has come when it is the duty of the United States to join with the other nations of the world in any feasible association that will effectively serve those principles, to maintain inviolate the complete security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all nations."

The Republican platform says: "We believe in the pacific settlement of international disputes and favour the establishment of a world court for that purpose."

THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES

In November, 1915, the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (which has a membership of 350,000), sent out a referendum on the subject of the several proposals of the League to Enforce Peace, e.g.:

I. The Committee recommends action to secure conferences among neutral countries, on the initiative of the United States, for the purpose of defining and enunciating rules which will at all times give due protection to life and property upon the high seas.

II. The Committee recommends that for the decision of questions which arise between nations and which can be resolved upon the application of established rules or upon a determination of facts the United States should take the initiative in joining with other nations in establishing an International Court.

III. The Committee recommends that for consideration of questions which arise between nations and which do not depend upon established rules or upon facts which can be determined by an International Court the United States should take the initiative in joining with other nations in establishing a Council of Conciliation.

IV. The Committee recommends that the United States should take the initiative in joining

with other nations in agreeing to bring concerted economic pressure to bear upon any nation or nations which resort to military measures without submitting their differences to an International Court or a Council of Conciliation, and awaiting the decision of the Court or the recommendation of the Council, as circumstances make the more appropriate.

V. The Committee recommends that the United States take the initiative in joining with other countries in agreeing to use concerted military force in the event that concerted economic pressure exercised by the signatory nations is not sufficient to compel nations which have proceeded to war to desist from military operations and submit the questions at issue to an International Court or a Council of Conciliation, as circumstances make the more appropriate.

VI. The Committee recommends that the United States should take the initiative in establishing the principle of frequent international conferences at expressly stated intervals for the progressive amendment of international law.

In response, over 96 per cent. of the vote was in favour of the proposition that the United States take the initiative in securing periodic international conferences for the purpose of codifying international law to meet new and changed conditions. A majority of more than two-thirds voted to approve of the proposition that this country take the in-

itiative in forming a league of nations under a treaty agreeing to submit justiciable questions arising between any of its members to an international court, and non-justiciable questions to a council of conciliation for their respective decision or recommendation, before resorting to war. The vote in favour of the third proposal of the League amounted to a very considerable majority of the total membership, though a little short of the two-thirds necessary for official endorsement.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF LABOUR, MR. SAMUEL GOMPERS

“Above and beyond the desire of America’s workers to secure a settlement that will safeguard the material interests of themselves and the nation is their desire to see a settlement that will render war less probable and peace more permanent in the future; for the interests of the men and women of labour are identified with those of peace. War has always meant to them sacrifice and suffering and the bearing of heavy burdens after the war. Working people have bought with their flesh and blood the right to a voice in determining the issues of peace and war; and in the general reorganisation that will follow the present war, the workers will insist upon having voice and influence. . . . In any programme looking toward the establishment of more permanent peace among nations, labour will insist upon the following principles:

"1. It must be a programme under which the military forces of the world will be rescued from the dictation of arbitrary autocracy and secret diplomacy and dedicated to the maintenance of a higher standard of morals, law and justice.

"2. It must be a programme elastic enough to admit of those fundamental changes that the growing life of the world makes inevitable.

"3. It must be a programme under which the small nation, as well as the large nation, will have a free hand in every just and individual development; a programme that will make it impossible for a few strong nations to dictate the policies and development of the world.

"4. It must be a programme that will give the masses preater influence in those decisions that plunge nations into war.

"5. It must be a programme under which the international machinery that is created will afford a medium through which all classes of society can voice their judgment and register their demands. . . .

"Insofar as the programme of the League to Enforce Peace represents an effort to meet the conditions I have outlined, it demands the interest and careful scrutiny of every man who has the interests of labour at heart. . . . Evidence is daily accumulating that some such a League of Nations is practically certain to be formed, if not at the end of this war, in the not far distant future. The

bitter experience of this war will prove to all nations that the system of small group alliances, armed to the teeth and eternally growling at each other, is a poor way to run the business of the world. Since such a Court or League as contemplated appears to be the inevitable goal toward which the whole evolution of law and government is tending, the labouring men of this and every other nation will feel it their duty and privilege to lift their voice in counsel at every step of the plans and propaganda, in order to make more certain the triumph of democratic principles and methods in whatever final form such an international institution may take."

THE SOCIALIST GROUP IN THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT

"The Socialist group in the French Parliament takes note with joy of the admirable message of President Wilson to the American Senate. The conception of peace founded upon the free will of peoples, and not upon force of arms, should be or should become the charter of the civilised universe. Upon this affirmation of justice, an inheritance from our revolutionary traditions and of our international congresses, President Wilson confers to-day a new and immense prestige. And it is the more necessary at this time that democrats of all nations, wherever they may be, should rise against imperialistic ambitions and against their bloody

and ruinous consequences. The Socialist group will request insistently that the French Government affirm clearly its accord with the high words of reason of President Wilson. To prepare and hasten an early and just ending of the present war and to assure a future of peaceful civilisation, the Socialist group asks the representatives of all belligerent nations to press upon their leaders a trial in good faith of the noble experiment offered to humanity by the head of the great American Republic."—*Resolution Unanimously Adopted by the Eighty-nine Socialist Deputies, January 26, 1917.*

THE BRITISH LABOUR CONFERENCE

"Resolved that all the British representatives at the peace conference should work for the formation of an international league to enforce the maintenance of peace on the plan advocated by the President of the United States and approved by the British Foreign Secretary."—*Resolution Unanimously Adopted at Manchester, January 27, 1917.*

THE PRESIDENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

DR. A. LAWRENCE LOWELL

"A breach of the world's peace, like a breach of domestic peace, is an offence against public order which the public ought to have some right to prevent. Nations that go to war break the peace of the world, and the world has at least a right to

insist on knowing the reason for the war. It has a right to go further and demand that peace shall not be broken until an opportunity has been given to ascertain where justice lies; to try mediation and arbitration; and to consider calmly whether or not the matter at issue requires the sacrifice of war. In saying that the world has a right to insist upon this, we mean that it is justified in compelling nations to go to arbitration and state their case before they take up arms. But in order that the compulsion may be effective, the method of enforcement must be certain, and sufficient for the purpose. In the terrible face of war there is no use in shaking the rattle of an unarmed watchman or in convening councils that talk and will not act. . . . No single country can enforce a *Pax Romana* on the modern world; to attempt it would be to make itself a Don Quixote in search of perilous adventures, to suffer defeat and become a laughing stock. It can be undertaken only by a league of nations strong enough and trustworthy enough to overawe any single state or combination of states that might venture to disregard its law of peace and war. Whether such a league can be formed or not, we do not know. The question bristles with difficulties for statesmen and international lawyers, which there is no use in attempting to minimise, and which requires learning, skill, patience and good will to solve. But one thing we do know — that such a league is not possible unless our country is

willing to join it; nay, more, unless we take a prominent part in its formation. . . . We are faced by the alternatives of standing aloof from the rest of the world, if we can, defending ourselves and working out our destinies by the strength of our own arm, if we must, a stranger and perchance an Ishmaelite among the nations; or of taking our part, if we may, in shaping with others the progress of mankind and helping with them to bring order and peace over the earth as the waters cover the sea."

PROFESSOR JOHN BATES CLARK, DIRECTOR CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

"The world demands a league of some kind for preserving peace, and, for the first time, much of the world expects to get it. . . . There is a highway in sight, along which unfriendly nations can walk, if they will, toward and finally to, the realm of fraternal union. They *must* make treaties of peace and *can* make treaties of arbitration. In due time they can co-operate in putting life into the institutions at The Hague. . . . They can develop and codify International Law. They must resume their economic activities and can so direct them that causes of friction shall gradually be reduced and common interests shall be magnified. They can hold conferences at intervals and let them become, as decade after decade shall pass, more frequent and influential. In the end, let us pro-

foundly hope, a single, strong and binding League of Nations can be created with every institution foreshadowed by the programme of our own organisation, and others besides, all buttressed by common interests and vitalised by community of feeling."

PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS OF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

"If war is to cease, there must be forecasting in a larger way than would suffice to prepare one nation only for defence. There must be agreeing action by many nations collectively strong enough to restrain any power that would break the peace — as the single state is strong enough to restrain the criminal individual, or the forces of local insurrection. The strength of the restraining group must be more than moral; it must be the strength of physical force. A League to pass resolutions, and to offer advice, will not avail; it must be a league to enforce peace. The preamble and the platform which the League to Enforce Peace has adopted, state the simple, obvious conclusions of experience. Throughout five thousand years of recorded history peace, here and there established, has been kept, and its area has been widened, in one way only. Individuals have combined their efforts to suppress violence in the local community. Communities have co-operated to maintain the authoritative state and to preserve peace within its

borders. States have formed leagues or confederations, or have otherwise co-operated, to establish peace among themselves. Always peace has been made and kept, when made and kept at all, by the superior power of superior numbers acting in unity for the common good. Mindful of this teaching of experience, we believe and solemnly urge that the time has come to devise and to create a working union of sovereign nations to establish peace among themselves and to guarantee it by all known and available sanctions at their command, to the end that civilisation may be conserved, and the progress of mankind in comfort, enlightenment and happiness may continue."

THE FACTS IN THE HULL AFFAIR

“IN 1904 Japan and Russia were at war in the Far East. On October 20, 1904, the Baltic fleet, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, left Cape Skagen on its trip to the Sea of Japan to meet the enemy. On October 23 steam fishing trawlers put into Hull, England, bearing the bodies of two men killed, six wounded fishermen, and bringing the report that the trawler *Crane* was sunk and that five other vessels had suffered serious damage. All casualties were due to firing by the Russian fleet, the earliest news from which was to the effect that it had been attacked by Japanese torpedo boats mingling with the Hull trawlers on the Dogger Bank. England pooh-poohed the story, and the national ire rose. On October 23, at Hull, inquest was held on the bodies of the dead fishermen, and the jury's expression of their sense of the gravity of the situation accurately reflected British public opinion. On November 2 the Board of Trade initiated an inquiry which lasted from November 16 to 20, and adjourned *sine die* after taking depositions. Between the time when the Board of Trade inquiry was initiated and its actual work The Hague Convention had doubtless saved a war. At the outset

the Russian fleet's act was described as 'an unwarrantable action,' an unspeakable and unparalleled and cruel outrage,' etc. Yet not a week had passed since the fateful Sunday when Britain learned the news until Premier Balfour announced in Parliament on October 28 that the whole matter was to be referred to an International Commission of Inquiry. As early as November 7 the terms of the convention submitting the question were correctly known to the world, and within another week British passions had subsided. On November 24, 1904, the convention was signed, its Article 2 reading,—The Commission shall inquire into and report on all the circumstances relative to the North Sea incident, and particularly as to where the responsibility lies and the degree of blame attaching to the subjects of the two high contracting parties, or to the subjects of other countries in the event of their responsibility being established by the inquiry.

“It can be seen at a glance that these terms of reference gave the commission jurisdiction far beyond the rendering of a report of the facts, which alone is stipulated by The Hague Convention. [It may be pertinent to quote at this point a note on this subject found in Mr. Woolf's *International Government* (p. 73): “A Commission of Inquiry is technically not arbitration. As Mr. Higgins points out in his book, *The Hague Peace Conferences*, the terms of reference to the Dogger Bank Commission were wider than those contemplated in Article 14

of the Convention of 1899. The Convention limited the report of the International Committee to 'a statement of facts.' The Dogger Bank Commission not only made a statement of the facts in dispute — namely (1) that the firing was unjustifiable; (2) that the Commander of the Fleet was responsible; and (3) that the facts were 'not of a nature to cast any discredit on the humanity' of Russian officers. It is important to remember that the Commission was composed of five naval officers and two jurists (the latter being assessors without votes); it was therefore an International Court-martial or Court composed of experts. 'It is doubtful,' writes Sir Frederick Pollock, 'whether a formal tribunal of jurists and diplomatists could have handled this delicate affair so well, if at all.'"] Yet fixing responsibility is not essentially a juridic attribute. The convention of reference in other respects followed the provisions of The Hague, and named Paris as the place for sitting. Admiral Dubassov was the Russian member, and Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Beaumont the British. By the convention the Governments of France and the United States were to name two commissioners, the persons selected being Rear-Admiral Fournier and Rear-Admiral Charles Henry Davis. These four chose the fifth and president, Admiral von Spaun, of Austria.

"The Commission met on December 22, and on February 26, 1905, its report was published. The

majority of the commissioners, the Russian dissenting, found that, 'being of opinion that there was no torpedo boat either among the trawlers nor on the spot, the fire opened by Admiral Rozhdestvensky was not justifiable'; that 'the responsibility for this act and the results of the cannonade sustained by the fishing fleet rests with Admiral Rozhdestvensky.' On March 9 the Russian ambassador handed to Lord Lansdowne, secretary of state for foreign affairs, the sum of £65,000 as the amount of indemnity due to Hull fishermen. On March 24 the Board of Trade published its report on the depositions taken from November 16 to 20, fixing the amount of damages at £60,000, so that the Russian payment more than covered the damages."—*Denys P. Myers in a pamphlet published by the World Peace Foundation, November, 1913, Vol. III, No. 1, Part 1.*

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eclecticism. It looks into the future far as human
eye can see, but no farther. It does not fail to recog-
nize the ultimate truth of the pacifists' position—as
a consummation devoutly to be wished. . . . It should
be plainly written down and underscored in red that
the League has no diagram of duty for the nations, no
pattern on the mount, no plans and specifications for
constructing at The Hague, or on any other site any-
where on the planet, an ideal world order. No effort
is made by the League to cloak the obvious fact that
its proposals do not constitute an ideal arrangement.
It probably would be better to require all the nations
to accept and abide by the decisions of the established
courts and councils. But there are plenty of courses
of action that are theoretically preferable to those that
are practically possible, and it is the conscious desire
and determined will of the League not to attempt more
than can be achieved. The thing of paramount impor-
tance just now is not to perform the miracle of spon-
taneous international government, but to take the next
step in the direction of world order. To some it may
be discouraging that more is not attempted, but if
this much is both attempted and achieved, there is
no one who will deny that it is infinitely better than
the present anarchy and the almost certain recurrence
of wars."—CHAPTER XII.